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Matching faces across rotations in view and lighting 
Abstract 
It is important to look at the combined effects of lighting and view direction on face recognition, as both 
depend on the three dimensional shape of the face and are in some ways analogous. For example, both 
pitch rotations and the change between top and bottom lighting involve rotations about the left-right axis, 
just as yaw and left/right lighting involved rotations about the vertical axis. We investigated identity 
matching performance across 45° rotations of the light source or the face about pitch or yaw with all 
images shown either upright or inverted. Upright images were better matched than inverted images, 
showing that image differences are not sufficient to explain performance. This is consistent with the idea 
that the use of class-based knowledge of upright faces is important for this task. The effects of face and 
light rotation interacted and depended on the axis of rotation. Overall, rotations about pitch impaired 
performance more than rotations about yaw, and changes in view impaired performance more than 
changes in light. The interaction between face and light rotation was such that if both rotated in the same 
direction, equivalent to a rotation of the camera in the opposite direction, performance was as good or 
better than if the face alone rotated. This was particularly pronounced for pitch rotations, with a clear 
pitch up advantage but only when the light rotated in the same direction. The results are interpreted in 
terms of image, surface and three-dimensional models based accounts of face matching. 
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ABSTRACTS: Paper presentations
Choreography on the couch: The role of psychological intervention in the choreographic process of Incarna
Adams, Neil
The Faculty of VCA and Music   University 
of Melbourne
nmadams@unimelb.edu.au
Dance and Cognitive ScienceThursday 2.10-2.30 Room #1
This paper will discuss the transactional nature and creative outcomes of the psychological intervention in the chorographic process of 
Incarna
The making of Incarna employed a number of strategies deliberately designed to disrupt and modify aspects of my choreographic 
process that I deemed to have become entrenched, and which were likely to produce predictable choreographic outcomes as regards 
my oeuvre.  One key strategy was the psychological intervention into the process carried out by psychologist and dance artist Dr. Beth 
Shelton.   
The intervention aimed to analyse the emergent choreographic materials and the participantsʼ understanding of the generative imagery 
and ideas driving the process.  It was anticipated that the intervention would productively deepen all the participantsʼ understandings of 
their relationship with the imagistic basis and emerging form of the work.  Dr. Shelton's intervention was designed to act as a change-
agent within the choreographic process.
The intervention encompassed observation of emergent form and content, discursive analysis and interpretation of the materials and 
process, feedback sessions and interviews, and improvisational workshops based on the imagistic realm of the work.  During the 
process great care was taken to focus the intervention on the nature of the work and not on the individual participantsʼ psychological 
profiles.
Incarna (2005) was presented as the folio component of my Ph.D. candidature, Victorian College of the Arts, University of Melbourne.
This paper was prepared in consultation with Dr. Shelton and is presented with her permission.
Simplest minds
Aitken, Ashley
Curtin University of Technology
ashley.aitken@cbs.curtin.edu.au
Navigation and RepresentationThursday 2.50-3.10 Room #3
Do primitive animals like earthworms or insects have minds or a form of language? They obviously don't have minds or language like 
humans do, but perhaps they have some minimal form of mind and language of mind, if not a verbal language.
There is a long history of creating simple machines with simple "nervous" systems that respond to their environment, e.g. 
[ Braitenberg ]. But what is the minimum requirement for such a machine to have a mind, and what does that exactly mean. The 
computational theory of mind [ Fodor, Pylyshyn ] proposes clearly what is required of a system to have a mind, particularly, the 
existence of a physical and non-trivial symbolic and semantic levels of description.
This paper considers what may be the "simplest minds" by describing from the ground up what would be the simplest wiring and 
functionality to enable a creature, animat, robot, system, whatever you wish to call it, to have a computational mind. Although the terms 
"awareness," "self-awareness," and "consciousness" have a long history in philosophical discourse, this paper gives them pragmatic 
definitions in relation to these simplest machines and possibly simplest minds.
The machines that are described herein aren't executable and don't run. The paper more precisely defines the simplest class of 
machines that it is argued could be claimed to have some sort of simple computational mind. Although this paper doesn't provide the 
functions necessary to produce a mind (although we see no theoretical reason why they could not be proposed), it does attempt to set 
some lower limits on what physical systems could have a mind.
One result relates to the fact that to have a non-trivial semantic level requires at least eight physical states (e.g. eight physical sensory 
states, that can be within one sensor or spread across multiple sensors). Similar results are explained for the motor states of a simple 
machine and for the internal states that relate more closely to mental states and the language of mind (with the added requirement of 
the combinatorial nature of language).
The conclusion of the paper is that the continuum of minds that naturally exists within the class of computational systems starts with 
some very simple systems, systems that perhaps we wouldn't have attributed minds and language (of the mind) previously.
ABSTRACTS: Paper presentations
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Relational processing following stroke
Andrews, Glenda David Shum, Graeme S. Halford, Mark Chappell, Damian P. Birney
Griffith University, Gold Coast
g.andrews@griffith.edu.au
Applications of relational complexity theory to the study of fluid cognitive functionsWednesday 4.00-4.20 Room #1
Relational processing underpins higher cognitive functions including reasoning and problem solving, which are important in many 
contexts. Prefrontal brain regions have been implicated in relational processing and their involvement increases as task complexity 
increases. We examined relational processing in 47 persons with brain damage due to stoke and 41 control participants of comparable 
age and education. We assessed relational processing using four tasks (Card sorting, Sentence comprehension, Latin Square, N-
Back) each with items at two or three levels of complexity. These complexity manipulations were based on Relational Complexity 
Theory, in which binary-, ternary-, and quaternary-relational tasks require integration of two, three and four variables respectively. The 
stroke group was impaired relative to control group at all three complexity levels. Within the stroke group, persons with frontal lobe 
lesions were more impaired than those with lesions to other brain regions, especially at higher (ternary- and quaternary-relational) 
complexity levels. Multiple regression analyses showed that working memory capacity (letter-number sequencing) predicted complex 
relational processing after controlling for less complex relational processing and group (stroke, control). Complex relational processing 
appears to demand working memory resources and to depend on the integrity of the frontal lobes. The findings are consistent with 
previous research in cognitive development, cognitive aging and neuro-imaging. They demonstrate the usefulness of theoretically 
based manipulations of task complexity.
Prior sensitivity in Bayesian model selection techniques
Averell, Lee Andrew Heathcote, Scott Brown
University of Newcastle
lee.averell@newcastle.edu.au
Computational models of cognitionWednesday 3.20-3.40 Room #1
One of the primary aims of cognitive psychology is to select which, of several competing models, best characterises a particular 
cognitive process. Ideally the selected model is able to generalise to as yet unseen data from either individuals within the study 
(sample based inference) or to new participants (population based inference) with the particular focus being determined by the 
research objectives (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin & van der Linde, 2002). Recently, Bayesian analysis along with Bayesian model 
selection techniques have been favoured over traditional maximum likelihood techniques because the Bayesian techniques offer 
complexity penalties which can improve generalization. However, Bayesian model selection techniques can be sensitive to the choice 
of prior distributions (Sinharay & Stern, 2002), an issue that has largely been ignored thus far in cognitive science (c.f. Liu & Aitkin, 
2008). Here we present the results of a prior sensitivity analysis in model selection of forgetting data. We address both sample and 
population focus using posterior deviance based selection criteria (Liu & Aitkin, Spiegelhalter et al., Raftery, Newton, Satagopam, & 
Krivitsky (2007)). The priors used are typical of those used in current research and range from moderately informative to quite vague. 
We find that in some cases results depend on focus, choice of priors and criteria. Possible solutions to this problem are discussed.  
Reference 
Lui, C & Aitkin, M (2008). Bayes Factors: prior sensitivity and model generalizability. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 52, 362-375.
Raftery, A.E., Newton, M.A., Satagopam, J.M. & Krivitsky, P.N (2007). Estimating the integrated likelihood via posterior simulation using 
the harmonic mean identity. Bayesian Statistics, 8, 1-45.
Sinharay, S. & Stern, H. (2002) On the sensitivity of Bayes factors to prior distributions.  American Statistical Association, 77, 325-334.
Spiegelhalter, D. J., Best, N. G., Carlin, B. P., & van der Linde (2002). Bayesian Measures of model complexity and fit. Journal of The 
Royal Statistical Society, 64, 583-639.
Perceiving musical change: Nothing more than a response to physical sound intensity?
Bailes, Freya Roger T. Dean
University of Western Sydney
f.bailes@uws.edu.au
Thursday 3.30-3.50 Room #3
A strong positive real-time relationship between loudness and tension in music (Krumhansl, 1996) and loudness and arousal (e.g. 
Schubert, 2001) has been claimed. Given that intensity is a dominant determinant of perceived loudness (e.g. Geringer, 1993, 1995), 
we use physical measures of intensity to study, in greater detail, listenersʼ real-time perceptions of change in music. The primary aim of 
the study was to determine the relationship between physical measures of music and listenersʼ continuous measures of structure using 
time series analyses. Thirty-two participants, ranging in musical experience (16 non-musicians and 16 musicians), listened to musical 
works of approximately three minutes duration. They were instructed to indicate when the music seemed to change by moving the 
mouse for the duration of the change, and at the rate of change. No definition of change was provided to the participants, as the study 
aimed to explore how this instruction might be interpreted. Mouse velocity every 500 ms was sampled for comparison with the intensity 
profile of each piece (dB). Detailed time series analyses were conducted using ARIMAX and VARX models. The intensity profile of the 
stimuli was found to significantly influence listenersʼ perceptions of change in the music. Determining Granger causality and cross-
correlations between intensity and perceived change provided additional support for this relationship. In conclusion, detailed time-
series analyses provide supporting evidence that physical intensity significantly influences the perceived structural changes that 




Hippocampal, parahippocampal and striatal neuronal activity predicts object-location retrieval during active navigation
Baumann, Oliver E. Chan, J. B. Mattingley
The University of Queensland
o.baumann@uq.edu.au
Thursday 1.50-2.10 Room #3
In humans, several cortical and subcortical circuits have been implicated in object-location memory and navigation, but it remains 
unclear how these areas contribute to the distinct processes of encoding and retrieval of object-locations in three-dimensional space. 
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure neural responses during active navigation within an immersive 
virtual environment. Healthy male volunteers were asked to encode the location of a single target object relative to a small set of 
landmarks and, following a delay period, to retrieve that location from memory by navigating back to the targetʼs original position. The 
relative and absolute locations of landmarks and the target object were changed on every trial, and no feedback on accuracy was 
provided. Within subjects, encoding related activity within the right hippocampus and the parahippocampal gyrus bilaterally predicted 
more accurate navigation subsequently to the hidden target object. By contrast, during the retrieval phase, more accurate performance 
was associated with increased activity in the left hippocampus and the striatum bilaterally. Between subjects, average accuracy and 
consistency of responses was associated with higher levels of retrieval related activity in the striatum and parietal cortex. Stronger 
striatal activity in good navigators might reflect a procedural component of the learning and retrieval process that is predominantly 
active in good navigators. Whereby greater parietal activity in good navigators might indicate a more effective spatial updating process 
present in these individuals. In summary, our findings suggest separate neural substrates for the encoding and retrieval stages, which 
are further modulated by participantsʼ overall navigational ability. 




Thursday 12.10-12.30 Room #3
The two experiments in this study investigate the accuracy of the feeling-of-knowing (FOK) ratings as a prediction for information 
available in memory to be retrieved. FOK is the relative belief that the correct answer or information necessary for a response is 
available in memory and will be recalled once a question is posed (James, 1890). 
The first experiment replicates Schwartz and Metcalfeʼs 1992 study utilizing the recall, judgment, recognition design (RJR) developed 
by Hart (1965). Each subject completed a three phased experiment following a word pleasantness rating task designed to prime half of 
the words (stimuli) later used in the experiment. For the first phase of the experiment, subjects were instructed to read a list of word 
pairs (e.g., sun - fun) out loud; in the second phase, subjects were given one half of the word pair from the previous list (e.g., sun) and 
asked to recall the other word from memory (e.g., fun). If the subject was unable to recall the correct response, then they were 
instructed to provide an FOK rating; a number representing a percentage between 0 and 100 as to what they believed their chances of 
recalling the correct response were if given a multiple choice recognition test. Finally in the third phase subjects were given a 
recognition memory test. 
The results confirm both the accuracy of FOK as a prediction of information available in memory retrieval and the cue familiarity 
hypothesis. The cue familiarity hypothesis describes the process of memory retrieval as a cue recognition process. 
The methodologies for the first and second experiment are identical with the exception of the initial priming task. In the second 
experiment, subjects observed a list of masked cues flash on a screen, and indicated whether or not the cue was a real word, or just 
random letters. The second study evaluated the possibility that divided attention (e.g., attempting to focus on stimuli amid other 
distracting stimuli) during memory encoding can enhance the accuracy of an FOK prediction. A masked cue priming task was utilized 
as an attention distracter. The results indicate that FOK was better enhanced under conditions of masked priming, lending support to 
the hypothesis that actually enhances an individualʼs FOK sensation.
Toward a sociocognitive approach to the construction of the moral self in autobiographical memory
Bietti, Lucas Manuel
Macquarie University / Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra
lucas.bietti@ling.mq.edu.au
Friday 3.30-3.50 Room #3
Not only antisocial individuals who do not feel empathy, guilt or remorse are able to commit horrible and deeply immoral acts towards 
others. Normal individuals with a well-developed sense of morality are also able to commit such acts. Furthermore, many people are 
able to (at least to some extent) justify their immoral or offensive acts towards others and by doing so they sustain a view of 
themselves as morally good people. Admitting to oneself that one is a bad person constitutes damage to the self concept that is to hard 
to bear and the perpetrator therefore looks incessantly for alternative paths to resolve this internal inconsistency.  The aim of this paper 
is to empirically investigate how this state of cognitive dissonance is overcome in real world-settings; an open-ended interview 
conducted in March 2008 to a retired police officer who served during the 1976-1983 dictatorship in Argentina.  
The construction of the moral self is closely associated with a positive self-representation. This representation is sustained by a 
coherent autobiographical memory. It is created in accordance with a cognitive representation of the context that controls the ways of 
representing oneself in relation to the environment.  
ABSTRACTS: Paper presentations
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Fluid cognitive functions underlying multi-process tasks: A relational complexity perspective on segmentation
Birney, Damian P. Leonardo Gabales, David B. Bowman
Accelerated Learning Laboratory, University 
of New South Wales
d.birney@unsw.edu.au
Applications of relational complexity theory to the study of fluid cognitive functionsWednesday 4.20-4.40 Room #1
A relation is a binding between elements in working memory (WM). According to relational complexity (RC) theory, one way cognitive 
demand of a task can be reduced is through segmentation, the decomposition of a relation into multiple less complex relations that are 
integrated in series. Instantiation of a relation can be seen as synonymous with a processing step. Because segmentation entails serial 
processing where earlier processing steps must be maintained in WM to be used in subsequent steps, it implicates cognitive functions 
outside the scope of RC theory (e.g., strategic maintenance). However, given RC theory formalises the processing demand of tasks, it 
provides a basis for investigation of processing capacity separated from other fluid cognitive functions, such as controlled attention and 
memory. Study 1 (N=142) investigated segmentation in two tasks. In the Latin Square task, the requirement for segmentation was 
manipulated across three levels of RC. In the Letter Swaps task, RC was held constant and five levels of segmentation were 
considered. Fluid cognitive function (Gf) was assessed using Ravenʼs matrices test. Increases in task complexity and segmentation 
were expected to lead to more errors and longer decision times; and to performance differences that would be predicted by individual 
differences in Gf. Results indicated processes underlying segmentation were a significant source of individual differences over and 
above RC. Study 2 (N=86) explored the controlled attention/maintenance aspect of segmentation from an alternative perspective. 
Explicit memory load was manipulated in the Greco-Latin Square task across three levels of RC. Either 0, 1 or 3 cells in the square 
matrix were highlighted. The elements from the highlighted cells were then removed and the target cell was identified. Because 
removed elements were a) critical to solution, and b) could not be re-instantiated if lost, it was hypothesised that memory load would 
interact with RC to the extent that strategic maintenance of the elements would draw on processing capacity required to instantiate 
relations to solve the task. Results showed no such interaction. Implications for controlled attention, relational processing, and WM 
frameworks are discussed.
On criticality and perception in the human brain
Breakspear, Michael Mika Rubinov, Olaf Sporns, J. P. Thivierge
Queensland Institute for Medical Research
michael.breakspear@qimr.edu.au
Computational Neuroscience: Modelling brain structure and functionWednesday 11.40-12.00 Room #1
Functional neuroimaging experiments confirm that cognition reflects activity in large-scale, distributed neural systems. On the other 
hand, invasive electrophysiology show that sensory perception is often critically dependent on precise activity in microscopic neural 
circuits. In this talk, we present experimental evidence and a computational framework which addresses the apparent dilemma 
concerning the breadth of scales in the human brain. In particular, detailed analysis of human EEG data acquired from subjects at rest 
provides evidence that cortical activity evolves in a ʻcriticalʼ  state whereby system fluctuations occurring at the very smallest scale are 
able to cascade up scales, occasionally even gaining strength as they do so. That is, unlike a ʻsubcriticalʼ  system, small scale 
fluctuations do not disperse, but neither do they inevitably cause macroscopic synchronization as in a ʻsupercriticalʼ  seizure. This 
process permits some small scale fluctuations to be cause coherent, macroscopic state fluctuations. Using a hierarchical model of 
spiking neurons, with spike-time-dependent plasticity, we show how such multiscale fluctuations arise and how their presence requires 
only a sparse number of metabolically costly, long-range myelinated axons. This approach allows us to also study disorders involving 
cortico-cortical connectivity such as occuring in schizophrenia and dementia.
An MEG study of sentence context effects in auditory word processing
Brock, Jon
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science
jbrock@maccs.mq.edu.au
Friday 10.30-10.50 Room #2
In studies of auditory and visual word processing, a negative deflection in the event-related potential, the N400, is observed between 
300 and 500 msecs after the word onset. The N400 is reliably associated with the wordʼs predictability based on preceding sentence 
context. However, its neural generators remain obscure. In this study, we used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to investigate the 
N400m – the magnetic counterpart of the N400. Participants listened to semantically congruous sentences in which the predictability of 
the final word was manipulated (e.g., “The little girl cuddled her doll” versus “Miss Black knew about the doll”). As expected, the N400m 
was considerably larger for low- than for high-predictability words. Spectral analyses also revealed an event-related desynchronization 
(ERD) in the beta frequency band (13-30 Hz) during the same time window as the N400m that was specific to the low predictability 
condition. Both the N400m and the beta desynchronization were localized to the left superior temporal lobe by co-registering MEG data 
with structural MRI scans for each participant. Ongoing coherence analyses aim to identify the brain regions that interact with superior 
temporal lobe to produce these context effects. Future studies will investigate the neural basis of impaired context-processing deficits 
in individuals with developmental language difficulties and autism.
ABSTRACTS: Paper presentations
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Heuristic vs Bayesian Models of Decision-Making
Brown, Scott E. J. Wagenmakers, Mark Steyvers
University of Newcastle
scott.brown@newcastle.edu.au
Computational models of cognitionWednesday 3.00-3.20 Room #1
Most decision-making research has focused on choices between two alternatives. For choices between many alternatives, the primary 
result is Hick's Law - that mean response time increases logarithmically with the number of alternatives. Various models for this result 
exist within specific paradigms, and there are some more general theoretical results, but none of those have been tested stringently 
against data. We present an experimental paradigm that supports detailed examination of multi-choice data, and analyze predictions 
from a Bayesian ideal-observer model for this paradigm. Data from the experiment deviate from the predictions of the Bayesian model 
in interesting ways. A simple heuristic model based on evidence accumulation provides a good account for the data, and has attractive 
properties as a limit case of the Bayesian model.
Expression processing is identity-dependent and identity-independent
Burke, Darren Jamie Campbell
Macquarie University
darren.burke@mq.edu.au
Wednesday 11.40-12.00 Room #2
Major cognitive and neural models of face perception maintain that the mechanisms underlying the extraction of facial expression and 
facial identity information involve separable visual systems. Using the visual adaptation paradigm, we explored the sensitivity of happy, 
sad, angry, disgusted and fearful facial expressions to changes in identity. Contrary to what would be predicted by traditional face 
perception models, larger expression aftereffects were produced when the identity of the adapting and test stimuli was the same 
compared to when the identity differed, suggesting the involvement of identity-dependent neurons in processing these expressions. 
However, for all five expressions, the aftereffects remained significant when the adapting and test stimuli differed in identity, suggesting 
the involvement of identity-independent neural populations. The extent to which the aftereffect transferred across changes in identity 
was the same for all emotional expressions. Consequently, there is no evidence that the processing of different facial expressions 
depends on facial identity differentially
Homophone vs. cohort competitors in predictive sentences: Time-course of language-mediated eye movements.
Calacouris, Samantha Jon Brock
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science
scalacou@maccs.mq.edu.au
Friday 11.10-11.30 Room #2
This study used eyetracking to measure the effects of sentence context on the unfolding process of spoken word identification. It is 
unclear from previous research whether sentence context affects the processing of spoken words and whether the effect is immediate 
or delayed. Huettig and Altmann (2004) presented sentences containing a homophone (e.g. pen). Participants tended to look at objects 
corresponding to both meanings of the homograph (writing pen, pig pen), even when the sentence context was biased towards one 
interpretation. This suggests that both meanings of a homophone are activated, regardless of context. However, other studies show 
that on hearing a target word (e.g. button) the tendency to look at a cohort competitor (e.g. butter) disappears if the competitor does 
not fit the sentence context (Brock & Nation, 2009; Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2004). The discrepancy between these findings may reflect 
differences in the way homophones are processed compared with other words, or may simply reflect differences in sentence context 
used across studies. In the present study, we directly compare the effect of the same sentence context on eye-movements directed at 
homophone and cohort competitors. Participants hear sentences such as ʻWhen Mark coughed he felt a pain in his chest so he 
decided to call the doctorʼ while viewing a display containing either a homophone competitor (e.g. a treasure chest) or a cohort 
competitor (e.g. a cheque). Results will shed light on the process of spoken word identification in typical populations and will provide 








Wednesday 12.20-12.40 Room #3
The sense of agency over bodily actions is the feeling that one is the agent of oneʼs actions. It is to be distinguished from the sense of 
acting intentionally in that it is about oneself qua agent of action not oneʼs mental states which seem to lead to the action. Those 
suffering from delusions of alien control have a deficit in eliciting this sense. In this paper I examine the prospects of Frith and 
colleaguesʼ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency over oneʼs bodily actions is elicited, in comparison to the 
multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues in response to some problems with this account. Here I provide 
the strongest argument possible for a version of the comparator model. I take it that these models aim to explain the sense of agency 
over oneʼs bodily actions and the deficitʼs in delusions of control. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the 
actual sensory consequences of action arenʼt needed to elicit the sense of agency. Following this I argue that the comparator model is 
able to provide an explanation of the sense of agency and the behavioural deficits displayed by those who have a deficit in this sense. 
However, there are considerable case-by-case modifications that need to be made to the model for this to work. Following this I argue 
that there is some confirmatory evidence for the p model in the behaviour of normal subjects when sensory feedback is unexpectedly 
altered and examine how this model may account for the findings of the ʻhelping handsʼ, ʻI-spyʼ and ʻwheel of fortuneʼ studies which 
some take to be problematic for this model.  Again, from these arguments it appears that the comparator model needs case by case 
adjustment to deal with problematic data. In the end we get several versions of the comparator model with no principled way of 
distinguishing between them or predicting when one will hold. To deal with this the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and 
colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete a single version can be offered which is naturally constrained by the cases 
which are problematic for the comparator model. However, it is not clear what, if anything, could count as evidence against the 
multifactorial weighting model. Despite being generated with the data in mind it may be untestable. I conclude that currently the 
comparator model has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model.
The influence of alignment on object-location memory within a virtual environment
Chan, Edgar Oliver Baumann, Mark Bellgrove, Jason B. Mattingley
University of Queensland
echan@psy.uq.edu.au
Thursday 2.10-2.30 Room #3
An enduring question in research on human navigation is whether memory for object locations in the environment is viewpoint-
dependent or viewpoint-independent. One line of research has shown evidence to suggest that cues from the external environment 
(e.g., room geometry) can play a significant role in how an array of objects is encoded and retrieved. Specifically, retrieval of object-
location information tends to be faster and more accurate when the retrieved orientation of the array is aligned with an axis defined by 
the external cue than when it is misaligned with this axis, even for orientations that were not presented during encoding. Here we 
investigated the role of alignment cues on object-location memory within a novel virtual environment. Participants were shown an 
image of a circular arena containing seven distinct target objects, and were required to learn the locations of the objects to a criterion 
level of performance. A uniquely coloured square mat was placed on the floor of the arena, the purpose of which was to provide a cue 
to the intrinsic axis of the object array. To test their spatial knowledge of the array, participants were instructed to imagine themselves 
standing at a particular object location facing another object, and to point to the location of a third object. We found that participants 
responded faster and more accurately when the imagined heading was aligned as opposed to misaligned with the axis defined by the 
mat. We also found that the alignment effect is an enduring property of object-location memory, as it remains evident after a 24 hour 
delay; and that it can occur in the absence of any external visual cues. Further studies are being conducted to investigate the influence 
of active navigation and visual cueing on the alignment effect. 
Conceptualizing agency in skilled action
Christensen, Wayne Andrew Geeves, John Sutton, Doris McIlwain
Macquarie University
wchriste@maccs.mq.edu.au
Agency, skills and embodiment in a cultural contextThursday 12.10-12.30 Room #1
We currently lack a conceptual framework for understanding agency that adequately captures the interplay of top-down and bottom-up 
factors. Using a dual process conception of cognition Haidt (e.g. 2001) and Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005) have each 
argued that traditional approaches overemphasize reasoning. However they may in turn be underemphasizing reasoning, and the dual 
process framework itself is unhelpfully simplistic, particularly in casting reasoning as slow and serial. This paper uses skilled action as 
a test case for developing a more nuanced conceptual framework. It is  argued that efficient, model-based representation makes high 
order agency possible in fast, fluid action. We offer some proposals for conceptualizing this control, together with some initial 
suggestions for operational measures, and the framework is applied to examples from sports, therapy and music performance.
Camerer C, L. G., Prelec D. (2005). Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 43
(1), 9-64.




Cognitive psychology does not reduce to neuroscience: The fundamental role of brain-body-environment interactions in 
explaining intelligent behaviour
Colling, Lincoln  Reece Roberts
Macquarie University
lcolling@maccs.mq.edu.au
Thursday 4.30-4.50 Room #3
Contemporary scientific investigations of the mind have increasingly looked towards the brain to answer questions about cognition. 
This is most clearly evident with the rise of cognitive neuro-imaging. This approach to studying cognition has, however, been met with 
mixed reactions. On the one hand, classical cognitive scientists—in the computationalist–functionalist tradition—have argued that 
cognitive neuro-imaging does not, and can not, answer questions about cognition; it is limited to questions about neural function or the 
neural basis of cognition. While on the other hand, there are those who argue that a proper understanding of the mind can only be 
gained through study of the brain. We suggest that both views are misguided. In this paper, we will present a third option: That 
neuroscience, properly used, can be employed as a heuristic for the development of cognitive theory, but also that cognitive science 
does not reduce to neuroscience, because a true understanding of the mind can only come from studying how the brain interacts with 
the body and the brain-body with the environment. We divide our argument into two sections. 
In the first section, we present the traditional computationalist–functionalist viewpoint that has relied on the multiple realizability of 
computational function to argue for the independence of cognitive science from neuroscience. Although not a necessary part of the 
computationalist–functionalist viewpoint, multiple realizability has been presented as a compelling argument for cognitive scientists to 
ignore neuroscience. We present a critique of multiple realizability, which regards the physical realisation of a mental state to be 
irrelevant to the understanding of that mental state. Contrary to this proposal, we suggest investigating the causally relevant physical 
properties of realisers can inform our understanding of mental states and cognition in at least two ways: first, it can inform theories 
about what type of computational system the mind is—for example, should cognition be understood as symbolic manipulation or 
pattern completion; second, it can inform our understanding of representation—for example, as action-centred and based on simulation 
as opposed to abstract and symbolic representational formats.
In the second section, we critique the proposition that the mind is what the brain does. Instead of focussing solely on the brain, we 
suggest that the proper object of study in cognitive science is the brain-body-environment system. An understanding of intelligent 
behaviour can only be gained by examining how the biological constraints inherent in an organismʼs body both constrain and scaffold 
information-processing. Furthermore, using examples from the social recall of autobiographical memory, we will examine how a proper 
understanding of certain cognitive functions can only be achieved by studying how organisms interact with each other. And we will also 
examine how, through manipulation of the environment, information-processing can be "off-loaded" onto the environment, thus making 
aspects of the environment part of the cognitive system. 
We conclude by providing some guidelines for integrating different levels of explanation, from neuroscience to the study of social 
interaction, and suggest that this can lead to a better, more complete, cognitive science.
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Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and BrainFriday 4.10-4.30 Room #1
I subscribe to Ned Blockʼs view that the mind is the software of the brain: thus the mind includes a suite of programs such as the Face 
Recognition Program, the Episodic Memory Program, the Speech Production program, etc. The aim of cognitive psychology is to 
discover the architecture of these programs. At present, nothing we know about the hardware on which these programs run (the brain) 
is informative about what a programʼs architecture might be.
 
(Q1a) Are the explanations provided by cognitive psychology and cognitive science indispensable, or are they replaceable in principle 
by explanations in neuroscience? If not, why not?
Cognitive psychology could discover everything there is to know about the Face Recognition Program without having discovered 
anything about the brain systems used for recognizing faces. Neuroscience could discover everything there is to know about the brain 
systems used for recognizing faces without ever referring to quantum physics
(Q2a) Are the phenomena referred to in explanations in cognitive science realizable or implementable in many different ways at the 
neurophysiological level? 
Yes. The Face Recognition Program is platform-independent. It runs on the brain, but if we know enough about its architecture to 
actually write it, it would run on various computers too.
(Q2b) If so, is this why these explanations are irreplaceable?
Yes. See also Q4a
(Q3) How do mental or psychological states relate to neural states? For example, are they identical to neural states?
I believe that philosophers of mind believe that cognitive psychology is devoted to the study of mental states like ʻbeing hungryʼ. But 
that isnʼt so. Cognitive psychology is devoted to the study of mental abilities, such as Face Recognition, Episodic Memory or Speech 
Production. Hence this question needs to be recast as: how do mental abilities relate to brain processes, to which I would answer: As 
software relates to hardware.
(Q4a ) Is it possible or likely that cognitive psychology will reduce to neuroscience? 
Not possible. You canʼt figure out what information-processing job a part of the brain does from studying its structure. No matter how 
much you knew about the wiring of the brain, you could never say: Ah, this must be the bit that does Face Recognition! And this must 
be the bit that does nonsense-word reading.
Max Coltheart has recently challenged the claim that neuroimaging has been informative for cognitive theory.
(Q5) Is the challenge successful?
So far
(Q6) If so, does it signal that neuroimaging is conceptually misconceived? Or is the putative failure just a symptom of immaturity of the 
discipline?
Thereʼs no way of telling which. But I am inclined to take the former of these positions, at least until there is a clear counter-example in 
the neuroimaging literature that makes this position untenable. I mean of course that neuroimaging is conceptually misconceived when 
considered as a way of investigating cognition. It is obviously an appropriate way of investigating the brain.
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Impaired face recognition and the mirrored-self misidentification delusion: Recreating the delusion using hypnosis
Connors, Michael Amanda J. Barnier, Max Coltheart, Rochelle E. Cox, Robyn Langdon
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, 
Macquarie University
michael.connors@maccs.mq.edu.au Using hypnosis to explore theoretical predictions and clinical phenomena from a cognitive 
neuropsychological perspectiveThursday 11.30-11.50 Room #2
Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that oneʼs reflection in the mirror is a stranger. Current theories suggest that the 
delusion may result from two factors: a deficit in face processing that is responsible for the content of the delusion (Factor 1) and a 
deficit in belief evaluation which accounts for the failure to reject the delusional belief (Factor 2). Due to the extensive neurological and 
cognitive deterioration in clinical patients, the mirrored-self misidentification delusion is particularly difficult to study. Previous research, 
however, has found that instrumental hypnosis can effectively model the delusion so as to allow empirical study. Barnier et al. (2008) 
and Cox et al. (in preparation), for example, gave highly hypnotisable participants a hypnotic suggestion to see a stranger in the mirror 
(a fully-formed suggestion for the full delusional experience). They found that the majority of participants did not recognise their 
reflection in the mirror, described the person in the mirror as having different physical characteristics to themselves, and maintained 
their delusion when challenged. These features were strikingly similar to the clinical condition. Connors et al. (in preparation) built upon 
this work by attempting to recreate the delusion from its component factors. Connors et al. gave hypnotic suggestions for either the 
Factor 1 impairment alone (impaired face recognition) or for both Factor 1 and Factor 2 impairments (impaired face recognition plus 
impaired belief evaluation). Suggestions for these component factors were administered either during hypnosis or in the normal, 
waking state. Participants who received suggestions for both component factors during hypnosis developed the delusional belief that 
their reflection in the mirror was a stranger and exhibited behaviour very similar to the clinical condition. Notably, a suggestion for 
Factor 1 alone in hypnosis was equally effective at producing the delusion as when participants were given suggestions for both Factor 
1 and Factor 2, suggesting that the hypnotic state, which itself disrupts belief evaluation, may act as a Factor 2. To explore this 
possibility, the present study directly compared a Factor 1 suggestion for impaired face recognition with a fully formed suggestion to 
see a stranger in the mirror. High hypnotisable participants received a hypnotic suggestion to either not recognise faces (Factor 1 
alone) or to see a stranger in the mirror (fully formed). Half of the participants received the suggestion while hypnotised and the other 
half received the suggestion in their normal waking state. Following the suggestion, we asked participants to look into a mirror and 
describe what they could see. We then indexed participantsʼ responses to a series of clinically inspired challenges. In one challenge, 
for example, we asked participants who described seeing a stranger in the mirror to touch their nose while looking in the mirror and 
explain why the stranger was copying them. Results support the idea that hypnotic suggestions can create a compelling mirrored-self 
misidentification delusion that is resistant to challenge. Results are discussed in terms of current theories of delusions.
Confabulation during an hypnotic erotomania delusion
Cox, Rochelle Jillian Attewell, Amanda J. Barnier
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, 
Macquarie University
rcox@maccs.mq.edu.au Using hypnosis to explore theoretical predictions and clinical phenomena from a cognitive 
neuropsychological perspectiveThursday 12.10-12.30 Room #2
Clinical confabulations involve the production of fabricated, distorted, or misinterpreted memories about oneself and the world without 
the conscious intention to deceive. They occur in both neuropsychological and psychiatric disorders and are commonly seen in the 
context of delusions. Although there is no single theory to account for confabulation, one theory suggests that confabulators have a 
source-monitoring deficit where they misattribute never-experienced events as real. Some researchers have also argued that 
motivation may combine with this source monitoring deficit to influence the content of confabulations. There is currently no viable 
experimental method for investigating clinical confabulation in the laboratory. However, because confabulation often occurs in the 
context of delusion, we used hypnosis to re-create a delusion in the laboratory and subsequently attempted to elicit confabulations. We 
selected an erotomania delusion which is the delusional belief that one is loved from afar by another person. This is a functional or 
motivated delusion characterised by extensive confabulations that support the delusional belief. To re-create the erotomania delusion, 
we gave high and low hypnotisable individuals a hypnotic suggestion that a factional character - Jo Pearson - was in love with them. 
We wanted participants to misattribute the source of their belief that Jo was in love with them, so we instructed them to forget that the 
hypnotist had suggested this. To elicit confabulation we asked participants to describe what Jo looked like, how they knew Jo, how they 
had first met Jo, how they felt about Jo, and how Jo felt about them. If participants commented that Jo liked/loved them, we asked 
them what evidence they had to support this belief. After the delusion suggestion was cancelled and after hypnosis, we asked 
participants where they had obtained their confabulated information. We found that high, but not low, hypnotisable participants 
experienced the erotomania delusion and claimed that Jo Pearson liked them or was in love with them. Importantly, these high 
hypnotisable individuals produced specific, detailed confabulations to support their delusional belief. Our findings indicate that in the 
context of an erotomania delusion, confabulations appeared to be positive and self-serving. This supports the idea that motivation 
plays a key role in shaping the content of confabulations. We discuss our findings in terms of current theories of confabulation and the 
value of using hypnosis to model such conditions.
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KeynoteFriday 9.00-10.15 The Atrium
There are two views about the distinction between core versus peripheral linguistic properties. Advocates of a Universal Grammar 
contend that the difference between core and periphery is significant, with core properties having several defining characteristics that 
are not shared by peripheral constructions of individual human languages.  By contrast, advocates of usage-based accounts contend 
that the distinction between core and periphery is vacuous, since individual human languages differ so extensively, and the same 
learning mechanisms that language learners exploit in acquiring peripheral constructions also suffice in acquiring more general ʻcoreʼ 
properties. I will discuss the major differences between these viewpoints, focusing on one property of human languages -- downward 
entailment. One question is whether or not downward entailing expressions are universal, and a second question is whether downward 
entailing expressions can be acquired using the same mechanisms that are recruited in the acquisition of peripheral constructions.
The danger of the extended mind
Devitt, S. Kate
Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science
skdevitt@gmail.com
Thursday 4.10-4.30 Room #3
This paper accepts three claims of the Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH): 1) External elements form part of the machinery of cognition, 
insofar as they causally interact with mental states. 2) The meaning of our thoughts is partly explained by reference to the external 
world (content externalism) and 3) Objects outside the physical brain can operate in functionally equivalent ways to many brain-based 
processes. I reject criticisms of EMH by Adams & Aizawa including 1) that cognition should be restricted to the domain studied by 
cognitive psychologists 2) that the processes of cognition are defined by the production of intrinsic or original content. Instead of 
engaging with these claims, I ask: What difference does it make to include external epistemic artifacts as part of the mind? I consider 
philosophical issues specifically relating to EMH, thus avoid issues relating to piecemeal replacement and functionalism generally. In 
one sense it does not matter whether we include external elements as part of cognitive processing. It does not matter if our beliefs are 
stored in our brains or on a notepad as long as we can access them when needed, just as it does not matter if a personʼs leg is made 
of wood or flesh if it helps them walk. 
However, in another sense it might matter a great deal to obviate differences between peripheral (e.g. edge detection in early vision, 
night vision goggles) and central processing. By ʻcentral processingʼ I mean processes that lie at the core of mental life such as 
analyzing, understanding and evaluating, henceforth summarized by the term ʻthinkingʼ. Thinking is a skill. Like any skill, thinking 
requires practice. A virtuoso thinker needs a strong capacity to concentrate and an excellent working memory. Thinking practice is 
internally generated and executed, even when influenced by a variety of inputs. If thinking is a skill, then failure to practice leads to 
cognitive atrophy. Increasing our peripheral access to data, whether via iPhones or iPlants increases the availability of information and 
opportunity for distraction, but not our ability to centrally process that information.  Even worse, the more access we get to data, the 
less we bother to memorize for any particular task. This loss of mnemonic practice in turn decreases our ability to hold many ideas 
simultaneously and thus further decreasing our ability to think. This is the real danger of saying it doesn't matter if external epistemic 








Friday 2.50-3.10 Room #3
Neuroanthropology is a humanistic science that brings together theory and methods from anthropology and neuroscience to study the 
little-understood relationship between culture and the brain. The neural structures and mechanisms that underpin the production and 
reproduction of culture are central to neuroanthropological enquiry. This paper puts forward a model of such structures and 
mechanisms based on theory and evidence from cultural anthropology, primatology, and cognitive, social and cultural neuroscience, 
among other fields. While the model distinguishes between animal and human forms of culture, these are both conceived as 
corresponding to repertoires of socially generated behaviours that are common within groups of interacting individuals. Animal culture 
is characterized in this model as depending on associative and/or mimetic mechanisms. Human beings are regarded as also being 
endowed with these mechanisms; however, human enculturation is posited to fundamentally rely on a relational mechanism. The 
present model proposes that an action recognition system (in macaques composed of areas F5, PF and superior temporal sulcus, and 
in humans of homologue structures Brodmann area 44, inferior parietal lobe and STS) underlies associative and mimetic forms of 
culture. The relational mechanism, in turn, is suggested to be realized in the prefrontal cortex (PFC). The model stipulates that this 
mechanism operates by establishing relationships between things and events represented in different areas distributed across the 
brain. Fully developed, the relational PFC mechanism manifests itself as intersubjective and symbolic capacities, long recognized in 
anthropology as making possible the generation and transmission of the webs of meaning that make up human culture. According to 
the model, the relational mechanism occurs in a heterogenous manner across the PFC owing to a segregation of activity defined by 
the dimensions of modality (with sensorimotor, emotional and motivational levels varying along a lateral-ventral-medial axis) and 
temporal context (with immediate, on-going and pending levels varying along a posterior-anterior axis). Finally, the model takes into 
account the links between the relational PFC mechanism and other systems and structures including the action recognition and limbic 
systems.




Agency, skills and embodiment in a cultural contextThursday 11.50-12.10 Room #1
Much of the research on elite performance and cognitive-perceptual learning assumes that skill-specific cognitive refinement is similar 
across individuals, sometimes even across different skills.  The more expertise an athlete gains, the more he or she is assumed to 
have converged on a single best strategy for accomplishing demanding athletic tasks.  Depending upon the type of sport, however, 
secondary evidence suggests that the ways in which athletes develop complex skills may not lead to elite-level convergence.  That is, 
highly accomplished athletes playing the same role or engaged in the same activity may have distinctive configurations of perceptual-
cognitive adaptation.  This preliminary discussion outlines potential applications for understanding patterns of cognitive variation, 
including how culturally distinctive regimens of training and development might produce varied profiles in perceptual-cognitive skills 
and high-speed decision-making.  Demonstrating culturally based variation in skill acquisition also better integrates observations of 
psychological variability from anthropology and cross-cultural neurosciences.




Friday 3.50-4.10 Room #3
Insofar as philosophers and psychologists have evaluated experiential (or 'autobiographical') memory as a source of knowledge, they 
have by and large construed this knowledge as representational. Most commonly, experiential memory has been thought to represent 
past events in the rememberer's life, with discussion centering on the question of how reliably memory represents those past events. In 
counterpoint to this dominant research paradigm, others have observed that, even when that which is remembered is not exactly that 
which actually happened, these 'misrepresentations' may in themselves represent that which is personally meaningful in the 
rememberer's experience. Experiential memory may thus represent either the past as it was experienced, or the meaning this 
experience has come to hold for the rememberer. I suggest that memory's claims to knowledge extend further, looking beyond the 
facts or meaning of the experiences represented, to the cognitive know-how contained in their mental re-enactment. By mentally re-
enacting (experientially remembering) scenes from their past, rememberers can think through their present situation from the 
perspective of their remembered past selves. In this way, memory can show us how to think about the present in ways we might not 
otherwise think. In this brief paper, I will outline a few examples to show what this form of cognitive know-how consists in, and how it 
resides in the perspective of our remembered experiences. By illustrating how rememberers rely on the cognitive know-how contained 
in experiential remembering, I also hope to show why it is deserving of more attention from memory researchers.
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The components of working memory updating
Ecker, Ullrich Stephan Lewandowsky, Klaus Oberauer, Abby Chee
University of Western Australia
ullrich.ecker@uwa.edu.au
Computational models of cognitionWednesday 1.40-2.00 Room #1
Working memory updating (WMU) - the ability to maintain accurate representations of information that changes or is transformed over 
time - has long been recognized as an important topic of study in cognitive psychology.  For example, in individual differences 
research, it has been claimed that WMU specifically predicts fluid intelligence and reading comprehension skills. However, little is 
known about the underlying component processes of WMU.  An intuitive decomposition of working memory updating (WMU) into at 
least three distinct components - retrieval, transformation, and substitution - was implemented into a standard WMU paradigm.  
Experimental conditions featured every possible combination of these three components.  Their contributions were modeled with 
multilevel linear regression.  Results suggest that the proposed sub-processes make distinct and independent contributions to WMU 
performance.  Further, both the view that WMC and WMU are strongly related and the view that they are dissociable dimensions of 
mental ability have been proposed.  Hence, the decomposition of WMU was used to analyze the relationship between WMU sub-
components and working memory capacity (WMC), employing structural equation modeling (SEM).  This study presents a novel 
utilization of SEM inasmuch as both interindividual variability and experimental effects on mean performance measures (RT and 
accuracy) were accounted for concurrently.  We found that WMC reliably predicts WMU in general, but we also found that some sub-
components of WMU - in particular substitution skills - are independent of WMC.  Hence, WMU and WMC may make independent 
contributions in predicting higher mental abilities.
The gamblerʼs illusion of control: Its structure, prevalence and determinants in a laboratory setting
Ejova, Anastasia Paul Delfabbro, Daniel Navarro
The University of Adelaide
anastasia.ejova@adelaide.edu.au
Friday 10.50-11.10 Room #3
Gamblersʼ behaviours and game-related thought patterns have often been found to reflect an ʻillusion of controlʼ - the perception of a 
causal relation between strategic or superstitious actions taken during the game and successful game outcomes. Attempts to elicit, 
measure and, subsequently, examine the predictors of the illusion in laboratory gambling tasks have been hampered by the use of 
overly trivial gambling tasks and overly brief outcome measures. Thus, a study was needed to unify existing findings and hypotheses 
using a more engaging experimental task and detailed measures that captured both the strategic (primary) and superstitious 
(secondary) elements of the illusion of control construct. In the present study participants played 100 rounds of a specially-designed 
sports-themed gambling game, before answering questions of varying subtlety about the degree of control they perceived over the 
gameʼs outcomes. The patterns of participantsʼ responses to these questions suggested that the illusion of control has a three-
dimensional structure, involving perceptions primary control, perceptions of secondary control, and, independently of these, an outward 
admission that game outcomes were nevertheless ʻall due to chanceʼ. Whether a participant reported experiencing primary control was 
determined by his or her extant beliefs about games of chance, but, also, by the number of times he or she experienced three wins in a 
row. The experience of secondary control was mediated solely by existing beliefs. The preliminary results of a follow-up study 
concerned with a particular determinant of the illusion - the sequence in which wins and losses are experienced - will be discussed.
Matching faces across rotations in view and lighting.
Favelle, Simone Harold Hill
University of Wollongong
simone_favelle@uow.edu.au
Wednesday 12.00-12.20 Room #2
It is important to look at the combined effects of lighting and view direction on face recognition, as both depend on the three-
dimensional shape of the face and are in some ways analogous. For example, both pitch rotations and the change between top and 
bottom lighting involve rotations about the left-right axis, just as yaw and left/right lighting involved rotations about the vertical axis. We 
investigated identity matching performance across 45° rotations of the light source or the face about pitch or yaw with all images 
shown either upright or inverted.  Upright images were better matched than inverted images, showing that image differences are not 
sufficient to explain performance. This is consistent with the idea that the use of class-based knowledge of upright faces is important 
for this task. The effects of face and light rotation interacted and depended on the axis of rotation. Overall, rotations about pitch 
impaired performance more than rotations about yaw, and changes in view impaired performance more than changes in light. The 
interaction between face and light rotation was such that if both rotated in the same direction, equivalent to a rotation of the camera in 
the opposite direction, performance was as good or better than if the face alone rotated. This was particularly pronounced for pitch 
rotations, with a clear pitch up advantage but only when the light rotated in the same direction.  The results are interpreted in terms of 
image, surface and three-dimensional models based accounts of face matching. 
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Friday 2.30-2.50 Room #2
The masked congruence priming effect (MCE) has proven valuable in the investigation of nonconscious cognitive processes.  Typically, 
studies of the MCE use mean reaction times (RT) as the dependent measure.  While mean RTs certainly reveal an MCE, they are 
relatively insensitive to the temporal properties of this effect.  To investigate the temporal dynamics of the MCE, we have participants 
perform a reaching-to-touch response and we sample the position of their hand multiple times during their response.  The advantage of 
this continuous measure is that it reveals the MCE as it emerges during the response.  In this talk, I will report the time course of the 
MCE from three experiments in which we manipulate the prime type (repeated primes [also appear as targets] versus novel primes [do 
not appear as targets]), spatial attention (prime attended versus prime unattended), and prime duration (16.7ms ~ 66.7ms).
Relational complexity in the context of processing speed
Gabales, Leonardo Damian P. Birney
University of Sydney
leong@psych.usyd.edu.au
Applications of relational complexity theory to the study of fluid cognitive functionsWednesday 4.40-5.00 Room #1
Research suggests that the relationship between fluid intelligence and processing speed is moderated by task complexity. However 
there is still no universally accepted view of what constitutes complexity in processing speed tasks. Perhaps the most well elucidated 
position is based on stimulus-response compatibility. Research adopting this view has consistently shown that as the stimulus-
response compatibility of a processing speed task decreases, its correlation with measures of fluid intelligence increases. Despite this 
success, the stimulus-response compatibility view is hamstrung by its inability to generalise beyond a relatively small subset of tasks. 
In contrast, competing views, such as the number of steps required for solution can generalise quite easily to a range of tasks. 
However it is possible to show that the findings from the stimulus-response compatibility view can be accounted for through relational 
complexity theory, which is concerned with the number of variables that must be integrated to solve a task. Critically, unlike the 
stimulus-response compatibility view, relational complexity theory can be applied to a broad range of tasks. In the current research (N 
= 110) we used a modified version of the Latin Square Task (LST) to investigate two different views of complexity in the context of 
processing speed: relational complexity and number of steps. Complexity manipulations of the LST according to relational complexity 
theory produced systematic effects on its correlations with the Ravenʼs Progressive Matrices (a measure of fluid intelligence). 
Specifically, greater relational complexity was associated with a stronger correlation with the Ravenʼs, mirroring the results derived 
from the stimulus-response compatibility view. However complexity manipulations of the LST via the number of steps required for 
solution did not have a systematic effect on its correlation with the Ravenʼs Progressive Matrices. We discuss the implications of these 
findings on relational complexity theory and processing speed. In particular, it seems that relational complexity theory may offer a 
fruitful way to view complexity in processing speed tasks.
Seeing double: Perceptual illusions of identity
Gerrans, Philip
Department of Philosophy University of 
Adelaide
philip.gerranas@adelaide.edu.au
Wednesday 12.00-12.20 Room #3
Metaphysics recognises a distinction* between intrinsic objects (things in themselves independent of any properties they bear) and 
relational objects (objects constituted out of properties: the bundle theory of objects). Intrinsic objects survive changes in their 
properties, relational objects do not. This distinction might seem arcane to cognitive science but it turns out to be interestingly relevant 
to understanding delusions of misidentification. 
I argue that the face recognition system represents persons as intrinsic objects but that standard theories of delusional misidentification 
assume the relational conception in their model of face recognition. I discuss the consequences for the understanding of these 
disorders. 
The argument has two aspects. The first is that visual perception exploits the intrinsic conception. Face recognition and other more 
central/ abstract  processes inherit the architecture of intrinsic representation. Here I side with Zenon Pylyshyn and  Mohan Mathen 
against John Campbell who thinks that we perceive not objects but located properties so that a perceived object is nothing more than a 
set of properties at a location. 
Secondly if we treat the face recognition system as representing intrinsic objects delusions of misidentification are more easily 
explained. In particular  we can understand a distinction between representing two identical people ( e.g identical twins, clones or 
duplicates) and two different people who appear identical ( e.g someone in perfect disguise or who has had plastic surgery to resemble 
the subject of an impersonation). This distinction is not available to the relational conception but the experience of delusional subjects 
suggests that it is computed within face and object recognition systems.
I close with some speculative suggestions on the sixty four thousand dollar question: ʻHow is the distinction represented?ʼ and some 
comments on how the intrinsic object idea fits with theories which give affective responses an essential role in identifying persons.
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Computational models of visual map plasticity
Goodhill, Geoffrey
The University of Queensland
g.goodhill@uq.edu.au
Computational Neuroscience: Modelling brain structure and functionWednesday 12.20-12.40 Room #1
The primary visual cortex contains multiple maps of features of visual scenes, including visual field position, orientation and ocular 
dominance. The adult structure of these maps depends on the patterns of visual input experienced during development. Since patterns 
of visual experience are relatively easy to measure and control in animal models, this plasticity provides the opportunity to investigate 
the general rules governing the formation of neural connections.  I will discuss our recent work computational modelling work which 
addresses how visual experience affects connectivity in the visual cortex.  This work shows that models which trade off "coverage" 
against "continuity" in forming visual representations can quantitatively reproduce the effects of many different types of perturbations of 
visual experience. Furthermore, such models can give insight into the influence of the higher-order statistical structure of natural 
scenes on map structure in visual cortex.
Expert pattern perception in sport
Gorman, Adam
Australian Institute of Sport
Adam.Gorman@ausport.gov.au
Cognitive effort and skill learning in sportThursday 3.50-4.10 Room #1
Sport expertise research has long borrowed experimental frameworks from cognitive psychology. However, in recent times the 
application of such approaches has been questioned (e.g., Ward, Williams & Hancock, 2005) due to the unique perceptual-motor 
requirements existing in the sport domain. This presentation will review this issue focusing on the use of the pattern recall and 
recognition paradigm and itʼs purported link to decision-making skill. 
Pattern recall and pattern recognition paradigms have been used in numerous investigations to help identify the underlying 
mechanisms that contribute to expertise in sport. The typical recall methodology is to display a series of patterns from a particular sport 
and then compare the ability of experts and novices to recall the locations of the elements (i.e., players) in the display. The recognition 
methodology is similar but in this instance, participants are first asked to memorise a series of patterns before being asked to identify 
those same patterns from amongst a series of previously unseen patterns. Whilst expert-novice differences have been consistently 
shown to exist on structured trials, doubt still exists concerning the extent to which these methodologies are able to accurately 
measure the underlying nature of expert performance in a complex and dynamic team-sport environment. 
It has been argued that the ability to perceive and understand structured patterns of play, and to extract meaning from symbolic 
representations of set plays and game strategies in sports such as basketball or soccer, may be key requirements for anticipation 
(Starkes, Allard, Lindley, & OʼReilly, 1994; Williams & Davids, 1995). Indeed, some studies have shown that pattern recall performance 
is able to explain around 40 percent of the variance in anticipation performance (Farrow, McCrae, Gross, & Abernethy, in press; 
Williams & Davids, 1995). However, the nature of the experimental task has come under criticism because it requires participants to 
use a process that is rarely, if ever, an actual requirement within the typical team-sport environment (Ward et al., 2008). As a 
consequence, recall tasks may provide only limited insight into the actual constituents that comprise expert decision-making and 
anticipation (Ward et al., 2008). 
Recent research conducted in our laboratory has found that traditional methods of measuring pattern perception may be effective in 
some situations but limitations may exist when attempting to use the same approach in other team sports. Similar research using a 
recognition paradigm has suggested that under certain display conditions, experts may perform the task using generic problem-solving 
strategies that are not necessarily based upon their knowledge or experience in the sport.




Thursday 12.30-12.50 Room #3
Literary texts, in particular novels, provide unique ways of representing and exploring the workings of the human mind. Through an 
analysis of Ian McEwanʼs novel Atonement (2001) I explore the role of narrative as a basic constituent of consciousness, critical to an 
understanding of our selves in time, and to comprehending and communicating with others. McEwan is deeply interested in 
consciousness and the capacity of the novel to convey what he describes as ʻan unruly sense of what the mind isʼ. Atonement is a self-
reflexive exploration of the power of narrative to shape and be shaped by what the mind perceives and understands. Narrative is 
shown to be essential to the ways we make sense of our selves: we gain pleasure from narratives and deeply desire to tell as well as 
to be told stories, to view our lives in terms of story. Our capacity and willingness to be immersed in an alternative world through the 
power of narrative suggests our peculiar sensitivity to this form of communication and its capacity to structure our experience. But our 
hunger for narrative suggests a desire for knowledge as well as a desire for the â€˜rightʼ story: when this desiring in the imagination 
motivates behaviour and affects decisions, narrative can become dangerous. The paper explores narrative imagination as an asset as 
well as an affliction, the role of confabulation and the destructive power of narrative in terms of what these phenomena, when 
represented in fiction, can tell us about the human mind.
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A Face in the Crowd: Race Perception and the Lightness Contrast Illusion
Gwinn, Owen S. Kevin R. Brooks
Department of Psychology, Macquarie 
University
gwinntastic@hotmail.com
Wednesday 12.20-12.40 Room #2
To date, few studies have directly investigated the facial cues that lead to the perception of racial origin. Past research has shown that 
people are more accurate at recognising faces belonging to their own racial group than they are for other race faces: a phenomenon 
known as the other race effect. This effect can be produced by simply changing a faceʼs skin tone, even when all other facial 
characteristics remain unchanged, suggesting that skin lightness has a substantial involvement in perceived race. The aim of the 
current experiment was to explore the possibility that peopleʼs perceptions of race could be altered using a traditional perceptual effect: 
the lightness contrast illusion. In this illusion, a neutral grey figure appears darker when surrounded by a light area, and lighter when 
surrounded by a dark area. To test for similar effects in the context of faces and perceived race, we morphed together faces of African 
and European descent (henceforth referred to as ʻblackʼ and ʻwhiteʼ respectively). By controlling the degree of input from each original 
face in the morphing process, we created 5 sets of faces at evenly spaced intervals on an objective continuum of racial origin. These 
morphed faces were presented amongst a surround of either black or white faces in separate conditions. Participants were asked to 
rate the perceived race of the central face using a visual scale ranging from ʻstereotypically blackʼ to ʻstereotypically whiteʼ. While 
participantsʼ ratings appropriately reflected the degree of input from the original faces (or ʻmorph levelsʼ), these ratings were entirely 
independent of whether they were presented within a white or a black surround. A second experiment consisting of two parts was 
conducted to establish why no effect of surround was found for face stimuli. In experiment 2a, the features of each face were 
eradicated by averaging all pixel luminance values within each individual face outline. This meant that participants could only base their 
ratings - this time of perceived lightness - on skin tone alone without the influence of morphological characteristics. In experiment 2b 
the average luminance of each face was made equal such that participants would base their racial stereotypicality ratings on the 
morphological characteristics of the faces, without significant influence of skin tone. An effect of surround was found in experiment 2a, 
with featureless faces in general appearing lighter when surrounded by black featureless faces and vice versa, in line with the 
traditional lightness contrast illusion. However, no such effect was found in experiment 2b. Trend analyses based on participantsʼ 
ratings and the facesʼ morph levels revealed similarities between experiments 1 and 2b. The trend of results of each of these 
experiments differed from the trend shown in experiment 2a. These findings are consistent with the idea that the morphological aspects 
of faces dominate judgements of race, while perceived skin tone is less influential.
Complexity of the Wason Selection Task
Halford, Graeme S. Brentyn Ramm, Glenda Andrews
Griffith University
G.Halford@griffith.edu.au
Applications of relational complexity theory to the study of fluid cognitive functionsWednesday 5.00-5.20 Room #1
Lack of a clear explanation for poor performance on the Wason Selection (four card) Task may be because failure to recognise the 
complexity of the task has made it difficult to interpret empirical findings. We decomposed the task into simpler subtasks by having 
participants respond to each of the four cards in isolation We then manipulated the complexity of the cognitive processes required. One 
source of difficulty is that, in order to test a rule such as “if there is an A on one side of a card, there is a 4 on the other side” (A → 4), 
participants have to hypothesise what could be on the opposite side of a card (e.g. a card containing a 7 on the face side would 
disconfirm the rule A → 4 if there were an A on the hidden side). Presenting possible hidden-side elements in a shadowed area below 
the card should aid this process, because the disconfirming conjunction (A and not-4) would be recognisable. Performance improved 
greatly with only one hidden-side element but only slightly with two possible hidden-side elements. Difficulty ratings were greater with 
two hidden-side elements than with none, suggesting that participants normally consider face side elements only. Established 
heuristics, such as matching and confirmation biases, require only face-side elements to be processed, and may be default responses 
to high task complexity. This questions the assumption that such heuristics indicate inherent reasoning limitations.
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Wednesday 2.00-2.20 Room #2
This paper theorises that contact with published autobiography and biography has an influence on autobiographical narrative, memory 
and self-formation. Bruner (1986, 1990 and 1991) has argued that experience and memories are shaped and organised as narrative, 
out of a cultural context of shared stories; the inter-relationship of narrative and self-formation is explored by Eakin (2008). Building on 
the work of Anderson and Conway (1993) on the structure, storage, and retrieval of autobiographical memories, Radvansky et al. 
(2005) have demonstrated the correlations between narrative comprehension and autobiographical memory. More specifically, Reese 
and Newcombe (2007) have contributed to ongoing studies of the causal link between parental reminiscing style and childrenʼs 
autobiographical memory by identifying maternal education as an implicated factor in memory formation; and Wenner et al. (2007) 
have shown the connection between parental reminiscence and the shape and content of childrenʼs fictional narratives. 
These studies have investigated, both theoretically and empirically, the psychological side of these inquiries; the present paper will look 
at the narrative side and suggest a causative relationship between published and personal autobiography. By deploying narrative and 
genre theory, this paper will explore the cognitive potential of life writing. It will postulate that exposure to published autobiography and 
biography, and in turn assimilation of their narrative principles, provides frameworks for meaning-making that normalise certain 
narrative structures and shape organisation in autobiographical memory. As genres, embedded in and perpetuated by cultural 
practices, published autobiography and biography shape knowledge and create ways of apprehending reality, including self-identity 
and memory. 
This paper will investigate these ideas by: making reference to specific instances of published autobiography; tracing the consistent 
conventions of the genres and their cultural importance from late antiquity up to the present day; and identifying elements of these 
conventions and paradigms in autobiographical memories reported in recent published research.
Collaborative remembering: When are can remembering with others be beneficial?
Harris, Celia Amanda J. Barnier, John Sutton, Paul G. Keil
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science
charris@maccs.mq.edu.au
Wednesday 3.00-3.20 Room #2
Experimental memory research has traditionally focused on the individual, and viewed social influence as a source of error or inhibtion. 
However, in everyday life, remembering is often a social activity, and theories from philosophy and psychology predict benefits of 
shared remembering. In a series of studies, both experimental and more qualitative, we attempted to bridge this gap by examining the 
effects of collaboration on memory in a variety of situations and in a variety of groups. We discuss our results in terms of a functional 
view of collaborative remembering, and consider when and in what ways remembering with others might help or hinder memory.
Unifying models of memory and reasoning
Hayes, Brett Evan Heit
University of New South Wales
B.Hayes@unsw.edu.au
Thursday 11.10-11.30 Room #3
Four studies examined the relationship between induction and recognition memory using a paradigm which makes these two tasks as 
comparable as possible. During study participants were asked to memorise or learn about a novel property of a common set of study 
items (pictures of dogs). At test old and new pictures were presented and participants made recognition decisions (“have you seen this 
animal before”?) or property inferences (e.g., “does this animal have beta cells”?). People doing induction were more likely to make 
positive responses to old and new test stimuli than those doing recognition. However, there was a strong positive correlation between 
the probability of making a positive response to test items in induction and recognition conditions. Manipulations of duration of 
exposure of study items (Experiment 1), frequency of exposure (Experiment 2), and decision-load at retrieval (Experiment 3) had 
parallel effects on recognition and induction. A control study (Experiment 4) showed that the strong empirical relationship between 
induction and recognition was maintained even when old stimuli remained in view while inductive inferences were made. A modified 
version of the Generalised Context Model (Nosofsky, 1986), assuming a common generalisation process based on exemplar similarity, 







KeynoteFriday 11.40-12.55 The Atrium
According to one theory, the brain is a sophisticated hypothesis tester: perception is Bayesian unconscious inference where the brain 
actively uses predictions to test, and then refine, hypotheses about what the causes of its sensory input might be. The brain's task is 
simply continually to minimise prediction error. This increasingly popular theory holds great explanatory promise for a number of central 
areas of research at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. I show how the theory can help us understand striking 
phenomena at three cognitive levels: vision, sensory integration, and belief. First, I illustrate central aspects of the theory by showing 
how it provides a nice explanation of why binocular rivalry occurs. Then I suggest how the theory may explain the role of the unified 
sense of self in autoscopic illusions driven by visuotactile conflict. Finally, I show how it provides an approach to delusion formation that 
integrates one-deficit and two-deficit accounts. To illustrate and support some of these claims, I present our findings from a study of 
autoscopic phenomena.
Why donʼt apes point but we do? A recognition-theoretical approach
Ikaheimo, Heikki
Macquarie University, Department of 
Philosophy
heikki.ikaheimo@scmp.mq.edu.au
Friday 2.30-2.50 Room #3
The phenomenological tradition in philosophy has for some while been acknowledged as a respectable voice in cognitive science. 
Many of the insights that the phenomenological tradition offers have to do with the role of intersubjective relations and attitudes in the 
genesis and constitution of the cognitive structures of normally functioning human persons. Within philosophy, the phenomenologists 
were however not the first people to put a strong emphasis on intersubjective relations and attitudes. About one hundred years earlier, 
the German philosophers Fichte, Schelling and especially Hegel already conceived of particular kinds of interpersonal attitudes as 
fundamental for having the kind of psychological structure that distinguishes humans from animals. They called these attitudes with the 
term ʻAnerkennungʼ. I translate this German term with ʻrecognitionʼ (which is not to be confused with ʻidentificationʼ, as in talk of ʻface-ʼ 
or ʻspeech-recognition/identificationʼ).
Today the concept of recognition is much discussed in social and political philosophy, but very rarely applied to the questions in the 
context of which it originally appeared: the genesis and constitution of human cognitive structures. In this paper I argue that the 
concept of recognition, as I define it more exactly, may help us understand what is at stake in what according to Michael Tomasello is a 
fundamental difference between apes and human infants – that apes, in contrast to human infants, do not point things to each other.
If Tomasello is right, this difference is the crossroads at which human infants part company with apes and embark on a developmental 
journey in which they will normally develop the full-fledged mind of a person. Tomaselloʼs question is why is it that apes never point 
anything to each other. Is it that they lack an innate capacity, or is it that they lack the appropriate motivation? Importantly, having the 
required capacities would not be enough for pointing to become stabilized into a practice if appropriate motivations and mutual 
expectations regarding the otherʼs motivation were lacking. 
An important clue here is that two of the ʻproto-speech-actsʼ that human infants perform according to Tomasello involve either helping 
the other by pointing, or requesting help from the other by pointing. I argue that in the prelinguistic stage this most likely involves one of 
two basic attitudes of interpersonal recognition as they have been articulated in recognition-theory – being non-instrumentally moved 
be an experience of the other having authority on one, or being non-instrumentally moved by the perceived needs of the other. 
The competing proposal that instrumental motives having to do with expected rewards would do the job looks weaker in comparison to 
the recognition-theoretical one. Weighing costs and benefits is cognitively more demanding than being ʻdirectlyʼ moved to help by the 
authority or needs of the other, and if such weighing requires language-based thinking then it is simply impossible at the pre-linguistic 
stages at stake.
Perhaps Hegel was right that what fundamentally distinguishes humans from animals is intersubjective recognition.
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The spatial and temporal dynamics of anticipatory preparation in task-switching
Jamadar, Sharna M. Hughes, R. Fulham, P. T. Michie, F. Karayanidis
Functional Neuroimaging Laboratory, 
School of Psychology, University of 
Newcastle
Sharna.Jamadar@newcastle.edu.au
Friday 2.10-2.30 Room #2
Task-switching paradigms require rapid alternation between simple tasks, and generally result in an increase in reaction time (RT) for 
switch relative to repeat trials. This switch cost is known to decrease with cue-stimulus interval (CSI) in cued paradigms, an effect that 
has been attributed at least partly to an active preparation process (Rogers & Monsell, 1995 JEP:G, 24, 207-231); the exact nature of 
this process, however, remains poorly defined. We propose that anticipatory preparation consists of two independent preparatory 
processes: ʻgoal-activationʼ which involves selection and activation of the task goal, and ʻtask-specific category-response (C-R) rule 
activationʼ which involves loading of generalized stimulus-response (S-R) rules. We tested this hypothesis using a cued task-switching 
paradigm that included both informative and non-informative cues. Informative cues allow for anticipatory preparation processes to be 
initiated and completed prior to stimulus onset, whereas non-informative cues signal the onset of the stimulus that carries task 
information. Behavioural, ERP and fMRI data were examined. Informative cues resulted in faster RT and smaller RT switch cost than 
non-informative cues. Cue-locked waveforms showed an early parietally-maximal increase in positivity for informative relative to non-
informative trials (300-400ms), which was followed by a later increase in parietal positivity for informative switch relative to repeat trials 
(500-600ms). The latter was similar in amplitude and morphology to the differential switch-positivity seen previously with task-switching 
paradigms (e.g. Nicholson et al., 2005 Psychophys, 42, 540-554). The mean amplitude of the early informative-positivity was 
correlated with activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; BA 8/9), whereas the mean amplitude of the later switch-positivity 
was correlated with activity in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC; BA 7). These findings are compatible with the existence of an 
anticipatory preparation process in task-switching which comprises of at least two processes: goal activation and C-R rule activation. 
We propose that the early informative-positivity indexes goal-activation, consistent with the role of the DLPFC in initiating top-down 
control of goal-directed behaviour (Egner & Hirsch, 2005 Nat Neurosci, 9, 1784-1790). The later switch-positivity is argued to reflect 
task-specific C-R rule activation, consistent with the PPCʼs role in maintaining S-R mappings and biasing posterior regions in goal-
directed behaviour (Bunge et al., 2002 Neuroimage, 17, 1562-1571). 
The evolution of technical competence
Jeffares, Ben
Victoria University of Wellington
ben.jeffares@vuw.ac.nz
Agency, Skills and Embodiment in a Cultural ContextThursday 12.30-12.50 Room #1
The stone tool record of human evolution reveals a number of stages in the sophistication of tool manufacture and the deployment of 
tools. Mode 1 tools from 2 to 1.8 million years ago seem to be simple ad hoc responses to immediate needs (Jeffares 2008). With 
mode 2 tools, associated with Homo erectus from 1.8 to 1 million years ago ? the classic Acheulean biface tradition ? we see the 
imposition of distinctive forms on tools, (Wynn 2002; Coolidge and Wynn 2009), probably buffered by social environments (Sterelny 
2003; Jeffares 2007). But it is not until mode 3 tools, characterised by new manufacturing techniques and associated with Homo 
Heidelbergensis (the 'Archaic sapiens') that we see the emergence of tool diversity and the first signs of tool specialisation (Klein and 
Edgar 2002; Coolidge and Wynn 2009). Coolidge and Wynn argue that this shows the development of increased working memory 
(Coolidge and Wynn 2005; Coolidge and Wynn 2009). I argue from the adaptive significance of these developments, and suggest that 
the transition from mode 2 to mode 3 tools shows increased strategic awareness. As archaic hominins began inhabiting increasingly 
diverse environments, and start exploiting new resources, the ability to manufacture reliable and specialised tools becomes adaptively 
salient (Odell 1996; Hiscock 2006). Tool manufacturers had to be 'mindful' of scarce raw materials (raw material transportation 
becomes a significant factor in the archaeological record by this time (Marwick 2003)) and just as aware of the eventual deployment 
options for a tool. Consequently, mode 3 tools demonstrate the first evidence for the integration into the tool-making act of strategic 
awareness: an awareness of scarce raw materials, and eventual specialised deployment of tools.




Friday 2.10-2.30 Room #3
This paper considers the implications for higher education of recent work on narrative theory, distributed cognition and artificial 
intelligence. These perspectives are contrasted with the educational implications of Heideggerʼs existentialist phenomenology and with 
classical foundations of education which Heidegger and Gadamer once criticised. The aim is to prompt discussion of what teaching 
might become if psychological insights (about collective minds let loose to learn) are associated with higher education.
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Neural correlates and temporal dynamics of task-switching in normal aging
Karayanidis, Frini L. R. Whitson, P. T. Michie, A. J. Heathcote
Functional Neuroimaging Laboratory, 
School of Psychology, University of 
Newcastle
Frini.Karayanidis@newcastle.edu.au
Friday 1.50-2.10 Room #2
Task-switching paradigms tend to show consistent age-related increase in mixing cost (RT on single task blocks vs. repeat trials within 
switch blocks) but less consistent age effects on switch cost (RT on repeat vs. switch trials in switch blocks). We examined the 
mechanisms underlying these effects in a large normative sample using a cued trials switching paradigm. The excellent time resolution 
of event-related potentials (ERPs) was combined with diffusion model parameters of decision making (Wagenmakers, et al., 2007 
Psych Bull Rev, 4, 3-22) in order to elucidate the cognitive processes that underlie age-related changes in task-switching performance. 
ERPs show consistent patterns of differences between switch and repeat waveforms time-locked to the onset of preparation (e.g., cue-
locked) and stimulus-driven processes. Evidence accumulation models posit that, in 2-choice decision paradigms, the behavioral end-
product (mean RT for correct responses and error rate) results from the combined effect of a number of latent variables. These 
contribute to the decision process (e.g., rate of evidence accumulation and response criterion) and to non-decision processes (e.g, 
stimulus encoding and response activation, and in the current context, cue encoding and task-set reconfiguration). We compared 
behavioral, diffusion and ERP measures of task-switching across a wide age range (18-80years, n=95). Participants were divided into 
4 age groups matched on IQ, semantic fluency and digit span scores and were trained to switch between a letter classification and a 
digit classification task. Cue-stimulus interval (CSI: 150, 1000ms) was manipulated to assess age effects on task-set reconfiguration. 
Each task was mapped to two cues and all stimuli were incongruent. Mean RT showed the expected age-related increase in mixing 
cost only in 60-80 year olds. Diffusion parameters indicated a number of age-related changes in rate of evidence accumulation and 
response criterion related to RT mixing cost emerging in 46-59 year olds. These were accompanied by age-effects on both cue-locked 
and stimulus-locked ERPs that emerged even earlier (30-45 years), suggesting the early emergence of compensatory processes. 
Although mean RT switch cost was not affected by age, diffusion parameters and ERPs showed a number of age-related changes in 
the processing of switch trials. The older groups (45-59y & 60-80y) showed evidence of less efficient encoding and/or reconfiguration 
for switch than repeat trials. Younger adults prepared more efficiently for an impending switch trial, even at the very short preparation 
interval. These data indicate that diffusion model parameters and ERP measures are valuable and complementary approaches that 
illuminate the underlying processes that contribute to the age-related cognitive changes. 
The results suggest early emergence of strategic changes in task performance that efficiently compensate for less efficient information 
accumulation. Implications for models of task-switching and cognitive aging will be discussed.




Wednesday 2.00-2.20 Room #3
We explore the application of Cognitive Theory of Multimedia Learning (CTML) in Virtual Reality (VR) applications. CTML suggests that 
complex visuals hinder novice learners to attend the lesson properly. However, VR applications favour the use of complex visuals as 
the technology in computer graphics allows it. So, how much of visual complexity is too much? This study specifically investigates into 
the visual complexity of Animated Virtual Actors' (AVAs) for learning. A series of VR simulations were created to teach second-year 
psychology students about the navigational capabilities of Cataglyphis ants with flat, cartoon, or life-like AVAs. Regarding learning 
outcomes, we predicted that visually more complex AVA would increase the perception of learning and the cognitive load, and 
decrease retention and transfer scores. The results did not reveal any significant differences between AVA's visual complexity and 
learning outcomes, contradicting our predictions. Nevertheless, our methodology significantly improved retention and transfer scores in 
all conditions. Possible explanations and future research direction are discussed.
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Friday 1.50-2.10 Room #3
This paper seeks to outline the potential for developing a cognitive model of historical investigation by exploring the origins and early 
development of a seventeenth-century English religious sect from the perspective of the cognitive science of religion. Harvey 
Whitehouseʼs influential ʻmodes of religiosityʼ thesis constructs a testable theory of how religions are created, passed on, and changed, 
based on a distinction between imagistic and doctrinal religious forms. Whitehouse's theory suggests religions tend to coalesce around 
one of these two poles depending primarily on the manner in which religious behaviour is constituted and remembered. Ritual is 
central. In imagistic modes, infrequent but emotionally laden rituals have a lasting impact on people's minds, deeply influencing 
memories and the manner in which people conceive religious topics. These psychological features result in small, exclusive, and 
ideologically heterogeneous religious communities. In doctrinal modes, religious knowledge is imparted through intensive, but 
emotionally light, repetitive teaching that results in large, inclusive, and centrally regulated religious communities. This study will test 
the usefulness of the theory in helping to understand the early years of the most radical and successful religious sect to emerge during 
the British Civil Wars and survive the Restoration to grow into a global denomination - the Quakers or Religious Society of Friends. 
Drawing on other theories from within the cognitive science of religion field, and critiques from without, this paper will evaluate ritual 
practices and gesture in worship, religious experience as socially embedded, sacramental forms and anti-externalist thinking, group 
identity and regulation, codification and the transmission of ideas. The argument will be advanced that, when refined by the extended 
mind/distributed cognition model, Whitehouse's "modes of religiosity" has the potential to be tremendously useful to historians of 
religion and presents one viable approach to developing a broader cognitive history.
In defence of nativism
Khlentzos, Drew
University of New England
dkhlentz@une.edu.au
Wednesday 4.40-5.00 Room #2
Can Nativism be defended from charges of empirical and conceptual inadequacy? Evidence from animal cognition, developmental 
psychology and language acquisition studies seems to point to the existence of innate knowledge. Yet many cognitive scientists remain 
sceptical. Some question the need to posit pre-wired stored knowledge when, they contend, general learning mechanisms can acquire 
the same information from the input. Others reject nativism on broad methodological grounds such as those to do with simplicity or 
parsimony. Finally some claim to detect conceptual incoherence of some sort or other in all the varieties of innateness hypotheses: 
some alleging that the nativist's case requires a flawed model of genetic encoding, others that it rests upon a mistaken conception of 
knowledge. 
I explain why the empirical and methodological arguments against nativism are unconvincing and argue that the a priori arguments are 
also unsound. A nativist model of innate knowledge is advanced which challenges one of the central tenets of a dominant theory of 
propositional knowledge but which seems to have independent empirical support. I conclude by reviewing some recent psycholinguistic 
evidence concerning young childrens' acquisition of logical words. Along with Stephen Crain and others, I argue that this evidence can 
be seen to provide good reason to believe in a quite specific form of innate knowledge: logic nativism.    
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Relational processing in childrenʼs arithmetic word problem solving
Knox, Kathy Glenda Andrews, Michelle Hood
Griffith University, Gold Coast
k.knox@griffith.edu.au
Wednesday 2.20-2.40 Room #3
The central executive is specialised to process relational information, which is integral to higher cognitive processes such as planning 
and goal-directed activities (Halford et al., 2007), such as solving arithmetic word problems. Word problem solving requires a mental 
model of task structure that represents variables and relations between them (i.e., the sets and operators). In arithmetic addition, three 
sets; augend, addend, sum; are related by the addition operation (English & Halford, 1995). This is a ternary relation. According to 
relational complexity theory (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998), once developed, relational processing (RP) capacity engenders 
flexibility allowing all components of a relation to be accessed. Thus, given the relation, addition (5,3,8), each of the following variations 
can be solved, 5 + 3 = ?; 5 + ? = 3; and ? + 3 = 8. In arithmetic addition, flexible access to the relation between sets is required when 
position of the missing set is varied, so individual differences in RP capacity should explain task performance. The effect of position in 
word problems has previously been investigated with Preschool to Grade 2 children, showing that accuracy decreased as the missing 
set was moved closer to the start of a problem (Riley, Greeno, & Heller, 1983). This also holds for older children, for example, 9- year-
olds solved word problems with the sum missing significantly more accurately than problems with the missing number in addend 
position, which were solved more accurately than problems with augend missing (Gilmore, 2006). Thus existing evidence shows a 
position effect on accuracy but has not examined other performance measures or whether individual differences in RP explain the 
effect. The present research addressed this by examining position effects and investigating how RP resources explain age-related 
performance on word problems. A sample of 166 children aged 6- to 9- years attending Queensland primary schools completed two 
measures of relational processing ability and an arithmetic word problem task. The 12 word problems were varied in the position of the 
missing set. Working memory and reading demands were controlled by presenting the task visually on a computer and reading each 
item aloud to the participant. Accuracy and response time data were analysed. Mixed ANOVAs showed significant position effects in 
the expected direction, such that missing sets in Augend and Addend position were solved with lower accuracy and longer response 
times than those in Sum position. Multiple regression analyses showed that RP capacity explained 58-68 % of the age-related variance 
in accuracy and a further 4-6 % unique age-independent variance in performance. These findings demonstrate the importance of 
individual differences in central executive functions defined as RP capacity in development of childrenʼs arithmetic addition, and have 
potential implications for designing effective word problem teaching strategies and interventions for children experiencing arithmetic 
difficulties.
A cognitive neuropsychiatric case-study of a circumscribed somatic delusion
Langdon, Robyn Laura Hughes, Emily Connaugton, Max Coltheart
MACCS
rlangdon@maccs.mq.edu.au
Wednesday 11.40-12.00 Room #3
We present a 30-year-old male (GC) with delusional disorder to illustrate the cognitive-neuropsychiatric approach to studying 
delusions. At the time of testing, GC believed that his mouth and gums were rotting. He had held this delusion with conviction for 10 
years. GC used ʻvisualʼ evidence to support his belief; he claimed to see the rotting skin and diseased gums. Neuropsychological 
assessment revealed that GCʼs attention and memory were impaired. He was relatively intact in all other domains. There was little 
evidence of a basic visual processing deficit. Visual imagery played no part in GCʼs delusion; he was just as capable as controls of 
discriminating between imagined and real events. While GC discriminated between pictures of normal and diseased gums as well as 
controls, he judged the diseased gums to be more abnormal, more distressing and more like his own gums. GC also showed delusion-
related attentional biases. We found no evidence that cognitive factors implicated in delusions in schizophrenia (biases of probabilistic 
reasoning and attributional style and poor ʻtheory of mindʼ) contributed to GCʼs failure to reject his delusional belief. In sum, excessive 
ruminations and associated interpretative and attentional biases appeared to sustain GCʼs delusion.
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Evaluation of a model of expert decision making in air traffic control
Lehmann, Stefan Scott Bolland, Roger Remington, Mike Humphreys, Selina Fothergill, Sam Hasenbosch, 
Andrew NealNational ICT Australia
Stefan.Lehmann@nicta.com.au
Wednesday 3.00-3.20 Room #3
Experts are capable of performing complex tasks using relatively simple strategies that are adapted to fit the constraints of the problem 
at hand. The resolution of conflicts between aircraft, for example, is regarded as a very complex optimisation problem, yet air traffic 
controllers are able to perform the task using a small set of simple strategies. Much of the expertise of the air traffic controller lies in the 
ability to select the appropriate strategy for the problem. In this project, we are developing a model of expert decision making for the air 
traffic control conflict resolution task. This is part of a broader project that is developing a new approach for simulating the tasks that a 
human operator performs, and the workload that the human experiences while carrying out those tasks. 
We model expert decision making as a serial search process in a hierarchical tree, in which the selection of a decision option for 
further evaluation is constrained by the situation. In this paper, we will present an analysis of the behaviour of an initial version of this 
model. The key aim of this analysis is to compare the modelʼs behaviour against the behaviour of expert controllers under varying 
scenario complexity. The analysis relies on both data from our model simulation runs and recordings of the activities of 14 air traffic 
Controllers. It is based on the frequencies of different intervention classes in four different static aircraft scenarios of varying 
complexity.
This paper is structured as follows: We will first present a functional overview of our conflict resolution model, including its underlying 
operational concepts. Both the aims and the general methodology underlying the analysis of the model will then be described. Results 
will be presented, identifying both the behavioural similarities and discrepancies between the model and human air traffic controllers. 
There is close agreement between the model and the humans in the selection of aircraft for intervention, although the humans are 
more variable than the model. Human controllers are also more variable in the solutions that they generate, and have a tendency to 
prefer vertical solutions, unlike the model which has a preference for lateral solutions. The results suggest that the modelling approach 
that we are taking has promise, and that it is possible to simulate expert decision making in complex dynamic tasks using relatively 
simple models of the decision process. 
A dynamic distributed model of short-term memory
Lewandowsky, Stephan
University of Western Australia
lewan@psy.uwa.edu.au
Computational models of cognitionWednesday 2.00-2.20 Room #1
Human cognition would be unthinkable without a “short-term” or “working” memory that provides ready access to task-relevant 
information. For example, mental arithmetic would be impossible without memory for intermediate sums. I present a dynamic 
distributed model of short-term memory that is derived from the “brain-state-in-a-box” attractor network. The model encodes order 
among memoranda via item-to-context associations that are encoded by Hebbian learning. The model relies on four core architectural 
principles: (1) Encoding is energy-gated, such that novel information is encoded more strongly than familiar information. (2) Retrieval is 
followed by response suppression (modeled by Hebbian anti-learning). (3) Response disambiguation is performed using attractor 
dynamics. (4) The passage of time per se does not causally determine the state of memory. I present the model and then show that 
many of the predictions derived from its core architectural principles have been experimentally confirmed.




Friday 10.50-11.10 Room #2
Although the definitive source of the left hemisphereʼs superiority for visual word recognition remains illusive, some argue that the left 
(LH) and right (RH) hemispheres engage different strategies during early perceptual processes involved in stimulus encoding. In 
particular, it is proposed that the LH treats a word as a unitary perceptual group whereas the RH processes the letters comprising a 
word as a series of individual perceptual units. Support for this processing distinction was assessed by examining hemispheric 
strategies for temporal integration using Prinzmetal and Millis-Wrightʼs (1984) feature-binding paradigm. Participants identified the 
colour and identity of a target letter, presented within a three-letter word (e.g., ART) or nonword (e.g., HRF), directed to their left or right 
visual field. Errors were classified on the basis of whether they involved substitution of a colour present within the stimulus but at a 
different location (ON error), or the substitution of a colour not present within the stimulus (OFF error). As anticipated, for word stimuli 
there was a higher proportion of OFF errors associated with trials directed to the RH, consistent with the notion that the LH treats 
words as single perceptual units and is hence biased toward miscombination of perceptual information present within the stimulus. The 
pattern of ON errors across stimulus type provided clear evidence of RH sequential encoding effects, with the number of errors 
increasing markedly across the ordinal position of the letters comprising the stimulus string. As such, these data provide new evidence 








Thursday 2.50-3.10 Room #2
In this study we show that there is a significant difference in the pace at which Chinese-speaking children and English-speaking 
children acquire the ability to name, manipulate and perform abstract functions on the days of the week (DOW). This occurs because 
the Chinese system relies on a numeric-based set of time-related terms, while the English system uses entirely arbitrary names for the 
same concepts. This, we claim, is a fundamental property of human learning: complex, abstract systems are acquired constructionally 
on the basis of previously-acquired, more concrete systems of knowledge. 
Pollmann (2003) argues that principles involved in the acquisition of number words also apply in the acquisition of time words. This, we 
argue, follows from the larger claim that acquisition of abstract systems is built on already-acquired, less abstract systems. If this is 
correct then we would expect children acquiring a language which labels time-terms with (already-acquired) numbers (e.g. Chinese) to 
be at an advantage over children acquiring a language which uses entirely arbitrary terms for time (e.g., English): Unlike the arbitrary 
words for the DOW in English, Chinese DOW are based upon the number system (e.g. Monday = 星期一, day-one; Tuesday = 星期二, 
day-two, etc.). This predicts that Chinese-speaking children should acquire the ability to name, manipulate and perform functions on 
the DOW earlier than English-speaking children. 
60 Children (30 Chinese, 30 English, 3-7 yrs) were shown seven picture cards, each corresponding to a day of the week (Figure1), and 
then told a story in their native language involving a cartoon character and his/her activities on each day. They were then asked, with 
pictures clearly visible, a series of questions reflecting five levels of complexity in assessing what level of mastery they had attained in 
comprehending and using time terms (Table1). Each progressive level tested the ability to perform more sophisticated manipulations of 
these abstract concepts.
Results show that Chinese children reach advanced levels of mastery at an earlier age than English-speaking children, t (58) = 2.86, p 
= 0.01. More specifically, Chinese children achieved a higher complexity-level at each corresponding chronological age than the 
English-speaking children, with the Chinese–speakers reaching the highest level (level5) by age 6:0, while the English-speakers only 
reached level 3 by 6;0. This apparent rapid development on the part of the Chinese speakers and the acquisition-differential between 
these two languages is because Chinese children have the benefit of a temporal system that is based on an already-acquired numeric 
system. English children, on the other hand, have no earlier system on which to base the acquisition of time concepts.
Thus, we have shown that there is a strong link between the early mastery of specific nomenclature systems, such as simple numeric 
sequences and the subsequent acquisition of more cognitively complex systems, such as time-related schema. This research shed 
lights on the constructional nature of human knowledge, where more complex abstract systems are acquired on the basis of less 
complex, more concrete systems.




Friday 2.50-3.10 Room #2
Many cognitive experiments that measure performance across multiple trials use a trial sequence that is unsystematic or random.  
Performance in these experiments is known to fluctuate according to the sequence of events leading up to any given trial.  The current 
experiments examined how these changes relate to a) explicit anticipation of the events on the next trial, and b) automatic facilitation 
based on recent event history.  A reverse dissociation was consistently found between trends in expectancy and trends in performance. 
This effect manifests in response biases in choice reaction time tasks, and spatial biases in attention under dual-stream rapid serial 




Current considerations for cognitive effort in the acquisition of sporting skill
Mann, David Damian Farrow
Australian Insitute of Sport & UNSW
david.mann@ausport.gov.au
Cognitive effort and skill learning in sportThursday 3.30-3.50 Room #1
Elite sportspeople rely upon highly refined visual-motor skills which are developed over many years of extensive practice. Theories of 
motor learning have commonly relied upon the role of cognitive effort to explain the facilitation of skill acquisition across different 
training paradigms. Cognitive effort is assumed to play a key role in skill learning, particularly considering that expert athletes are 
consistently demonstrated to possess superior perceptual-cognitive skills such as movement anticipation and pattern recall (Williams, 
Davids & Williams, 1999). In contrast, more recent evidence suggests that the minimisation of cognitive effort may in fact be beneficial 
for skill learning.
When compared to conventional practice structures involving the repetition of single skills in a blocked design, contextual interference 
– where practice involves the random sequencing of a combination of different motor skills – is consistently shown to enhance long-
term learning and retention (Shea & Morgan, 1979). This training effect is often explained to be a result of increased cognitive effort 
required for the reorganisation of different movements across successive practice trials. In contrast, blocked practice designs involve 
high degrees of repetition with little demand of cognitive processing (Magill, 2007). It is beneficial for attentional resources to be 
allocated to the execution of novel skills in novice athletes, though as the motor skill develops there is a decrease in the cognitive effort 
required (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon & Starkes, 2002). Indeed for skilled athletes, cognition is most likely to be detrimental to the 
execution of well-learned skills.
An alternate and more recent body of work has examined the acquisition of skills through the avoidance of cognitive effort in the motor 
learning process. Implicit learning – through methods such as analogy learning and dual-task paradigms – is reported to provide a 
superior means of skill acquisition facilitating more robust learning which is resistant to emotional and physiological stress (Masters, 
1992; Liao & Masters, 2001). These learning methods aim to minimise conscious awareness of how the skill is executed. Such an 
outcome may prevent reinvestment in well-learned skills, potentially advantageous in the avoidance of ʻchokingʼ or the ʻyipsʼ. 
This presentation will address this incongruence and present these issues as a background for new emerging experimental work 
focusing on the role of cognitive effort in sporting skills.
Autobiographical memory across the life span: Brain imaging and neuropsychology
Markowitsch, Hans J.
Physiological Psychology, University of 
Bielefeld, POB 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld, 
Germany
hjmarkowitsch@uni-bielefeld.de
Wednesday 1.40-2.00 Room #2
Numerous data from developmental psychology to neuropsychology point to a hierarchy of memory systems in which autobiographical 
memory develops latest and is ranked on the top of the memory systems. In Tulvingʼs recent definition it is largely congruent with the 
episodic memory system which he defines as the conjunction of subjective time, autonoetic consciousness and the experiencing self. 
Usually, autobiographical memories are affect-related.
We have studied autobiographical memory in four different groups of normal individuals ranging in age from 15 to 72 years by using a 
semi-structured interview (modified German-language version of the Autobiographical Memory Interview) in which it is asked for 
episodes from all life epochs. Usually two specific episodes from each decade – or for the young age – from each five-year epoch of 
life – are requested. These events should be remembered as realistically as possible; they should have a direct reference to the place 
where they happened and to the time at which they occurred. Furthermore, they should be evaluated with respect to the feeling the 
interviewed had at the time of their occurrence. The episodes were coded so that they could easily be re-evoked at a later time, that is 
under conditions of brain scanning. This was done by using certain stimulus words that were characteristic for the event (e.g., 
“marathon” for an episode where an individual was among the winners of a marathon run in Salonik). Subjects were then scanned with 
functional magnetic resonance imaging to reveal a network of brain regions active during retrieval of such episodes. Furthermore, brain 
activations during autobiographical episodes were compared with those to semantic memories.
It was found that there are differences (a) between age groups of subjects, (b) between time epochs within a given age group, and (c) 
between autobiographical and semantic memory retrieval. Overall, the young subjects had the clearest and most distinct activations. 
These were in limbic and paralimbic brain regions (including retrosplenial and precuneate regions) as well as in lateral temporal and 
prefrontal areas. Especially for the oldest group of subjects, events from childhood and youth resulted in the more and more limbic 
system-related activations, compared to recent events. Semantic knowledge led to more restricted and more neocortical activations, 
compared to autobiographical episodes. 
These results emphasize the importance of emotional connotations for autobiographical events and indicate that – in accordance with 
Ribotʼs law – the remote events still have a higher significance for the present life than the recent ones.
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An information-theoretic measure of representation
Marstaller, Lars Arend Hintze, Chris Adami
Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences 
(present) / Macquarie Center for Cognitive 
Science (soon)
lamarsta@gmail.com
Thursday 2.30-2.50 Room #3
We give a conceptual definition of representation and argue that informally, representation can be understood as the excess of 
information an artificial neural network has about its environment. From this, we develop a formal measure of representation based on 
information theory, viz. mutual information. Empirically, our measure is then tested by evolving a neurocontroller and measuring its 
representation. The results of our study shows that representation correlates with fitness in evolution, i.e. evolved neurocontrollers 
have a higher representation. And due to the information theoretic nature of this measure we can show how to apply and generalize it 
to other controller implementations. Finally, we discuss the relevance of our measure in the context of more recent debates about 
representation.
The mysterious disorder of unilateral spatial neglect
Mattingley, Jason
Queensland Brain Institute and School of 
Psychology
The University of Queensland
j.mattingley@uq.edu.au
KeynoteThursday 9.30-10.45 The Atrium
The syndrome of unilateral spatial neglect is a common outcome of acquired lesions of the right parietal lobe. Individuals with neglect 
display a range of bizarre behaviours, which taken together imply that the left side of the patients? perceptual world has ceased to 
exist. Twenty years ago debate raged over whether neglect should be explained as a disorder of attentional processes, or whether it 
should more properly be considered as a problem in constructing stable representations of contralesional space. Looking back, that 
debate seems largely to have missed the point. In this talk, I will provide a contemporary overview of the neglect syndrome, focusing in 
particular on what it has revealed about mechanisms of selective attention, spatial working memory and dynamic updating of sensory 
and motor representations. I will also consider what research on neglect has revealed about unconscious cognitive processing, and 
how it might be explained in terms of brain anatomy and physiology.
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Fullness of feeling: Reflection, rumination and autobiographical memories
McIlwain, Doris A. Geeves, J. Lambie
Department of Psychology, Macquarie 
University, NSW 2109
dmcilwai@psy.mq.edu.au
Wednesday 2.20-2.40 Room #2
Remembering in a way that is saturated with the feelings of the past seems to be a bad thing. Rumination has strong links to 
depression. Yet blues songs are full of richly immersed emotional experiences, and many of us listen to such songs, enjoying 
experiences from that past that might be sad. What makes the difference? Is it possible to fully have oneʼs feelings about sad past 
experiences, without this sadness tainting the present by promoting mood-congruent memory recall? We suggest that we can revisit 
the past in a way that enables us to contextualise that feeling then in the feelings we have in the present moment and that having full 
feeling is not necessarily rumination.
People have many motivations for directing attention to processes going on within. You might be distressed and want to sort things out 
(but get trapped in unproductive remembering), or be curious. Not surprisingly there are big differences in the consequences for coping 
and mood repair depending on just how you attend to inner processes. Reflection produces mood-incongruent memories, while 
ruminative focus produces mood-congruent recollections (McFarland & Buehler, 1997). However, existing psychological research on 
reflection and rumination (Trapnell & Campbell, 1997) does not measure the two equally well. In each case, we need to maintain 
distinctions between what you attend to, with what emotions, how fully you experience the emotions, and how they are attended to. 
In the case of rumination, Nolen-Hoeksemaʼs experimental work and other factor-analytic studies suggest that rumination has two sub-
components – a focus on symptoms and other aspects of self-experience (self-focus), and an analytical, evaluative cognitive style. The 
latter has been found to be associated with the over-general memory style linked to depression (and its subclinical variant dysphoria), 
which persists even when people are not currently depressed (Watkins, & Teasdale, (2001); Watkins & Baracaia (2002) and Watkins & 
Teasdale (2004)). 
But the parallel distinctions have not yet been made in research on reflection. Alternative, non-ruminative ways of accessing the past 
that have been studied often measure reflection in ways that make it synonymous with either the mere absence of rumination, or with 
distraction. Instead, we offer a positive account of reflection, situating reflection in an emotion theory (Lambie & Marcel, 2002) which 
suggests that emotion experience is underdetermined by bodily clout. We suggest that true reflection entails a richness of emotional 
experience as well as a capacity to know what emotion one is experiencing. This positive account of reflection distinguishes it from 
variants of emotional avoidance (like distraction and intellectualisation). We offer preliminary results of a scale assessing reflection 
(McIlwain & Galati, 2005), showing its links to and differences from rumination and its links to features of autobiographical memory like 
valence, specificity and generality. We explore the implications for depression and PTSD of a capacity for reflecting on feelings.




Agency, skills and embodiment in a cultural contextThursday 11.10-11.30 Room #1
This paper argues that there are important roles for both motor intentionality and representational intentionality to play in real-time 
skilled activity. The paper begins with the kinds of expert skilled activities that Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) have outlined. On their 
account, the transition from novice, to competence and proficiency, to genuine expertise involves the move from reliance on explicit 
rules and conscious deliberation, to a situation specific perception and a flexible, adaptive responsiveness to the situation. While it 
provides a valuable antidote to purely intellectualist accounts of cognition, the Dreyfusian model tends to present the expert as 
unreflective and unmotivated, merely expressing their embodied skills. This seems to be implausible in many cases. In particular, 
Dreyfusʼ account of skill development relies only upon the idea of motor intentionality and leaves no room for the influence of 
representational intentionality. This paper argues for a limited role for representational intentionality in the deployment of skills.




Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and BrainFriday 1.50-2.10 Room #1
In this paper I argue that the explanations provided by cognitive psychology and cognitive science are indispensable and cannot be 
replaced by explanations in neuroscience. The principal reason for this lies in the fact that cognitive phenomena are multiply realizable 
at the neural level. Given the plausible constraint that explanations involving cognitive phenomena are insensitive to the manner of 
their neural realization, I argue that cognitive explanations cannot, even in principle, be replaced by neural explanations.
ABSTRACTS: Paper presentations
33




KeynoteWednesday 10.00-11.15 The Atrium
As a philosopher, I am interested in the relationship between consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective. 
Conceptually, I will defend the claim that agency and minimal bodily self-consciousness are independent. On the level of new empirical 
data, I show how out-of-body experiences (OBEs) and full-body illusions (FBIs) provide an interesting new entry point for investigating 
the nature of the conscious self. In conclusion I sketch a new research program and advertise a new research target: "Minimal 
Phenomenal Selfhood". I ask - What is the simplest form of self-consciousness?




Wednesday 4.00-4.20 Room #2
Visual paradoxes such as the Penrose triangle present us with the problem of how to describe them mathematically. Only if we can 
describe them mathematically do we have a hope of proving rigorously (a) that they are really paradoxical, ie. contradictory (the “proof 
of paradox”), and (b) that two examples of paradoxes are of the same kind or of different kinds (the “classification problem”). I propose 
that there are three components to analysing them. First, there is a cognitive component, concerning which mental mechanisms give 
us the impression that we are seeing something impossible. This is best addressed by psychologists, who have done some work on 
this problem. Second, there is a logical problem, best addressed by logicians informed by the psychological results. Here the aim is to 
construct a logical theory which is internalised by the cognitive system, and from which a formal contradiction can be rigorously proved. 
Logicians are only just scratching at this problem these days. Third, there is a mathematical problem, best addressed by 
mathematicians informed by the above results, of providing mathematical modellings of inconsistent theories which show that certain 
propositions do not follow from the logical theory. This sort of result provides the basis for classification into different basic kinds. 
Mathematicians have done very little work on visual paradoxes, and none at all utilising the techniques of the theory of inconsistency. 
This synthesis of disciplines should yield novel directions for collaboration.




Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and BrainFriday 2.30-2.50 Room #1
Historically, the explanations provided by cognitive psychology have been indispensable to the development of neuroscience. 
However, as John Campbell has recently suggested, it is an open question whether or not this is because we have a built-in 
psychological bias towards explanations that cite cognitive processes. It may be that we have unexamined a priori assumptions to the 
effect that some phenomena must have certain causes. We may only find explanations of cognitive phenomena satisfying if they 
appeal to cognitive processes, but that may not reflect the way the world actually works. It may be a brute fact that low-level 
phenomena have complicated cognitive and rational effects.
The extent to which cognitive science explanations are multiply realizable is also unknown. Connections across levels may be much 
tighter than we have thought. We may learn things about the relations between cognitive phenomena from the way the flow of 
information in the brain is organized, but imaging studies alone cannot tell us very much. Imaging studies alone cannot uncover the 
relevant neural systems, which can be done by a patient mix of anatomical and experimental stuides.
 Mental states are probably not neural states, because they may better be thought of as states of the person rather than states of parts 
of the person; the mind is not a thing, and we probably go astray if we ask where it is, or where its parts are. But reduction to brain 
science is unlikely on epistemic grounds, whatever the underlying metaphysics may be. 
However, although outright reduction is unlikely, the future for cognitive theory may be difficult. We may be moving towards a situation 
in which traditional cognitive theory is squeezed out by a two-level cognitive neuroscience. Such a theory is currently being developed 
by some neuroeconomists. In its mature form, it would incorporate systems neuroscience at the bottom level and a formal rational 
choice or decision-theoretic picture of human psychology at the top level, but no intervening cognitive level. In a scientific world 
dominated by neuroeconomics or something like it, cognitive psychologists would continue to discover important effects, but would not 
offer computational theories to explain them.
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The cognitive science of mathematics: A case study
Newstead, Anne J. Franklin
UNSW
a.newstead@unsw.edu.au
Wednesday 4.20-4.40 Room #2
How does the mind comprehend and represent the infinite structures used in higher mathematics?  After all, a finite mind cannot 
perceptually survey in a sequential manner infinitely many objects.  The concept of the infinite therefore poses a challenge to 
empiricism about concept acquisition.  In cognitive science terms, there can be no mere image or visual sensation with an infinitely 
complex structure.  Nonetheless, the brain is able to think about infinite structures in mathematics. How is this feat possible? We 
examine Marcus Giaquintoʼs work on this topic in 'Visual Thinking in Mathematics', and situate it within the historic debate between 
rationalist and empiricist approaches to concept acquisition.
Connectionist representations and dynamical systems
O'Brien, Gerard Jon Opie
University of Adelaide
gerard.obrien@adelaide.edu.au The continuity of mind: dynamical systems and continuous representation in the cognitive 
sciencesFriday 10.50-11.10 Room #1
This paper critically evaluates Spivey's radical reconstruction of the idea of mental representation,  comparing it with alternative 
approaches; and discusses the relationship between connectionist and dynamical systems perspectives in cognitive science.
The facilitative effects of goal orientation on the speech convergence of partnersʼ mean vocal intensity
Oehmen, Raoul
University of Western Australia: School of 
Psychology
oehmer01@student.uwa.edu.au
Friday 4.30-4.50 Room #2
Speech convergence is the phenomena of interlocutorsʼ speech becoming more similar to one another over a period of conversation. 
With regards to the variable of amplitude (or more precisely, mean vocal intensity), prior research has shown the tendency for speakers 
to converge on this variable. However, past studies have shown this effect to be an extremely gradual process, requiring hours of 
conversation (perhaps in part due to methodological measurement problems). This has then called into question itʼs usefulness as 
either a social signalling tool or an automatic mechanism to aid fluency (as the literature has variously accounted for the phenomena of 
convergence). Furthermore, recent evidence from the convergence literature suggests that having a conversational goal dramatically 
enhances the degree of convergence (Reitter, Moore & Keller, 2006). As such, the current study aimed to rectify methodological 
problems in past studies as well as introducing a degree of goal orientation with a view to demonstrating amplitude convergence over a 
much shorter time period (minutes rather than hours).
The present experiment examined the speech from dyads engaged in goal orientated and non-goal orientated conversations for 
convergence of mean vocal intensity. Participants discussed the relative importance that they attached to 13 issue statements relating 
to a plagiarism scenario and were either told to simply discuss their views (non-goal orientated) or to come to a consensus (goal 
orientated). While both groups converged, greater convergence was observed in dyads where their conversations had a goal, 
compared to those that didnʼt.
 Furthermore, for the goal-orientated condition, but not for the non-goal-orientated condition, the degree of convergence was 
significantly correlated to the similarity with which participants ranked the issues in order of importance prior to the discussion. This 
suggests that perhaps it is not the presence of a conversational goal per se, but rather a change brought about as a result of goal 
orientation; with increased attention being the obvious candidate. Results suggest that speakers do indeed converge on mean vocal 
intensity and that this convergence can occur far more rapidly than previously thought, especially when speakers share a 
conversational goal. Results are further discussed in relation to Communication Accommodation Theory (Giles, 1973) and the 





Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and BrainFriday 2.50-3.10 Room #2
It is a mainstay of the philosophy of science that inter-theoretic reduction concerns the relationship between explanations pitched at 
different levels of nature. But the relevant sense of “level” is notoriously difficult to pin down. A promising recent analysis links the 
notion of level to the compositional relations associated with mechanistic explanation. Such relations do not order objects according to 
their scale or physical type — one and the same kind of entity can occur at several levels in a single mechanism. I will sketch this 
approach to levels and consider some of its implications for the relationship between cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
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Thursday 3.50-4.10 Room #2
Williams syndrome is a genetic disorder with a unique cognitive profile. People with WS have specific difficulties with arithmetic, spatial 
reasoning, planning and problem solving, while auditory and music skills, language,face recognition and social abilities appear to 
remain relatively spared. This unique pattern of spared and impaired abilities has seen WS recruited as evidence for mental modularity, 
particularly for language and social skills. But emerging evidence suggests the claims of modularity been premature. Social skills 
appear to have been overstated: individuals with WS tend to be inappropriately sociable, hyperactive and socially anxious, overly 
friendly and demonstrate abnormal social approach behaviour. Language abilities once thought to be intact are now thought to be 
either significantly delayed or to follow atypical developmental trajectories. The preserved music and face recognition abilities of the 
WS population are served by different cognitive and neural resources than in the typically developmental brain. Thus the evidence 
suggests that the WS brain is developmentally atypical and, as such, it is wrong to characterise the WS brain as a normal brain with a 
pattern of specific preservation and deficits. Thus arguments from WS to specific modules fail. Indeed, rather than being a rigidly 
encapsulated system, the new evidence suggests the WS brain is an extremely flexible organ that that co-opts available neural 
resource in a highly dynamic manner to cope in the world.
Remembering with dance
Pemberton, Monte
The University of Queensland (Philosophy)
rock_n_out@hotmail.com
Thursday 3.50-4.10 Room #3
When considering the relation of dance and memory the first question that people think to ask is ʻhow is it that dancers can remember 
(how to perform) a given dance?ʼ In other instances, dance appears as the object or locus of some remembering activity: the 
commemoration of the past, the stabilisation of identity, and as a means of overcoming the past, to name a few. But less explicit in the 
literature is the more general question of just how we remember with dance. What is it about dance that lends itself (in its many forms – 
we are best inclined to speak here of dance and dance-like practices) to a variety of different mnemonic applications and ends? 
With reference to distributed cognition, embodied cognition, the role of motility in thinking, and institutional theories of dance, I explore 
some of the ways in which dance works as a mnemonic technology. It would seem that the kind of role that dance is required to play in 
a given social or collective memory event exploits different aspects of our ability to remember dance in general. Furthermore, it would 
seem that different mnemonic practices that involve dance require different kinds of dance or dance-like practices. I examine these 
points in particular reference to the lack of employment of modern art dance as a technology of the collective memory. 




Thursday 3.30-3.50 Room #2
Key questions for the interface of developmental psychology with cognitive science are bound up with the growth of a theory of mind 
(ToM). A wealth of cross-sectional studies show that ToM, as assessed using inferential false belief tests, is mastered by most hearing 
children by age 5 but is often seriously delayed in children with atypical development owing to autism, blindness of deafness. However 
questions about the causal basis for delayed ToM growth in children with sensory or neuro-cognitive  impairments cannot be fully 
answered either with use of a single ToM indicator (e.g., false belief) or with cross-sectional data alone. This paper will briefly review 
published longitudinal studies of false belief understanding by children with deafness or autism and will then present original research 




Measuring the sense of agency in hypnosis
Polito, Vince Amanda J. Barnier
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, 
Macquarie University
vince.polito@maccs.mq.edu.au Using hypnosis to explore theoretical predictions and clinical phenomena from a cognitive 
neuropsychological perspectiveThursday 11.10-11.30 Room #2
A compelling feature of hypnosis is that highly hypnotisable people often describe their actions during hypnosis as occurring without 
effort. This sense of a shift in personal agency has influenced theories of motor control, thought and consciousness. However the 
phenomenology of this experience, that is, what it is like to act without a sense of agency, is poorly defined. I report here on the 
development of a scale for indexing subjective experiences of agency during hypnosis. Scale items were derived by analysis of the 
terminology used to describe agency in the psychological and philosophical literatures. The final scale consisted of 17 items which 
participants are asked to endorse on a 5-point Likert scale, e.g. “I was responsible for what I experienced” and “My experiences and 
actions were under my control”. Factor analysis of responses from 370 participants of varying levels of hypnotisability revealed two 
underlying factors that account for the subjective sense of agency in hypnosis – perceived involuntariness and perceived 
effortlessness. This scale was then used in a series of studies to investigate a) participantʼs retrospective evaluations of their overall 
sense of agency during an entire hypnosis session, b) changes in moment to moment sense of agency during different phases of a 
hypnotic task (i.e., before a hypnotic suggestion, immediately after the suggestion and after cancellation of the suggestion) and c) 
variations in participantsʼ sense of agency in response to different types of hypnotic tasks (eg motor vs. cognitive tasks). I will conclude 
by outlining the implications of these findings for competing theories of agency and theoretical accounts of hypnotic responding.
Bridging cognitive modeling and human behavior representation engineering
Pronovost, Sylvain
Institute of Cognitive Science, Carleton 
University/CAE Professional Services
spronovost@gmail.com
Wednesday 1.40-2.00 Room #3
The research presented here endeavors to integrate human factors models and other cognitive/behavioral modeling efforts, focusing 
on knowledge representation (KR hereafter), as well as on linking theoretical and applied research issues. On the issue of knowledge 
representation, the aim is to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for (i) satisfying the constraints of known design and 
processes concerning brain, cognition, and behavior on the one hand, and (ii) for satisfying the integration of such KR with other types 
of representations used in modeling and simulation (M&S) practices. The second focus is on linking theoretical issues with applied 
issues, with an emphasis on what features of models of individual agents are necessary to model their interactions with technologies, 
environments, and other agents, and what additional requirements are needed to make them scalable to such larger complexities.
Two interrelated solutions that are currently in development to address the aforementioned objectives are presented in this paper: the 
first is the development of a concept for the integration of scalable cognitive models (where scalability is meant as an architecture 
design bridging micro- and macro-level cognition and behavior) with human behavior representation (HBR) models, which are 
engineering models designed for M&S products and services. There have been numerous attempts to link low-level cognitive 
architectures to human-technology interaction (HTI) and multi-agent interaction models – all such models now generally fall under the 
label of sociotechnical systems (STS) modeling. We propose SoHBeR (SOciotechnical Human BEhavior Representation), a tripartite 
model combining the ACT-R cognitive architecture, a sociotechnical systems model bridging ACT-R with a macro-cognitive framework, 
and task network models obtained from human factors best practices used in discrete-event simulations of performance and workload.
The second solution is the automated re-use of human factors models in HBR. This second research interest stems from the idea of 
reusing human factors models generated via all sorts of task analyses, to be translated as direct extensions of HBR models of 
synthetic agents. This amounts to transferring the knowledge gathered from human factors analyses into working models of intelligent 
agents. Some compromises have to be made by the concerned subject matter experts, such as in the way human factors analyses are 
conducted and data is compiled, as well as how HBR-specific programming is conducted. On the human factors side, KR and 
representations of goals, tasks, functions, etc. will have to follow a strict language to satisfy formalism constraints such as explicitness, 
completeness, and decidability, while on the HBR programming side, extensions will have to be created to accommodate higher-level 
constructs such as goals, operators to reach such goals, selection rules, planning schemas for networks of subgoals and subtasks, etc. 
The end product would be an automated human factors model-to-HBR script to generate on-the-fly intelligent agents in synthetic 
environments, fulfilling roles, functions, and goals gathered from human factors analyses. The extensions for HBR modeling would be 
a candidate choice for inclusion in the Common Databases (CDB) standards in the M&S community, such as XML metadata files to be 
seamlessly accessed via CDB development and use.
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An Hypnotic Analogue of Somatoparaphrenia: Recreating the Delusion, Testing the Proposed Factors, and Challenging 
Experiences
Rahmanovic, Alena Amanda J. Barnier, Rochelle E. Cox
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science, 
Macquarie University
arahmano@maccs.mq.edu.au Using hypnosis to explore theoretical predictions and clinical phenomena from a cognitive 
neuropsychological perspectiveThursday 11.50-12.10 Room #2
Many aspects of delusional beliefs, particularly the factors that cause and maintain them, remain a mystery to psychology. Despite 
theoretical and clinical imperatives for studying clinical delusions, there is currently no practical way to investigate them in the 
laboratory. Hypnosis offers a powerful means to do this. This study used hypnosis for the first time to: (1) recreate the delusion of 
somatoparaphrenia – the delusion that oneʼs arm belongs to someone else; (2) test the predictions of Langdon and Coltheartʼs (2000) 
influential two-factor theory of delusions; and (3) explore the impact of multiple, progressively harder challenges to the delusion. To do 
this, 85 high, medium and low hypnotisable participants were hypnotised and given a suggestion to create a temporary delusion of 
somatoparaphrenia. Half were given a “Factor 1 + Factor 2” suggestion, which suggested the proposed components of 
somatoparaphrenia (arm paralysis, anosognosia and a belief evaluation deficit), and half were given a “Fully Formed” suggestion, 
which suggested the full blown delusional experience (“your arm belongs to someone else”). Participantsʼ responses were tested by 
five tests of paralysis and an ownership of arm test. Also, participantsʼ responses were challenged with contradiction, confrontation and 
peer-model procedures. The majority of highs, some mediums, and a few lows experienced components of somatoparaphrenia 
(paralysis and anosognosia), and approximately 50% of highs given the Fully Formed suggestion showed the full blown delusion; these 
highs reported compelling experiences with features strikingly similar to clinical cases of somatoparaphrenia. Notably, the Factor 1 + 
Factor 2 suggestion, intended to model the proposed components of somatoparaphrenia, failed to recreate the full blown delusion. 
Whereas some participantsʼ responses were breached in the face of challenge, others maintained their experiences. Together, these 
novel findings highlight the value of hypnosis for modelling clinical delusions; in particular, for testing theories of delusion and for 
exploring clinically relevant techniques for challenging and resolving them.
The Paradoxical Role of Cognitive Effort in Motor Skill Learning
Rendell, Megan Damian Farrow
Queensland Academy of Sport
Cognitive effort and skill learning in sportThursday 4.10-4.30 Room #1
A considerable body of empirical and theoretical literature has investigated the role of practice variables in the acquisition of motor 
skills (e.g., Guadagnoli & Lee, 2004). The current paper examines the notion of cognitive effort, specifically as it relates to two practice 
variables that suggest conflicting implications for cognitive effort: the scheduling of practice conditions (contextual interference) and the 
accrual of task-relevant knowledge during practice (implicit/explicit motor learning). First, research on contextual interference is 
examined and the implications of its two major theoretical explanations are discussed from the viewpoint of cognitive effort. Second, an 
overview of the implicit motor learning literature is used to discuss the implications of working memory resources and their relationship 
to practice and subsequent learning. Finally, the practical implications of the contextual interference and implicit motor learning 
research perspectives are discussed, particularly with regard to how the skill level of a learner, the complexity of the to-be-learned 
tasks, and the ability of the learner to effectively perform under psychological pressure interact with learning. It is hoped that these 
practical implications also inspire researchers to seek more applied outcomes from their research. 
References
Guadagnoli, M.A. & Lee, T.D. (2004). Challenge point: A framework for conceptualising the effects of various practice conditions in 
motor learning. Journal of Motor Behaviour, 36, 212-224.
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A Neurocomputational Instructional Indicator of Working Memory Load in Cognitive Load Theory
Revithis, Spyridon William H. Wilson, Nadine Marcus
University of NSW
revithiss@cse.unsw.edu.au
Wednesday 2.40-3.00 Room #3
This work is based on an earlier neurocomputational study of learning-performance aspects of human behaviour in automated learning 
environments. It expands the scope of the latter study by applying metrics of instructional efficiency within the conceptual framework of 
cognitive load theory.
The test bed of the proposed approach is a simulated learning environment, in which the organisation of the learning content is 
represented as a dependency graph of learning components (i.e. topics). The human learning behaviour in the specified environment 
is neurocomputationally recorded per learning component in terms of externally-assessed performance and introspective mental effort. 
The behavioural instances monitored from both behavioural spaces (i.e. performance space and mental-effort space) are assumed to 
be statistically representative, and are respectively mapped within the patterns of two Kohonen self-organising map (SOM) neural 
networks. Each network, due to the standard-SOM properties, is a topologically ordered set of patterns, which constitutes a highly 
compressed version of its corresponding behavioural space; P-SOM is a compressed version of the human performance space and E-
SOM is a compressed version of the human introspective mental-effort space, both based on the behavioural instances recorded 
within a given period of time in the specified learning environment, in relation to the learning content.
%
P-SOM and E-SOM are, in essence, models of learning behaviour for the specified learning environment, and can be used to pinpoint 
instructional design weaknesses associated with the dependency graph of the learning content. Furthermore, this dual-SOM neural 
network can indicate working memory load levels and cognitive load characteristics associated with the instructional design of the 
specified learning environment (and of its learning content); this is achieved by combining mental effort and performance behavioural 
patterns, an established dual-data metric in the field of educational psychology, within the interpretational framework of cognitive load 
theory. Specifically, germane and extraneous cognitive load levels are indicated in relation to performance and mental effort values.




Friday 3.30-3.50 Room #2
Standard linguistic accounts of lexical knowledge acknowledge a fundamental distinction between ʻdescriptiveʼ terms like 'triangle', 
'over' or 'hit' and ʻexpressiveʼ ones like 'hurray', 'damn' and 'yuck'. Neither the nature nor the extent of this distinction, however, has 
been articulated precisely, and there are many cases where a single expression can receive either an expressive or a descriptive 
analysis, or, indeed, both. For example, the meaning of exclamations like 'bravo', 'yippee' or 'hurray' appears to be susceptible to 
descriptive, propositional representation, even though these words are usually treated as canonical expressives. At the same time, 
canonical descriptive terms, in particular evaluative ones such as 'good', are often endowed with an expressive value which seems to 
preempt their descriptive one in actual discourse, at least from the phenomenological point of view. Given the very different 
psychological mechanisms taken to characterize expressive and descriptive semantic content, the grounds on which an expressionʼs 
meaning is classed as principally one or the other has major consequences for our understanding of the cognitive processes 
underlying speech, and is in need of clarification. Recently, Potts (2007) has suggested the following criteria for expressive content:
1. Independence: Expressive content contributes a dimension of meaning that is separate from the regular descriptive content. 
2. Nondisplaceability: Expressives predicate something of the utterance situation. 
3. Immediacy: Like performatives, expressives achieve their intended act simply by being uttered; they do not offer content so much as 
inflict it. 
4. Repeatability: If a speaker repeatedly uses an expressive item, the effect is generally one of strengthening the emotive content, 
rather than one of redundancy.
5. Descriptive ineffability: Speakers are never fully satisfied when they paraphrase expressive content using descriptive, i.e., 
nonexpressive, terms. (Potts 2007: 166-7, reordered)
As part of a broader investigation into the role of non-conceptual content in lexical representation, I suggest in this paper that, in fact, 
none of Pottsʼ characteristics can serve as a reliable criterion of expressive content. As a result, some other way of identifying 
expressive meaning is needed if the expressive/descriptive distinction is to be fruitfully maintained as a hypothesis about the nature of 
semantic content found in the lexicon.
Reference
Potts, C. 2007. The expressive dimension. Theoretical Linguistics 33: 165–198
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Computational Neuroscience: Modelling brain structure and functionWednesday 12.00-12.20 Room #1
Natural cognition is chiefly underpinned by neural activity in the brain, which is commonly probed via the EEG, electrocorticogram, 
depth electrodes, functional MRI, and other measures. Published connections between stimuli, physiology, information processing, and 
measurements have been based mostly on phenomenological correlations, but quantitative mathematical models of brain stimulus-
activity-measurement dynamics now exist. These include key features of physiology and anatomy from synapses to the whole brain 
and are constrained by multiple independent physiological measurements. Such models successfully predict and/or quantify a wide 
range of aspects of normal and abnormal brain function. These include evoked responses to stimuli in cognitive experiments, visual 
gamma (40 Hz) correlations during perception, and some abnormal cognitive states. Quantitative brain modeling thus provides a 
framework within which to interrelate, predict, and interpret diverse cognitive and other phenomena, especially where multiple scales 
and levels of description are involved.
Assessing cognitive effort in an applied sports contexts
Ruiz, Natalie Fang Chen
NICTA (National ICT Australia)
Natalie.Ruiz@nicta.com.au
Cognitive effort and skill learning in sportThursday 4.30-4.50 Room #1
Elite athletes' performance is not only based on excellent perceptual motor abilities, but also on outstanding perceptual cognitive 
ability. Fast and effective decision-making under time-pressured and physically demanding competitive environments can provide a 
great advantage, even between competitors at similar motor skill levels. Being able to evaluate an athleteʼs cognitive demand during 
performance can provide both athletes and coaches with an additional tool to support talent identification and targeted skills 
development. 
However, assessing the cognitive demand is difficult. Traditional methods for cognitive load monitoring include the use of physiological 
sensors, e.g. EEG, fMRI, as well as performance measures and subjective feedback. More often than not, these are not practical or 
feasible in the sports domain, mainly due to complex instrumentation, and specific mobility requirements. Performance measures offer 
too coarse a granularity to assess the level of cognitive load being experienced by the athlete, and cannot detect the gradual 
improvement in sports performance that often occurs over time – learning actually reduces the level of cognitive load incrementally, but 
may not initially translate into increased performance. 
Behavioural-based measures such as speech, gesture or eye-gaze analysis can provide an objective and non-intrusive method for 
monitoring cognitive load. The literature published in other domains suggests that various types of behavioural features can be 
severely affected by cognitive overload, e.g. the fundamental frequency and pauses of speech, the fluency and rate of gesture, and the 
type of visual search strategies used etc. Gradual reduction in mental load due to learning can cause changes in load-symptomatic 
behaviours, allowing the use of such implicit features as a proxy for the athleteʼs experience of cognitive load, and providing insights 
into the level of cognitive skill and strategic decision-making. Moreover, they can be collected while the athlete completes routine 
training, and be assessed against the athleteʼs own baseline.
Our research, while still in its early stages, is grounded in cognitive and educational psychology. Our first attempt at applying our 
technology to the sport domain has been carried out through a Netball cognitive decision-making study using video-based stimulus, 
where we collected speech, eye gaze and gesture data. We found that these assessment techniques have a great potential for real-
world deployment, in particular as a support tool for coaches in the construction of individualised training schedules, and in the 
diagnosis of underdeveloped perceptual-cognitive abilities, independently of perceptual motor ability.
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The categorisation of objects into numeral classifier categories: A discrimination task using Malay
Salehuddin, Khazriyati Heather Winskel
MARCS Auditory Laboratories, UWS
k.salehuddin@uws.edu.au
Thursday 11.50-12.10 Room #3
Categorisation is an essential process in human cognition and language development. It has been proposed that childrenʼs ability to 
categorise objects into categories proceeds through a differentiation from broader to finer distinctions (Mandler, Bauer, & McDonough, 
1991). It has also been claimed that children learn first to categorise typical exemplars prior to more atypical members of the same 
category (Markman, 1989; Mervis & Pani, 1980; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 
By studying numeral classifier acquisition we are able to examine how children learn to categorise and label objects in their 
environment using a constrained system or framework. The current study aimed at investigating how children categorise objects into 
Malay shape-based numeral classifier categories using a discrimination task. Specifically, it was aimed at examining if categorising 
pairs of numeral classifier exemplars that have a greater number of differing features, a strong contrast (two features differ: in 
dimensionality and rigidity, or in dimensionality and size) is an easier task than categorising those that differ in just one feature, a weak 
contrast (difference in dimensionality only). In addition, this study aimed at investigating if degree of typicality of numeral classifier 
exemplars has an effect on childrenʼs performance in categorising the objects. A categorisation discrimination task was conducted on 
140 6- to 9-year-old Malay children using e-Prime. The objects for categorisation in this experiment were pictures of eight Malay 
shape-based numeral classifier exemplars, which were paired based on number of contrasts (strong vs. weak) of the numeral classifier 
categories they are members of, and degree of typicality of exemplars (typical vs. atypical). Children were required to select the object 
from the picture pair that matched the numeral classifier category. It was found that children categorised objects more readily when 
there was a strong than weak contrast between exemplars of the shape-based numeral classifiers. Typical exemplars were categorised 
more readily than atypical exemplars. There was no interaction effect between the number of contrasts and typicality, which suggests 
that there are separate mechanisms operating in the categorisation process. This supports a mixed representational model of 
categorisation. 
References
Mandler, J. M., Bauer, P. J., & McDonough, L. (1991). Separating the sheep from the goats: Differentiating global categories. Cognitive 
Psychology, 23, 263-298.
Markman, E. M. (1989). Categorization and naming in children: Problems of induction. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Mervis, C. B., & Pani, J. R. (1980). Acquisition of basic object categories. Cognitive Psychology, 12(4), 496-522.




Predicting possible polysemies from conceptual transfer: An ontolinguistic view on multiple meanings
Schalley, Andrea Dietmar Zaefferer
Griffith University
a.schalley@griffith.edu.au
Thursday 1.50-2.10 Room #2
It is a basic tenet of ontology-based linguistics (ontolinguistics, Schalley & Zaefferer 2007) that the perceivable shapes of linguistic 
signs are concept activators of a special kind and that the activated concepts are always embedded in a rich network of 
interconceptual relations, called an ontology. Related concepts are another kind of concept activators when they are active, whereas 
the first and basic kind of concept activator is of course whatever falls under the given concept. Thus we agree with Lakoff and 
Johnson's (1980, 1999) insight that linguistic metaphor and metonymy is based on interconceptual relations and arise whenever an 
instance is conceptualized not only in terms of its most appropriate concept (BLOND-HAIRED or SKINNY PERSON), but also via 
related ones (BLOND or BEANPOLE). On the other hand we side with Casasanto (2009) when he warns: "We must be cautious when 
trying to infer conceptual structure from patterns in language and to discover conceptual universals on the basis of linguistic 
universals." We therefore separate conceptual and linguistic analysis, do the former first and use it as a reference frame for the latter.
Two kinds of relations form the backbone of ontologies: Taxonomic relations are to do with feature sharing and conceptual 
subordination, meronomic relations are to do with part-whole relations. The former give rise to metaphorical, the latter to metonymic 
transfer. Due to each conceptʼs embeddedness in the ontology ('No concept is an island') it is safe to assume that activation of a 
concept always entails to a certain degree the coactivation of taxo- and meronomically related concepts. Then, the possibility of 
polysemy (the same form has the lexicalized potential of activating different, but metaphorically and/or metonymically related concepts) 
is built into the very setup of ontolinguistics, which thus predicts what is generally observed, namely that polysemy is rather the rule 
than an exception in lexical items. Against this background, the question of what allows polysemy is replaced by the question of what 
constrains it. 
In this paper, we concentrate on the polysemy constraints provided by an underlying ontology and on the resulting structured 
multiplicity of possible meanings. Thereby, a cognitive motivation of what has been called ʻregularʼ or ʻsystematicʼ polysemy is 
proposed. In particular, the readings of the English syllable /lIft/ are analyzed in detail with regards to (i) possible polysemies (ex ante 
motivation: which formations of multiple meanings are conceivable?) and (ii) realized polysemies (ex post motivation: which readings 
are actually present, and how coherent are they with regards to the underlying ontology?). Our analysis shows that the prediction both 
overgenerates (predicted possible readings are not lexicalized) and undergenerates (lexicalized readings are not predicted). We 
propose explanations which in the former case draw on competition with closely related lexical units (cf. /reiz/), and in the latter on the 
fact that far-fetched connections may ex post be mnemonically helpful, but cannot be anticipated. Overall we claim that the comparison 




The explicable emergence of the mind
Schier, Elizabeth
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science
lizschier@gmail.com
Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and BrainFriday 3.30-3.50 Room #1
It is standard in philosophy to base the irreducibility of mental states in the fact that they are multiply realisasble. However there are a 
number of philosophers of science (most noteably Bunge and Auyang) who have argued that mental states are emergent because 
they are identical only to particular organizations of the brain. Just as water is identical to one way of organizing H20 molecules and ice 
is identical to another set of structured H20 molecules, so to are mental states identical to particular set of structured brain states. In 
this paper I sketch how this approach to the mind-body problem differs from the standard approach.
1) Explanations in cognitive Psychology are indispensable because there are new properties that emerge at the cognitive level which 
will require new causal explanations. The whole can do things that the unstructured parts canʼt and so explanations that refer to the 
whole will be necessary.
(2) Often mental phenomena will be multiply realisasble, but this is not why explanations referring to them are irreplaceable. Rather, 
the explanations are irreplaceable because of the emergence of new properties
(3) Mental states are identical to neural states in the same way as water is identical to H20. What is important about this form of 
identity is that it is not eliminative. Just as water can do things that H20 molecules in different organizations canʼt (would you want to 
jump off a diving board into a pool full of steam) so too can particular mental states do things that their neural constituents in a different 
organization cannot. 
(4) What we can obtain is a reduction without leveling (Bunge). In particular we can explain the nature of the whole in terms of its parts 
but this does not mean that the whole is nothing more than its parts nor does it mean that explanations referring to the whole are 
unnecessary.
(5) I have yet to see a case that meets Maxʼs criteria. So it seems fair to say that currently the challenge has succeeded
(6) I suspect that the challenge will ultimately be met because I hold that non-eliminative reductive explanations can be obtained. 
Because of the denial of radical multiple realisability and the acceptance of an identity between mental and neural states, studying the 
brain should prove to be theoretically informative. The only caveat I would offer is that neuroimaging may not be informative because of 
the gap between blood flow and the neural activity that is the representing vehicles. 
Using with and without music conditions in a dance to provide insight into temporal cognition
Schubert, Emery Sam Ferguson, Kate Stevens
University of New South Wales
e.schubert@unsw.edu.au
Dance and Cognitive ScienceThursday 2.30-2.50 Room #1
This paper outlines techniques to investigate cognitive mechanisms that mediate the recall of a dance work.  A dancer, in a small 
ensemble, performed an original contemporary piece in two conditions: with-music and with no-music.   His movements were motion 
captured.  Under the assumption that the with-music condition provided a time-locked version of the performance, we examined the 
types of 'errors' that occurred in the absence of music when compared to the with-music performance.  The presence of two temporally 
manipulative cognitive mechanisms were investigated: (1) Scaling, where timings in the no-music condition were compressed or 
expanded (performed consistently faster or slower respectively) and (2) Lapsing, where short fragments of material were inserted or 
deleted in the no-music condition.  Applying findings from studies from performance of memorised music and speech predicted that 
lapsing would be the dominating mechanism.  Two analytic techniques were applied and developed to compare the motion-capture 
data across the two conditions: A time domain based sliding window of cross correlation functions and a frequency domain based 
modification of dynamic time warping (used in speech recognition software).  Both techniques had a range of strengths and 
weaknesses, but produced, on the whole, consistent results.  Specifically, while lapsing was found to be the dominant mechanism 
explaining differences in timing between with-music and no-music conditions (consistent with expectations compared with literature in 
other domains), a repeated performance of the same work in both conditions and by the same dancers produce a more complex 
picture:  Scaling was found to explain some of the variation in timing.  Given that the dance work under investigation was 'in progress' 
we assert that the (A) memory errors manifesting themselves as lapses can be reduced with practice and, contrary to intuition and 
previous research (B) scaling errors (the production of an accurate internal time-keeping clock) can also be improved with practice.  
The theoretical implications of scrutinizing or explaining dance memory in terms of lapsing and scaling are discussed.
ABSTRACTS: Paper presentations
43
Multielement visual signal detection: Three principles and a model
Sewell, David K. Philip L. Smith
The University of Melbourne
dsewell@unimelb.edu.au
Computational models of cognitionWednesday 2.40-3.00 Room #1
Models based on signal detection theory accurately characterize psychophysical performance on a wide variety of tasks. 
Notwithstanding these successes, a central question of performance is unaddressed by detection theory. What computational 
processes give rise to observed behavior? We address this question in the context of visual signal detection. In the simplest such task 
– detection of a single stimulus in an otherwise empty display – a comprehensive account of performance has been provided by the 
visual short term memory (VSTM) model of Smith and Ratcliff (2009). The model relates detection performance to the rate at which a 
VSTM trace of the stimulus is formed. Strong traces result in fast, accurate performance, whereas weak traces are associated with 
slower, error-prone performance. We propose an extension of the VSTM model that is applicable to visual displays comprising multiple 
stimulus elements. The extensions to the model are based on three key principles: 1) Stimulus inputs interact competitively for access 
to VSTM, 2) Competitive interaction is facilitated by recurrent feedback, and 3) Attentional resources are dynamically reallocated 
across inputs over the course of a trial. These three principles are readily incorporated into the theoretical framework of the VSTM 
model. We demonstrate that the extended model provides a very natural processing account of a number of qualitative aspects of 
detection performance. These include biased recruitment of target-like stimuli into VSTM, performance costs imposed by the presence 
of redundant targets, and reduced encoding rates as a function of the number of display elements.




Agency, skills and embodiment in a cultural contextThursday 11.30-11.50 Room #1
The re-emergence and re-evaluation of Gilbert Ryleʼs work has provided valuable frameworks for recent developments in the cognitive 
sciences. Ryleʼs assertion of the primacy of know-how, his emphasis of the connection between thought and action, his rejection of the 
ʻintellectualist legendʼ, and his anti-representationalism, are just four aspects of The Concept of Mind (1949) that prefigure recent 
debates about the mind. 
Ryleʼs account of know-how, the ability to do something (1949, Ch. 2), will be the main focus of my discussion. Crucially this account 
denies that there are any accompanying ʻinternalʼ mental processes that are the cause of skilled behaviour (Ryle, 1949). The 
distinction between knowing how and knowing that is simply that between the ability to do something – ride a bike for example – and 
the ability to state a fact – that a bicycle has two wheels. Furthermore, knowing that in this formulation is dependent on knowing how. 
The distinction is important for Ryle in his understanding of expert skills: “Cleverness at fighting is exhibited in the giving and parrying 
of blows, not in the acceptance and rejection of propositions about blows, just as ability at reasoning is exhibited in the construction of 
valid arguments and the detection of fallacies, not in the avowal of logicianʼs formulae. Nor does the surgeonʼs skill function in his 
tongue uttering medical truths but only in his hands making the correct movements” (Ryle 1949, p. 48). Therefore, what counts when 
one knows how to do something is the evidence of oneʼs competence in action.
I will explicate and defend Ryleʼs distinction. However, as valuable as Ryleʼs distinction is, he did not have the resources to explain how 
we embody and exercise these abilities. I hope to show how recent developments in cognitive science provide these resources.
Externalism and intuition
Slezak, Peter
University of New South Wales
p.slezak@unsw.edu.au
Wednesday 5.00-5.20 Room #2
A decade ago, Egan (1999) described externalism regarding mental content as “clearly in the ascendancy” while “Individualism seems 
passé.” Segal (2000) remarked that “Putnamʼs Twin Earth example has become a sort of paradigm in the philosophies of language and 
mind” and Farkas (2003) describes externalism as “almost an orthodoxy.” Fodor (1987) has noted that the Twin-Earth Problem “isnʼt a 
problem; itʼs just a handful of intuitions together with a commentary on some immediate implications of accepting them” (1987). 
However, Fodor doesnʼt question or analyse the intuitions themselves. In support of the dissident internalist position, I take up the 
matter of intuitions mentioned by Farkas (2003) and also by Boghossian (1998) as being at the heart of externalism. Farkas 
characterizes this “deeply rooted” intuition as “baffling” and a “vexatious problem” that “poses a serious challenge for any attempts to 
give an internalist analysis” of the familiar thought experiments such as Putnamʼs (1975) Twin Earth scenario. I focus attention directly 
on theoristsʼ “intuitive responses to a certain kind of thought-experiment” that “appear to leave them little choice” (Boghossian, 1998). 
The internalist or individualist accounts can be strengthened if this compelling intuition can be given a diagnosis in the way that one 
might show that the Müller-Lyer illusion is deceptive in spite of its subjective force. That is, the externalist position may be undermined 
by attending to its aetiology and demonstrating how the intuition arises from explicable mechanisms. Instead of defending internalism 
directly I ask: If internalism is true, why does it seem to be so implausible?
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Modelling the neural basis of memory representations and decision making
Smith, Philip Roger Ratcliff
University of Melbourne
philipls@unimelb.edu.au
Computational models of cognitionWednesday 2.20-2.40 Room #1
Recent single-cell recording studies have investigated decision-making in awake, behaving monkeys performing simple perceptual 
tasks. These studies have yielded evidence for a model of decision-making much like the sequential-sampling models developed in 
mathematical psychology over the last 40 years. In these models, noisy information is accumulated over time until there is enough 
evidence for a response. These models predict response time (RT) distributions and choice probabilities from simple decision tasks in 
precise, quantitative detail. Recently we have shown that model parameters estimated from a monkey's choice probabilities and RT 
distributions also predict the neural firing rates in cells in the oculomotor control circuit in the period prior to the response. This provides 
evidence for the neural reality of the hypothesized information accumulation processes. In this talk I provide an overview of these 
recent developments. I then discuss problems in how to link the mass-action properties of populations of neurons to behavioural-level 
information accumulation functions. I also discuss how the persistence of stimulus information in visual short term memory after 
stimulus offset can be represented computationally using a simple feedback model.
The continuity of mind: Experimental and theoretical considerations
Spivey, Michael
University of California, Merced
spivey@ucmerced.edu The continuity of mind: dynamical systems and continuous representation in the cognitive 
sciencesFriday 10.30-10.50 Room #1
This talk introduces and updates central themes of The Continuity of Mind. The book argues that comprehending a spoken sentence, 
understanding a visual scene, or just thinking about the days events involves the serial coalescing of different neuronal activation 
patterns, i.e., a state-space trajectory that flirts with a series of point attractors. As a result, the brain cannot help but spend most of its 
time instantiating patterns of activity that are in between identifiable mental states rather than in them. When this scenario is combined 
with the fact that most cognitive processes are richly embedded in their environmental context in real time, the state space (in which 
brief visitations of attractor basins are your thoughts) suddenly encompasses not just neuronal dimensions, but extends to 
biomechanical and environmental dimensions as well. As a result, your moment-by-moment experience of the world around you, even 
right now, can be described as a continuous trajectory through a high-dimensional state space that is comprised of diverse mental 
states. This talk discusses experimental evidence for these views, and some theoretical implications.
Dissociative memory disorders and immigration
Staniloiu, Angelica Sabine Borsutzky, Hans J. Markowitsch
Bielefeld University
angelica.staniloiu@uni-bielefeld.de
Wednesday 2.40-3.00 Room #2
Studies of immigrant populations have shown that the stresses associated with the process of immigration and acculturation could lead 
to significant psychological, psychiatric or somatic symptoms. The mechanisms by which they trigger the psychiatric pathology in 
immigrants are still incompletely defined and understood, but some studies have found that acculturative stress could alter the function 
of the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis. The risk for developing certain psychiatric conditions might increase with the duration of 
residence in the new country, which raises the hypothesis that at least in the case of certain psychiatric conditions, chronic stress 
related to immigration and acculturation might play a role. Among the psychiatric symptoms, the dissociative ones have extensively 
been studied as part of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in immigrant populations or refugees who were victims of torture or war or as 
part of the Culture-Bound Syndromes. Although, since long time ago, several psychoanalytical writings pointed to a connection 
between immigration and dissociation, by noting that the immigration process might pose a significant threat to feelings of identity and 
self-cohesiveness, little has so far been published in the psychiatric or psychological literature about the occurrence and characteristics 
of other dissociative conditions in immigrants, in particular the ones which belong to the DSM-IV-TR category of Dissociative Disorders 
(such as Dissociative Amnesia and Dissociative Disorders Not Otherwise Specified-Ganser Syndrome). 
In the current presentation, we aim to review four cases of patients who developed Dissociative Disorders (Dissociative Amnesia and 
Ganser Syndrome, respectively) on a background of stresses related to immigration. The patients were investigated psychiatrically, 
medically, neurologically and by neuropsychological methods. These patients were adult males, who had Eastern or Central European 
backgrounds and no known previous psychiatric or medical illness and no known family psychiatric history. They immigrated to 
Germany or Canada and encountered several difficulties in the process of migration and/or adaptation to the new country. All four 
patients developed severe psychiatric dissociative symptoms after objectively minor stresses that involved accidents (physical injuries) 
of mild severity, which occurred several years after the patients had immigrated to the new country of residence. In spite of adequate 
treatment, their symptoms followed a chronic, unremitting course. The neuropsychological profile of these patients revealed certain 
similar characteristics, such as executive functioning deficits (such as limited cognitive flexibility) and impairments of emotional 
processing. Although no firm conclusions can be drawn based on the limited number of case reports, we propose that psycho-social 
stresses related to immigration and acculturation could lead to Dissociative Disorders in certain immigrant populations via a 
dysregulation of the hormonal stress responses associated with the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis, which is mediated by factors 
related to pre-migration experiences, ethnic features and individual characteristics, such as cognitive flexibility, emotional processing 
abilities, language skills and competence and explanatory model of illness. 
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The effect of causal strength on the use of causal and similarity-based information in feature inference
Stephens, Rachel Daniel Navarro
University of Adelaide
rachel.stephens@adelaide.edu.au
Thursday 11.30-11.50 Room #3
Category-based feature generalisations are affected by similarity relationships between objects and by knowledge of causal 
relationships between features. However, it is unclear whether people will simultaneously consider both relationships. Some recent 
experiments have suggested that people use only one or the other types of information, and that causal knowledge may draw attention 
away from similarity information. However, other studies suggest that people do incorporate both relationships. To help resolve these 
seemingly contradictory results, the current study addresses an important difference between past experimental designs: the strength 
of causal relationships between features. Participants were trained on a set of four different kinds of artificial alien animals (with a 
known perceptual similarity structure), and were taught about three features that the animals can have. In a between-participants 
design, participants were taught that either: 1) there were no relationships between the three features; 2) the features shared weak 
causal relationships; or 3) the features shared strong causal relationships. After training, all participants then made some feature 
predictions about the four kinds of animals, to test which type/s of information were used by participants in each condition. Three 
probabilistic graphical models were fit to the participants' predictions: one that considers only the tree-structured similarities between 
objects, one that considers only the causal chain relationships between features, and one that combines knowledge of both 
relationships. It was found that the strength of the causal relationships influenced the degree to which participants' feature 
generalisations were affected by causal and similarity considerations.
Implicit learning of structured contemporary dance movement
Stevens, Kate Tajana Opacic, Barbara Tillmann
University of Western Sydney
kj.stevens@uws.edu.au
Dance and Cognitive ScienceThursday 2.50-3.10 Room #1
The sequencing of dance movements may be thought of as a grammar. We investigate implicit learning of regularities that govern 
sequences of unfamiliar, discrete dance movements. It was hypothesized that observers without prior experience with contemporary 
dance are able to learn regularities that underpin structured human movement. Thirty-one adults were assigned to either an exposure 
or control group. Exposure consisted of 22 grammatical three-, four- and five-movement sequences presented twice in random order; 
sequence duration ranged from 9-19 s. In a test phase, exposure and control groups identified previously-unseen sequences as 
grammatical or ungrammatical, and rated confidence of judgment. The exposure group selected significantly more new grammatical 
sequences in the test phase than the control group. In addition, for the exposure group, the zero correlation criterion, wherein no 
relation between confidence and accuracy indicates unconscious knowledge, was satisfied. Through exposure, novice observers can 
learn a grammar that governs the sequencing of dance movements. This has implications for implicit learning of long sequences, 
working memory, and the development of expectations through exposure to contemporary dance.
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Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and BrainFriday 2.10-2.30 Room #1
1) Are the explanations provided by cognitive psychology and cognitive science indispensable? Or are they replaceable in principle by 
explanations in neuroscience? If not, why not?
If ʻindispensableʼ means ʻthe best availableʼ the answer seems to be yes. On the question of ʻreplaceable in principle by neuroscienceʼ 
one would need here to have some clarification (at least) of what ʻin principleʼ and ʻneuroscienceʼ means. For example, there seems to 
be sense in which cognitive psychology might be replaceable in principle by explanations in physics (at least the physics that scientists 
will adopt in the ideal limit of inquiry), but this would be true of neuroscientific theories as well. Likewise it is not completely clear to me 
why the systems postulated currently by cognitive psychology are not already properties of the brain in some sense, and so come 
under the subject matter of neuroscience broadly construed.
(2) Are the phenomena referred to in explanations in cognitive science realizable or implementable in many different ways at the 
neurophysiological level? If so, is this why these explanations are irreplaceable?
Mostly (scientific) psychological theories seem to postulate computational or representational systems of various sorts that can indeed 
by implemented or realized in the brain in various ways. But this isnʼt what makes such theories irreplaceable (at least if this means 
ʻindispensableʼ as per question 1). What makes them indispensable is that they are the best available theories. 
(3) How do mental or psychological states relate to neural states? For example, are they identical to neural states?
If it is true that psychological theories postulate things that are multiply realizable then these things will not be identical to any particular 
neural states (at least if by ʻneural stateʼ we mean the sort of thing that multiply realizes the system postulated by the psychological 
theory). This follows simply from the fact that multiple realization is a one-many relation, while identity is a one-one relation. I think it is 
therefore more reasonable to say that the things in question will be realized by neural states, but of course the notion of realization can 
be explained in various ways.
(4) Is it possible or likely that cognitive psychology will reduce to neuroscience? If so, what is the relevant sense of reduction? If so, will 
a successful reduction mean that phenomena (the entities/properties/processes) at the cognitive level do not exist?
The idea that one theory can be reduced to another may be clarified or explained in various ways. One thing that might be meant is 
that the characteristic claims of cognitive psychology follow logically from the characteristic claims of neuroscience together with bridge 
laws. If that is what is meant it does not follow from a successful reduction that the phenomena at the cognitive level do not exist. 
Another thing that might be meant is that the data that the cognitive psychological theory was advanced to explain are better explained 
by some neuro-scientific theory. If that is what is meant, then it does seem reasonable to think that that the items required for the truth 
of the cognitive psychological theory do not exist if there is a successful reduction. There are also other possibilities. 
Max Coltheart has recently challenged the claim that neuroimaging has been informative for cognitive theory.
(5) Is the challenge successful?
As an onlooker in these debates, I find Coltheartʼs papers on this largely convincing. But I also find it very striking how his discussion is 
(intentionally) limited in scope. For example, in his discussion (2006, p.326) of the subsequent memory paradigm, the issue turned on 
the fact that one neuroimaging study supported the structural theory, while another supported the competing procedural theory. This 
raises the concern that had a particular study not been carried out (e.g. for irrelevant reasons), Coltheartʼs conclusion would have been 
quite different!
(6) If so, does it signal that neuroimaging is conceptually misconceived? Or is the putative failure just a symptom of immaturity of the 
discipline?
Coltheart (2006, p.422) draws a three-way distinction between (a) a view which says that neuroimaging studies do currently provide 
evidence to distinguish psychological theories; (b) a view which says that the do not currently provide such evidence but they might do 
so in the future; and (c) a view which says that they could not in principle provide such evidence. If his arguments are correct, Coltheart 
seems to have ruled out (a), but he has left it open which of (b) or (c) is true. I am inclined to option (b) mainly because I worry about 
what ʻin principleʼ is supposed to mean.
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A taxonomy of silences from a psychological perspective
Stone, Charles B. Alin Coman, Adam Brown, William Hirst
Macquarie Centre for Cogntive Science 
(MACCS), Macquarie University
cstone@maccs.mq.edu.au
Wednesday 3.20-3.40 Room #2
When discussing the past with others, people often leave things unsaid that they are capable of remembering.  Silences about the past 
are ubiquitous, from the failure of leaders to state all that they know about a national crisis, through the erasure of public figures from 
public discourse by totalitarian governments, to the embarrassed hesitancy to talk about a socially taboo topic or the lies (sometimes 
white) that permeate everyday conversation. Here we are concerned with the role silences play on subsequent memory, what we call 
mnemonic silences, between a speaker and a listener. We outline four types of mnemonic silences: covertly remembered, intentional 
silence; covertly remembered, unintentional silence; not remembered (covert or overt), unintentional silence; and no remembering 
(covert or overt), intentional silence. We discuss current psychological literature demonstrating the role these mnemonic silences play 
on the subsequent memory of both speakers and listeners. In particular, it will be argued that Cuc, Koppel, and Hirstʼs (2007) socially-
shared retrieval-induced forgetting (SS-RIF) provides a novel and systematic means of investigating the effects of mnemonic silences 
on both the speaker and the listener. We conclude by discussing the importance of mnemonic silences in both future individual and 
collective memory research.
Cuc, A., Koppel, J., & Hirst, W. (2007). Silence is not golden: A case for socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting. Psychological 
Science, 18, 727-733.
Making sense of group cognition: the curious case of transactive memory systems
Theiner, Georg
Department of Philosophy, University of 
Alberta
georg.theiner@ualberta.ca
Wednesday 4.20-4.40 Room #3
The group mind thesis (GMT) — i.e. the idea that groups can have emergent cognitive properties in their own right — was a fixture in 
the intellectual landscape of the late 19th and early 20th century (Wegner 1986). But traditional expressions of GMT were riddled with 
serious problems that eventually led to its demise. First, it remained unclear how the group mind was supposed to be physically 
embodied. Second, it was unclear how we could measure it. However, despite its historical ballast, appeals to group cognition have 
recently gained new ascendancy in a wide range of disciplines concerned with collective behavior, such as historiography (Le Goff 
1992, Nora & Kritzman 1996), social decision theory (Pettit 2003, List 2008), social psychology (Larsen & Christensen 1993, Hinsz et 
al. 1997, Mohammed & Dumville 2001), organizational memory and learning (Sandelands & Stablein 1987, Walsh & Ungson 1991, 
Argote 1999), group-selection theory (D.S. Wilson 2002), distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995, Tollefsen 2006), and philosophy 
(Goldman 2004). Against this revival, Rob Wilson (2001, 2005) has argued that contemporary versions of GMT remain fraught with 
precarious ontological commitments that have no real explanatory value. From a methodological perspective, Cooke et al. (2000) have 
argued that the measurement of genuine team-level cognitive constructs would require the development of hitherto unavailable 
“holistic” methods.
In this paper, I argue that these pessimistic assessments are mistaken, based on an understanding of group cognition as an emergent 
form of socially distributed cognition. To that end, I first break down the notion of cognition into a graded cluster concept which 
subsumes a more or less loosely knit family of capacities, and use Wimsattʼs (1986) notion of emergence as a failure of “aggregativity” 
to classify the organization-dependence of cognitive activities performed by groups. In the resulting two-dimensional space, we can 
distinguish three different types of socially distributed cognitive systems (swarms, aggregates, and teams). Then I use our conceptual 
framework to reconstruct appeals to team-level cognition in the theory of transactive memory systems (Wegner 1986, 1995). A TMS 
consists of two components: (i) a representational component which is the distribution of individual and transactive (“who knows what”) 
memories in a group, and (ii) a procedural component which includes all communication processes (“transactions”) by which members 
cooperatively allocate, encode, retrieve, elaborate, and integrate information. Focusing on the assembly-task paradigm (Liang et al. 
1995, Moreland et al. (1996), Moreland & Myaskovksy (2000), Lewis et al. (2005), Lewis et al. (2007), I show how the notion of a TMS 
can be operationalized, and what cognitive benefits it confers on groups. Based on my analysis, I argue that groups can function as 
adaptive information-processors in their own right which display collective forms of intentionality. Our multi-level framework reveals that 
the relationship between individual and group cognition is not a zero-sum game, and that the causal mechanisms in virtue of which 




Automatic cognitive processes in eating behaviour implicated in obesity: Application of the implicit association paradigm
Todorov, Kamelia
CSIRO Human Nutrition; School of 
Psychology, Social Work and Social 
Science, University of South Australia
kamelia.todorov@csiro.au
Friday 10.30-10.50 Room #3
In light of the unprecedented increase in the prevalence of overweight and obesity, considerable efforts are being made towards 
understanding regulatory processes implicated on food choice and eating behaviour.  
The observation that obeseogenic eating exhibits features of addictive behaviour has prompted a focus on the automatic cognitive 
processes underlying individual differences in responsiveness to environmental food cues.  
Based on conditioning models in addiction, food-cue responsiveness is framed in terms of its representation in the associative network 
whereby exposure to the cue triggers relational connections corresponding to approach or avoidance behaviour.  The nature and 
strength of these associations are presumed to determine the accessibility (automaticity) of the corresponding behavioural tendency.  
In the context of obeseogenic eating, strong associations reflecting an enhanced motivation for the rewarding properties of food in 
particular may automatically trigger approach behaviour, ultimately undermining regulatory control.
The present research reports on two studies examining automatic associations implicated in food-cue responsiveness as a function of 
BMI status and various eating behaviour tendencies.  The Implicit Association paradigm (Greenwald et al., 1998; 2003); a 
computerised latency response-based measure of associative strength used extensively in cognition research, was adapted to 
examine (1) the nature and strength of associations between high and low-fat foods and anticipatory enjoyment of consumption as well 
as (2) the accessibility of eating enjoyment relative to eating control constructs upon exposure to palatable food cues.  Relationships 
with self-reported food-intake, habitual eating tendencies, explicit attitudes and behavioural intentions were additionally examined.  
In both investigations, the nature and strength of automatic associations were reflected in corresponding self-report indices, eating 
behaviour and BMI status.  Specifically, results from Study 1 indicated that obese participants automatically associated high-fat foods 
with positive anticipatory outcomes relative to low-fat foods, while normal-weight and (to a lesser degree) overweight participants 
exhibited the opposite association pattern.  Furthermore, the automatic response tendency exhibited by obese participants was 
significantly associated with obeseogenic eating in addition to self-reported difficulty in inhibiting food craving, and demonstrated 
greater predictive utility than self-reported behavioural intention.  Results from Study 2 indicated that while palatable food was more 
readily associated with eating enjoyment relative to eating control constructs across comparison groups, reaction time differences were 
significantly more pronounced in overweight and obese participants, chronic (unsuccessful) dieters, and participants scoring high on 
disinhibited eating and non-homeostatic consumption indices.  Again, associative strength as assessed by the latency-response 
paradigm demonstrated unique predictive utility.
Results of the research provide support for the notion that heightened food-cue responsiveness is a function of conditioned, 
associative processes reflecting enhanced motivation for palatable food which may undermine deliberate efforts to regulate food 
intake.  These findings point to the significance of potential differences in the cognitive structuring and processing of food-related 
information in the development of targeted therapeutic interventions.  Additionally, the findings add to a growing body of research 
emphasising the importance of considering automatic processes in understanding and predicting self-regulatory behaviour.  
Methodological considerations relevant to the assessment of automatic associative processes are also highlighted.  




Wednesday 4.00-4.20 Room #3
Cognitive approaches to literature and literary theory have gained increasing ground in the past decade, but remain decidedly a 
minority approach within the discipline. Most advocates of cognitive approaches to literature draw from an limited repertoire of research 
in the broader field of cognitive science, with much work taking its inspiration from the work of Stephen Pinker (so-called Darwinian 
literary criticism); the cognitive linguistics of George Lakoff (the so-called “embodied mind”); neuro-imaging; and research on Theory of 
Mind. The assumptions governing this work remain decidedly ʻbrainboundʼ or, at best, “embodied” in a rather restricted and inert sense. 
In this paper I will survey recent approaches to literature and cognition and argue that a more promising approach is to view cognition 
not as intra-cranial, but instead as extended across brain, body, and world, as has been argued by philosophers such as Andy Clark, 
Michael Wheeler, and John Sutton, as well as social scientists such as Ed Hutchins. Such distributed models provide a key mechanism 
for linking cognition and culture, and point the way to a model of cognition with genuine historical purchase. Such models also permit 
reciprocity between the disciplines, since historically nuanced accounts of cognition stand to contribute accounts of such cognitive 
processes as memory, skill, and perception. I will demonstrate the utility of such approaches with examples drawn from theatrical 
history, especially evidence about the complex patterns of skill and memory that underpinned the practices of early modern playing 







KeynoteWednesday 5.30-6.45 The Atrium
We engage in spatial cognition from the first moments of life: where to look, where to reach, where to go.  Each of these acts entails a 
different space and a different set of behaviors. Spatial knowledge derives from many sense modalities, is essential for survival, and is 
a basis for other knowledge.  Our conceptions of space derive from our perceptions of space and our behavior in space.  Both our 
bodies and the world have natural asymmetries that affect perception of and behavior in these spaces, yielding mental or external 
representations of them that systematically differ from space as measured by geographers or physicists.  Perception and behavior are 
different for the different spaces we inhabit: the space of our bodies, the space immediately surrounding us, the space we navigate, 
and the spaces we create to augment our own thinking.
How space gets into language? A novel approach
Ursini, Francesco-Alessio
MACCS center for Cognitive Science
fursini@maccs.mq.edu.au
Friday 4.10-4.30 Room #2
The dilemma regarding the relation between Cognition and Language has always been subject of intense study, and one topic which 
has received intense scrutiny is that of “Space”: how we determine the position of objects in the world and how we express such 
information in everyday language.
Two approaches have emerged as the most relevant and empirically supported, although they offer quite different perspectives: a 
perspective focusing on Language (or “Language-bound” perspective) and a perspective focusing on Cognition (or “Cognition-bound” 
perspective).
The “Language-bound” perspective proposes that certain parts of speech (prepositions, e.g. “at”, “behind”, “on”) are the main carriers 
of “geometrical” information, limited to orientation, distance and inclusion (Landau & Jackendoff (1993)). Look at (1): 
(1) The book is behind the table
In (1), the preposition “behind” only expresses the geometrical relation between the book and the table, reduced however to a minimal 
notion of orientation and inclusion (or lack thereof). Other pieces of visual information are claimed to be “filtered” out. 
The “Cognition-bound” perspective proposes that other aspects are equally relevant (Coventry & Garrod (2004)). Look at (2) and (3):
(2) The hand is in the glove
(3) Mario sits at the piano
In (2), mechanical aspects are relevant, as the hand and glove form a “joint unit”: if we also say that hand touch an apple, the glove will 
touch the apple too. In (3), more abstract notions (loosely definable as “affordances”) also play a part: Mario may potentially interact in 
various ways with the piano, but it is not specified how.
Landau & Jackendoff (1993) offer a more fine-grained perspective on which parts of speech convey spatial information, but a quite 
coarse-grained perspective on their content. Conversely, Coventry & Garrod (2004) offer a fine-grained perspective on meaning, but a 
quite coarse-grained perspective on which parts capture such meaning.
Both theories, however, fall silent on how the relation of two objects can change over time, as a sentence like (4) conveys: 
(4) Mario goes to the store
Intuitively, (4) informs us that Mario is currently moving and, as a consequence, he will reach the store afterwards, but neither theory 
can explain us how this is so.
In this talk I will offer a novel approach to this dilemma. I will first show that we can have a dynamic perspective on “Space” by 
analyzing how we keep track of objects and the events they partake in, over time (Pylyshyn (1989, 2003), Zacks et al. (2001,2008)), 
and thus capture how we can keep track of Mario and his journey to the store. 
I will then use Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp et al. (2005) and show how such information is captured by the single parts of 
speech (verbs like “goes”, prepositions like “to”) when they are combined together to form a sentence. I will then argue that, by offering 
a fine-grained (and dynamic) approach to the syntax and semantics of linguistic expressions, informed by dynamic theories of 
cognition, I will also offer a more viable answer to the dilemma of “Space”.
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Wednesday 3.20-3.40 Room #3
Intelligence analysis is a very rich and demanding cognitive process. There is often also a great deal at stake. Improving intelligence 
analysis is one place where cognitive science can potentially make a very practical contribution to high-level knowledge work. In this 
talk I will focus on hypothesis investigation, a central aspect of intelligence analysis. Hypothesis investigation is attempting to 
determine what is most probably happening in some situation by assessing hypotheses in the light of available or obtainable evidence. 
Hypothesis investigation is typically done in an intuitive, informal manner. Common problems are intelligence analysis include (a) failing 
to canvass an adequate range of hypotheses; (b) neglecting or mis-rating evidence when judging the plausibility of hypotheses; and (c) 
inefficiency in seeking additional evidence. To help deal with these problems, various structured methodologies have been proposed. 
The canonical technique is the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) method, developed by Richards Heuer at the CIAʼs Kent 
School and widely taught in analytical training at intelligence agencies. ACH has a superficially compelling logic and a number of 
important advantages over informal or unstructured analysis. However it also has a number of intrinsic limitations and practical 
difficulties. I will describe five very serious problems with ACH, concluding that ACH grieviously distorts the both the logic of the 
relationship between evidence and hypotheses and the analystʼs intuitive cognitive processes, i.e. her capacity to make sense of a 
situation. I will also briefly describe an alternative to ACH, hypothesis mapping (HM). HM is an application of argument mapping, a.k.a 
structured argumentation to the specific context of hypothesis investigation. Hypothesis mapping addresses the major problems of 
ACH, and it may well be more “user friendly” than ACH, and fit better into the analystʼs overall workflow.
Computation and representation in dynamical cognitive science: Revision or replacement?
van Gelder, Tim
University of Melbourne
tim@vangelder.id.au The continuity of mind: dynamical systems and continuous representation in the cognitive 
sciencesFriday 11.10-11.30 Room #1
Spivey argues that instead of fighting the use of the word 'representation' in dynamical cognitive science, we should 'merely allow it to 
naturally shed that albatross of *symbolizing* something'. This paper critically evaluates Spivey's reconstruction of the idea of 
representation within a dynamical systems perspective.




Wednesday 4.40-5.00 Room #3
The presentation will introduce a connectionist Agent-based model (cABM) that incorporates detailed, micro-level understanding of 
social influence processes derived from laboratory studies and that aims to contextualize these processes in such a way that it 
becomes possible to model multidirectional, dynamic influences in extended social networks. At the micro-level, agent processes are 
simulated by recurrent auto-associative networks, an architecture that has a proven ability to simulate a variety of individual 
psychological and memory processes. At the macro-level, these individual networks are combined into a “community of networks” so 
that they can exchange their individual information with each other by transmitting information from one net to another. This essentially 
creates a network structure that reflects a social system in which (a collection of) nodes represent individual agents and the links 
between agents the mutual social influences that connect them. The network structure itself is dynamic and shaped by the interactions 
between the individual agents through simple processes of social adaptation. The process of theory building and testing is 
implemented through a tight coupling of simulations and empirical research, in which the cABM is validated against data obtained from 
neuroscientific research, psychological experiments and the analysis of large collectives. This process should allow to determine 
parameters of cABM to simulate larger groups, providing a bridge between individual processes, small group interaction and large 
social collectives. In this talk, I will report on the current state of this program.
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The cognitive plausibility of algorithms for referring expression generation
Viethen, Jette Robert Dale
Language Technology Group, Macquarie 
University
jviethen@science.mq.edu.au
Friday 3.50-4.10 Room #2
Over the last two decades, referring expression generation has become one of the most popular research topics within Natural 
Language Generation. Arguably, describing objects is a central task for any computational system engaged in producing natural 
language. There are two distinct exercises we might be undertaking when we develop algorithms to determine the content for referring 
expression. One would be an exercise in engineering, where we attempt to develop algorithms that are able to effectively identify 
intended referents for hearers, for use in sophisticated applications of natural language generation. Alternatively, we might be engaged 
in an exercise in computational psycholinguistics, where we attempt to model what it is that speakers do when they refer to an entity. 
Our interest in the present paper is in the second of these exercises: how might we develop algorithms that emulate the referring 
behaviour of humans, and in so doing, perhaps begin to explain how humans carry out this task? 
We present an analysis of a corpus of experimentally collected referring expressions in which humans describe simple target objects 
surrounded by a few distractor objects with the aim of shedding some light on the processes that might be at play. We show that 
popular algorithms for the generation of referring expressions are not able to produce the full range of variation displayed in the 
human-produced data and are therefore unlikely candidates for cognitive models. This shortcoming is in large parts due to the serial 
fashion in which these algorithms consider properties for inclusion in a referring expression, where each decision is dependent on what 
has been included so far. One important finding from our analysis is that the data vastly underspecifies what might be involved 
algorithmically in the generation of referring expressions in physical scenes such as the ones from our corpus. However, it does allow a 
number of conclusions to be drawn that lead us to propose to replace serial dependency with a parallel gestalt model that considers 
visually salient properties independently of each other. We conclude with a list of questions that need to be addressed experimentally 
before a full algorithmic account of human referring expression generation is possible.
Audience response to dance structure: Effects of observer experience and soundscape on continuous measures of 
engagement with a contemporary dance work
Vincs, Kim Emery Schubert, Catherine Stevens
Deakin University
kvincs@deakin.edu.au
Dance and Cognitive ScienceThursday 1.50-2.10 Room #1
Measuring ʻreal timeʼ or continuous responses to dance performance offers a means of investigating how observers respond to 
structure in dance. In order to comprehend dance, observers must parse dance movement into a series ʻlegibleʼ choreographic 
frameworks. While post-performance measurement tools probe audiencesʼ responses to a dance work as a whole, moment-by-
moment responses to choreographic form and structure are more difficult to investigate because they are necessarily subsumed in the 
process of generating a cohesive response to a dance work at its conclusion. However, understanding how responses to dance are 
generated by specific choreographic structures and devices throughout a dance is critical to understanding how dance elicits the kinds 
of cognitive and emotional responses that make it culturally valuable.
In previously reported work, we have used the portable Audience Response Facility (pARF) – PDAs that record audience response 
continuously, – to measure audiencesʼ ʻlevels of engagementʼ with a dance work, sampling the responses of up to 20 observers and 
plotting the average response time series and standard deviation time series of the levels of engagement. We have identified what we 
term ʻgem momentsʼ in the observersʼ responses to dance, in which average engagement increases fairly suddenly across a group of 
observers. We have also analysed the agreement between observers, and found that a ʻgem momentʼ is often associated with a drop 
in agreement between observers. By analysing what kinds of choreographic structures coincide with these kinds of responses, we 
have hypothesized that periods of high engagement often follow choreographic ʻdisjuncturesʼ or surprises, and that periods of high 
agreement tend to be associated with more predictable dance structures. 
In the experiment reported here, we compared continuous responses recorded from two distinct kinds of dance observers, dance 
experts and tertiary dance students, to a solo work by a professional contemporary dance artist. The aim was to see whether there 
were any distinctions between the two responses that would indicate how dance artistsʼ approaches to apprehending dance change 
over the course of their transition from student to professional artists. To this end, the presence and absence of an accompanying 
soundscape was systematically manipulated. Additionally, we used video recordings of the performances to correlate the kinds of 
choreographic structures that were associated with specific aspects of the responses, and motion capture to determine the dynamic 
characteristics of movement passages associated with areas of increased engagement.
Preliminary analyses indicate striking similarity between the responses of students and experts to this dance work. We will discuss the 
kinds of choreographic structures and the movement dynamics, as determined using video and motion capture, that elicit engagement 
of and agreement between observers watching a professional contemporary dance work, as well as the subtle differences that emerge 
in the response between the two groups.
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Cognitive neuroscience: Spanning the void between cognitive science and neuroscience
Williams, Mark
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science
mwilliam@maccs.mq.edu.au
Integrating Perspectives on the Relation between Mind and BrainFriday 3.50-4.10 Room #1
Throughout history there has always been debates about the worth of one method over another. The invention of the combustion 
engine had carriage designers and engineers up in arms about the worth of such a noisy, expensive machine. Yet eventually, they 
conceived of a new carriage that made their lives more exciting: the car. Today, there are those who have no interest in the brain and 
continue to create models based purely on behavioural data. Their questions relate to how the mind works (independent of the brain; 
Cognitive Scientists). Then there are those that are interested in how the brain works (Neuroscientists). Are the questions different? 
Yes, of course. I would like to suggest that Cognitive Neuroscience is a way of bridging the gap between these two disciplines, and 
neuroimaging is the main (but not only) tool. Cognitive neuroscientists see the mind as an intrinsic part of the brain: they take cognitive 
models and attempt to test them and develop new hypotheses using neuroscience methods. The big issue is that cognitive models do 
not refer to the brain, but the methods used in neuroscience are exclusively about the brain. It is the necessary re-interpretation of the 
cognitive models to fit with the neuroscience methods that creates the misunderstandings. How can a theory be informed by a method 
if the questions are different?  I will discuss cognitive neural modelling as a way to span this void and hopefully convince you that the 
void is worth looking across. 
Linguistic relativity: From chasing frogs to eating spaghetti.
Winskel, Heather
University of Western Sydney
h.winskel@uws.edu.au
Thursday 2.10-2.30 Room #2
There is ongoing interest and debate on whether the language we speak influences the way we think or perceive of the world. Indeed, 
there are considerable differences in how languages segment and package events or actions into sentences (Talmy, 2001). An 
intriguing question is whether these linguistic differences affect how speakers attend to different aspects of the visual world when 
speaking. According to Slobinʼs (1996) thinking-for-speaking formulation, the grammatical categories of the language that one speaks 
shape or filter the way that aspects of the world are expressed. It is argued that obligatory, grammaticalized categories have a special 
channeling effect on the attention of the speaker towards particular functions of these forms (Berman & Slobin, 1994; Slobin, 1996; 
Strömqvist & Verhoeven, 2004). 
Winskel and Luksaneeyanwin (2009) investigated if obligatoriness of grammatical categories in Thai and English affects the expression 
of temporal events depicted in short animations in children and adults. Thai and English differ in the degree of obligatoriness of 
grammatical categories of imperfective aspect and the expression of deictic motion events. English has obligatory grammaticized 
imperfective aspectual marking on the verb, whereas Thai has verb final deictic-path verbs that form a closed class set. The speech 
produced by participants was analysed in terms of explicit expression of ongoingness of the two events and entrance and exit of 
protagonists depicted in the animations. Results supported the notion that obligatory grammatical categories shape how Thai and 
English speakers express temporal events or actions. English speakers explicitly expressed the ongoingness of the events more than 
Thai speakers, whereas Thai speakers expressed the entrance and exit of protagonists depicted in the animations significantly more 
than English speakers. 
However, this type of research has its methodological limitations as linguistic behaviour is being used as evidence to support the 
ʻchanneling of attentionʼ hypothesis. An innovative approach to empirically test this claim that obligatory categories have a channeling 
effect on ʻattentionʼ, is to monitor eye movements while participants observe animations, as the pattern of eye fixations and the 
trajectory of the eye are an indicator of visual attention (Rayner, 1998). In the current study participants watched short animations 
depicting two overlapping actions in a linguistic and a non-linguistic condition and their eye movements were recorded using the latest 
eye tracking technology (EyeLink 2000). In the linguistic task participants were required to describe what happens in the animations. In 
the memory task participants were required to select the matching picture to the animation out of a set of three. If event perception is 
only affected by thinking-for-speaking, but otherwise is independent of language, we would expect differences in distribution of visual 
attention between English and Thai speakers only in the linguistic condition. However, if cross-linguistic differences in grammatical 
marking more profoundly affect event perception, we would expect to find differences in visual attention between English and Thai 
speakers in both the linguistic and non-linguistic conditions. Preliminary results will be reported.
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The concept of ʻsocial brainʼ is a hybrid, located somewhere in between politically motivated philosophical speculation about the mind 
and its place in the social world, and recently emerged inquiries into cognition, selfhood, development, etc., returning to some of the 
founding insights of social psychology but embedding them in a neuroscientific framework. In this paper I try to reconstruct a 
philosophical tradition for the social brain, a ʻSpinozistʼ tradition which locates the brain within the broader network of relations, 
including social relations. This tradition runs from Spinoza to Lev Vygotski in the early 20th century, and on to Gilles Deleuze, Toni 
Negri and Paolo Virno in recent European philosophy, as a new perspective on the brain. The concept of social brain that is articulated 
in this reconstruction overcomes distinctions between Continental thought and the philosophy of mind, and possibly gives a new 
metaphysical framework for social cognition.
Eating and drinking in Mandarin and Shanghainese
Ye, Zhengdao
The Australian National University
zhengdao.ye@anu.edu.au
Thursday 2.30-2.50 Room #2
There are many activities that human cannot do without. Eating and drinking are two of them. But, do people conceptualise these 
ʻbasicʼ human activities in the same way or differently? Do languages encode them similarly or differently? This paper provides a 
perspective from two varieties of Chinese—Mandarin Chinese and Shanghainese Wu, which is spoken in the Shanghai area with 
approximately 14 million native speakers. Both of these forms of Chinese suggest two different ways of conceptualization. In Mandarin 
Chinese, a lexical distinction is made between chī and hē, comparable to eat and drink in English (but not exactly the same); whereas 
in Shanghainese Wu one single lexical item *čhyq is used to describe any activity involving the intake of things. In this paper, I will 
conduct a detailed contrastive semantic analysis of these concepts in question. I will compare the range of use of Mandarin chī and hē 
with English eat and drink, and discuss the conceptualisation reflected in čhyq, including its figurative use. The findings of this paper 
are consistent with those emerging from cross-linguistic investigation of less familiar languages in recent times, in that there are 
variations in linguistic coding of eating and drinking (e.g. Newman, in press). However, this paper also illustrates that one perhaps 
should not underestimate the variations of conceptualisation within one ethnic group. 
(*Transcription convention follows Sherardʼs 1972 thesis.) 
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Some philosophers think that perception is a perfectly good source of knowledge about other peopleʼs mental states. In particular, they 
think it is possible to know that others have emotions by perceiving that they have emotions. In this view, there is such a thing as 
perceiving that someone has an emotion. Does this mean that we cannot perceive emotions themselves, but only that people have 
emotions? Although only a few philosophers explicitly argue for this view, most are likely to say that itʼs not at all clear what it means to 
say that we see emotions. On the other hand, those who think that we do see emotions hardly provide any positive argument for their 
view and confine themselves to explaining why some philosophers deny that we see emotions. 
In this paper, I provide a positive argument for the view that we see emotions. I develop my approach by running two separate but 
interdependent arguments. The first shows that facial expressions of emotions are dynamic patterns of changes that carry information 
about the emotions that produce them. The second shows that the visual system functions to extract the information that expressions 
carry. I develop this argument by drawing on empirical data from psychology and brain lesion studies. The conjunction of the two 




Gorilla watching: Effects of exposure and expectations on inattentional blindness
Beanland, Vanessa Kristen Pammer
Department of Psychology, The Australian 
National University
vanessa.beanland@anu.edu.au
Inattentional blindness (IB) occurs when an individual fails to notice an obvious but unexpected object when their attention is engaged 
by another task. Previous research has shown that expectations can significantly influence IB rates, specifically through determining 
attentional set. Most research has excluded participants with IB knowledge on the belief that any knowledge of IB would invalidate 
experiments by causing participants to “expect the unexpected”. We conducted a series of experiments using dynamic stimuli to 
determine whether knowledge of and exposure to IB research had any effect on expectations and rates of IB. Experiment 1 
investigated the effect of limited pre-existing IB knowledge in a sample of 72 undergraduates (71% female; age M = 21.4 years, SD = 
4.6). Participants had not previously participated in any IB research and had either no knowledge (n = 25) or minimal knowledge of IB 
research and terminology (n = 47). There was no between-groups difference in IB rates, Χ2 (1) = .008, p > .05. Primary task accuracy 
on critical trials did not vary with IB knowledge, nor did accuracy differ between those who noticed the critical stimulus and those who 
did not. Experiment 2 investigated the effect of varied knowledge levels in 36 undergraduates (78% female; age M = 23.2 years, SD = 
8.7). All had recently participated in a similar IB experiment and were either first years with no knowledge (n = 16), first years with 
limited IB knowledge (n = 11) or later year students who had studied IB in their psychology coursework (n = 9). Rates of IB did not vary 
with knowledge (p > .05, Fisherʼs Exact Test). Primary task accuracy also did not vary with knowledge, F(2,33) = 1.503, p > .05, nor 
between noticers and non-noticers on the critical IB trial, t(34) = -1.745, p > .05. Experiment 3 manipulated IB knowledge in 46 
undergraduate students (85% female; age M = 19.5 years, SD = 2.9), immediately following a similar IB experiment. High knowledge 
participants (n = 23) were given detailed information on IB research paradigms. Low knowledge participants (n = 23) were given 
comparable information on eye movement research. Rates of IB differed significantly between groups, Χ2 (1) = 4.847, p < .05, with 
nearly three times as many high knowledge participants noticing the unexpected stimulus (48% vs 17%). There were no differences in 
primary task accuracy between high and low knowledge groups, however accuracy was significantly lower for noticers compared to 
non-noticers, t(44) = -3.527, p < .01. This suggests that noticers in experiment 3 may have adopted a dual task strategy and been 
“watching” for the unexpected stimulus. Overall these results suggest that pre-existing knowledge of IB does not affect the incidence of 
IB in experimental settings unless the participants have detailed information about the specific paradigm and are given the information 
immediately prior to the experiment.
The use of dynamic cues in self and familiar face recognition
Bennetts, Rachel Darren Burke
Dept Biological Sciences, Macquarie 
University
rachel.bennetts@students.mq.edu.au
Familiarity plays an important role in facial processing - generally, familiar faces are processed faster and more accurately than 
unfamiliar faces, and familiar face processing involves additional neural substrates when compared to general face processing. The 
importance of familiarity is highlighted when facial form cues are degraded, so that a person must rely primarily on movement 
(dynamic) information to identify someone (OʼToole, Roarke and Abdi, 2002). It is, however, unclear what dynamic cues are used for 
facial recognition of both familiar and unfamiliar faces. Self-face recognition also recruits differing neural substrates when compared to 
unfamiliar and familiar face processing (Platek et al, 2006). However, little work has been done on dynamic self-face recognition, and 
none has focussed on the type of movement that facilitates this process. The current study used motion capture cameras to record the 
facial movement of participants. This motion was then animated into point-light-displays, with either the rigid (eg nodding/shaking), 
non-rigid (eg mouth/eyebrow motion) or combined motion displayed. Participants completed a recognition task involving point-light 
animations of themselves, a person familiar to them, and a person unfamiliar to them to determine whether differences in familiarity 
resulted in the use of different movement cues. Results will be discussed in relation to previous research on dynamic facial recognition, 
and possible implications for current facial processing models.
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Action synchronisation with biological motion
Colling, Lincoln William F. Thompson, John Sutton
Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science
lcolling@maccs.mq.edu.au
People exhibit an astonishing ability to synchronise their actions with others with a high degree of temporal precision. Because of the 
speed and accuracy of interpersonal synchronisation, it is unlikely that these actions are planned on the basis of incoming sensory 
input. Instead, recent theory suggests that actions are planned in advance on the basis of internal predictions. It has been proposed 
that these predictions are generated by means of an emulator that concurrently simulates perceived actions. These emulations require 
information about the simulated system in order to accurately predict it, and it has been proposed that this information is derived from 
the observer's own motor system, that is, observers generate predictions of observed actions based on how they would, themselves, 
perform these actions. If this is the case then a prediction advantage should occur whenever observed motor actions are similar, or 
identical, to those that would be produced by the observer's motor system. More generally, synchronization should be relatively good 
between individuals who have similar motor systems, and it should be optimal when one attempts to synchronize with one's self.
Method: Twenty participants (17 females; 1 left-handed) took part in this study. The experiment was split into two phases separated by 
an average of 3 weeks. During the first phase, participants performed 30 repetitions of a rhythmic up-and-down arm movement while 
their movements were recorded with a motion capture system. Each pattern contained 5 up and 5 down movements. The best 20 
repetitions were selected for the Test phase. During the second phase, participants were presented with animated humanoid figures 
constructed from the motion capture data. Half of the animations were constructed using their data, while the other half were 
constructed using the data from another person. Participants were asked to press a response button whenever the arm of the figure 
reached the peak of each “up” movement, and synchronisation accuracy was measured. Subjects completed 4 blocks of 40 trials each.
Results: Timing error was calculated as the time difference between the button presses and the peak of each up movement. We found 
a significant main effect of Authorship (self, other) [F (1, 57) = 4.800, p < .05], with timing error significantly lower when synchronising 
with “self” [M = 109 ms, SD = 6.667] animations compared to “other” [M = 122 ms, SD = 7.257] animations. There was no effect of 
Block [F (3, 57) = .318, p > .05] or an Authorship × Block interaction [F (3, 57) = .702, p > .05].
Conclusions: As predicted, superior synchronisation was observed when participants synchronised with their own actions. This finding 
supports the emulator hypothesis of joint action coordination, whereby actions are planned in advance using information from the 
observerʼs motor system.
Cognitive web search model as multitasking, cognitive coordination, and cognitive shifts
Du, Jia Tina Amanda Spink
Faculty of Science and Technology, 
Queensland University of Technology
jia.du@student.qut.edu.au
Web search is a complex behaviour involving usersʼ cognitive efforts. Studies show that people often conduct Web searches including 
more than one related or unrelated topic and switch between them. Web searchers also allocate and coordinate cognitive resources 
among tasks, and experience shifts in cognitive, problem and knowledge states. This paper reports preliminary results from a study 
modeling the interplay between multitasking, cognitive coordination, and cognitive shifts during Web search. Study participants 
conducted three Web searches on personal information problems. Data collection techniques included pre- and post-search 
questionnaires; think-aloud protocols, Web search logs, observation, and post-search interviews. Key findings include: (1) users Web 
searches included multitasking, cognitive shifting, and cognitive coordination processes, (2) cognitive coordination is the hinge linking 
multitasking and cognitive shifting that enables Web search construction, (3) cognitive shift levels determine the process of cognitive 
coordination, and (4) cognitive coordination is interplay of task, mechanism and strategy levels that underpin multitasking and task 
switching. An initial model depicts the interplay between multitasking, cognitive coordination, and cognitive shifts during Web search. 
This study highlights the nexus role of human cognitive coordination processes during Web searching. Without cognitive coordination, 
neither multitasking Web search nor cognitive shifting can occur, and information retrieval interaction has not been effective. This study 
is important for understanding and modelling the cognitive processes during Web searching. Increased understanding of Web search 








The present study investigated whether the idiosyncratic bias towards inclusive disjunction (ʻA or B, even bothʼ ) or exclusive 
disjunction (ʻA or B, not bothʼ ), reported in studies such as Chevallier et al. (2008), is the result of speakersʼ allowing or rejecting logical 
inference rules. A second goal of the study was to determine whether the domain of application for these rules is discrete or dense. 
What was found is that research participants biased towards an inclusive interpretation were also allowing the inference rules ʻA, 
therefore A or Bʼ, ʻA, therefore A and Bʼ, ʻA and B, therefore A and C and B and Dʼ and ʻA or B, therefore A and C or B and Dʼ; the 
participants who rejected them, all favoured an exclusive interpretation. Moreover, participants who allowed or rejected inference rules 
in the discrete domain, as above (containing individual terms like ʻAʼ  or ʻBʼ), were also found to respectively allow or reject the following 
rules in the dense domain, targeting part-whole relations: ʻsome A, therefore all Aʼ, ʻsome A and some B, therefore all A and all Bʼ and 
ʻsome A or some B, therefore all A or all Bʼ. Based on these findings, the conclusion is reached that speakers apply inference rules in 
both the discrete and the dense domains, suggesting that the corresponding semantic scales and their implicatures (ʻA or B, but not 
bothʼ and ʻsome A, but not all Aʼ) are activated together, in keeping with the Universal Density of Measurement theory (Fox & Hackl, 
2006). The results also confirm Braine & Rumain (1981)ʼs prediction that speakers use inference rules rather than truth tables in 
interpreting disjunction; ʻinclusivityʼ and ʻexclusivityʼ  may be epiphenomenal.
The utility of different object properties in change detection.
Favelle, Simone Stephen Palmisano
Universtiy of Wollongong
simone_favelle@uow.edu.au
It is important to look at the combined effects of lighting and view direction on face recognition, as both depend on the three-
dimensional shape of the face and are in some ways analogous. For example, both pitch rotations and the change between top and 
bottom lighting involve rotations about the left-right axis, just as yaw and left/right lighting involved rotations about the vertical axis. We 
investigated identity matching performance across 45° rotations of the light source or the face about pitch or yaw with all images 
shown either upright or inverted. Upright images were better matched than inverted images, showing that image differences are not 
sufficient to explain performance. This is consistent with the idea that the use of class-based knowledge of upright faces is important 
for this task. The effects of face and light rotation interacted and depended on the axis of rotation. Overall, rotations about pitch 
impaired performance more than rotations about yaw, and changes in view impaired performance more than changes in light. The 
interaction between face and light rotation was such that if both rotated in the same direction, equivalent to a rotation of the camera in 
the opposite direction, performance was as good or better than if the face alone rotated. This was particularly pronounced for pitch 
rotations, with a clear pitch up advantage but only when the light rotated in the same direction. The results are interpreted in terms of 
image, surface and three-dimensional models based accounts of face matching.
Reconceptualising expertise; How an investigation into the experience of music performance for the expert musician can 




At first glance, an investigation into the experience of music performance for the expert musician may not appear to hold relevance for 
the domain of cognitive science. This is not the case. Attempting to understand what the experience of music performance is like for an 
expert musician sheds light on a number of key areas in cognitive science. This paper will illustrate how examining an expert 
musicianʼs experience of music performance has the potential to enrich current understandings of expertise in cognitive science.
What is the experience of music performance like for an expert musician? How are some expert musicians able to communicate 
powerful emotion so effectively and what is this like for the musician at the level of phenomenology? Some theorists (Beilock, 2003; 
Csikszentmihaly, 1991; Dejours, 2004; Dreyfus, 2002; Sudnow, 1978) suggest that expert performance is an embodied process 
whereby the expert is completely absorbed in ʻsmooth copingʼ, guided entirely by their body to respond in a flow-like manner to all 
situational demands. Other theorists (Chaffin, Imreh & Crawford, 2002; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995) accord much more importance to 
top-down processes, overarching cognitive structures and highly refined retrieval strategies when attempting to explain the execution 
of expertise in a performance domain. 
As will be demonstrated, a more complex understanding of expertise is sorely needed. In line with the paradigm of Embodied Cognition 
(Clark, 1997; Gallagher, 2005; Hutchins, 1995; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Rowlands, 1999), this understanding needs to integrate and 
dynamicise the  mind-body dichotomy that has plagued past understandings of expertise, therefore leaving room for both higher-order 
planning structures AND bodily guided action in expert performance. Drawing specific inspiration from Lemanʼs (2008) work in 
Embodied Music Cognition, Hochshildʼs (1983) research into emotional labour and preliminary data from interviews carried out by the 
author of this paper, possible components of a new conceptualisation of expertise, richer than that which cognitive science currently 
has to offer, will be outlined and explored.
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Expertise and the own-age bias in face recognition: Evidence for the enhanced configural processing of own age faces
Harrison, Virginia Graham Hole
University of Sussex
vmh20@sussex.ac.uk
Previous research has shown that we recognise faces similar in age to ourselves better than older or younger faces (e.g. Anastasi & 
Rhodes, 2006).  Harrison and Hole (2009) suggest that this effect may be mediated by contact with the different age groups and thus 
may be the result of differential expertise.  Two studies examined whether perceptual expertise, reflected in enhanced configural 
processing for own-age faces, is involved in this own-age bias.  Experiment 1 investigated the ability of children, and two groups of 
young adults with different amounts of contact to children, to remember upright and inverted facial photographs of 7-10 and 18-25 year 
olds. While the children and low-contact adults showed greater accuracy and more inversion impairment for own-age faces, the high-
contact adults exhibited the opposite pattern. Experiment 2 tested undergraduates' sensitivity to small configural changes to both own- 
and other age faces. Participants were most accurate at identifying alterations made to faces belonging to their own age group. These 
results support a perceptual expertise explanation of the own-age bias. 
Acquiring expertise in the mental manipulation of visual images: Visual brain activity associated with extensive practice in a 
mental rotation task.
Johnson, Blake Alexander Provost, Scott Brown, Andrew Heathcote
Macquarie University
bjohnson@maccs.mq.edu.au
We examined the effects of practice on event-related brain responses measured during performance of a Shepard-Metzler mental 
rotation task. 64 channel event-related potentials and 160 channel event-related magnetic fields were measured concurrently from 12 
participants before practice, and again  after a week of intensive daily practice with the mental rotation task. T1-weighted magnetic 
resonsance imaging structural brain scans were obtained from all participants in a separate session. Pre-practice reaction times 
increased monotonically as a function of angular misorientation of the visual stimuli, confirming that participants were performing a 
mental rotation of the images.  Post-practice reaction times were flat, indicating that subjects were no longer using a mental rotation 
strategy. Practice-related changes in  late-latency cognitive brain responses are described in a companion report at this meeting 
(Provost et al., 2009). An unexpected finding was that an index of relatively early visual cortical processing, the P100 component,was 
markedly enhanced in the post-practice ERPs. These results suggest that extensive practice with a visual imagery task involves plastic 
changes in visual cortex at quite early stages of visual  processing. These changes may facilitate subsequent attentional and cognitive 
processing of visual features. We conclude that the acquisition of expertise in spatial imagery is supported by changes to multiple 
stages of brain processing. 
As time goes by: Temporal construal moderates the effects of category variability on belief revision
Kearney, Lauren Brett Hayes
University of New South Wales
lkearney@psy.unsw.edu.au
Two experiments examined the effect of category variability on updating of category beliefs. In Experiment 1, participants learned 
about categories via exposure to numerical distributions of category attributes. These distributions had the same mean value, but had 
either high or low levels of variability around the mean. After category learning participants were shown new category exemplars that 
contradicted the acquired beliefs (i.e. drawn from a sample with higher or lower means) and were asked to re-estimate the category 
central tendency. Importantly, this new data was purportedly sampled ten years after the original sample. Beliefs about the attributes of 
low variable categories were more strongly influenced by disconfirming information than beliefs about the attributes of high variable 
categories. In Experiment 2, the same procedure was followed except that half the participants were told that the training data and the 
new, contradictory exemplars were drawn from the same sample (i.e. no ten year interval between training and test exemplars). Under 
these conditions, beliefs about the attributes of the categories were still influenced by disconfirming information, but the effect of 
variability was attenuated. This suggests that temporal construal is an important factor in determining responses to disconfirming 
information. The results are discussed in terms of Bayesian models of belief revision.
Does looking down influence our mood?
McDowall, John Amy Lovegrove
Victoria University of Wellington,New 
Zealand
john.mcdowall@vuw.ac.nz
Meier and Robinson (2004, 2006) had subjects evaluate affectively toned words that were shown to them either at the top or the 
bottom of a computer monitor. Reaction time to evaluate positively toned words was faster when they appeared at the top of the screen 
and slower when at the bottom. Negatively toned words were evaluated faster when they appeared at the bottom of the screen.  The 
present study was an attempt to extend this finding to non-verbal stimuli i.e. scenes taken from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS).  A between group design had three groups of subjects affectively evaluate previously normed neutral words appearing 
either at the top only, middle only, or bottom only, of a computer screen. At the conclusion of the study subjects evaluated their own 
mood. There was no difference in the overall affective evaluation of the stimuli as a function of screen position but those subjects 
evaluating stimuli at the bottom of the screen rated their mood at completion as being lower than those evaluating stimuli at the middle 








When two targets are presented within 500msec of each other in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), the accuracy of second target 
identification is significantly reduced; a phenomenon termed the attentional blink. Recent studies have reported that children and adults 
with dyslexia exhibit inferior performance on attentional blink tasks; however some ambiguity remains as to the nature of these deficits 
and how they relate to reading difficulties. The current study aimed to address these issues by examining attentional blink deficits in 
relation to different aspects of reading impairment. Twenty-two children with dyslexia were compared to 22 children with normally-
developing reading skills on an attentional blink task with results indicating the dyslexia group exhibited impaired performance 
regardless of the temporal lag between targets. These deficits appeared tied to general dual-target RSVP performance rather than a 
prolonged attentional blink and differences between groups fell below significance when the influence of general performance factors 
were controlled for. A review of previous studies exploring the AB in dyslexia is consistent with this conclusion with no evidence (group-
lag interaction) for a prolonged AB in dyslexia.
Neuro-motor coordination in developmental disorders: new research directions
Ng, Tommy Blake Johnson, Jon Brock, Paul Sowman
Macquarie University
tng@maccs.mq.edu.au
Developmental disorders including attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and dyspraxia 
adversely affect the normal development of a growing child. The anomalies during ontogeny are characterized by a heterogeneous 
combination of cognitive, affective, and motor dysfunction, of which the latter appears to be the common denominator. Research into 
the development of motor function in these disorders reveals a central poverty of neuro-motor coordination. The neuro-motor deficit, 
namely ʻclumsinessʼ, may be among the earliest symptoms of the disorders but very little is known about the neurological bases of the 
problem. We investigated the mechanisms that underlie this problem by measuring brain activity from seven healthy subjects with 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) and electroencephalography (EEG) in a bimanual load-lifting task. Subjects were asked to maintain 
the elbow joint at a desired angle when a weight was placed on the forearm. In an imposed condition, the experimenter lifted the 
weight unexpectedly and an upward deflection of the forearm occurred as a result. In a voluntary condition, the subject lifted the weight 
with the other hand and forearm deflection was attenuated. Current analyses are aimed at elucidating the system of motor control 
mechanisms involved in anticipatory postural adjustments by comparing brain activation patterns elicited in the two conditions. Future 
work will compare these anticipatory control systems in normal and autistic samples. This program of work will establish a rigorous 
experimental paradigm for studying neural mechanisms of high-level motor control in clinical populations.
Acquiring expertise in the mental manipulation of visual images: Cognitive brain activity associated with extensive practice 
in a mental rotation task.
Provost, Alex Blake Johnson, Scott Brown, Andrew Heathcote
The University of Newcastle
alexander.provost@newcastle.edu.au
The ability to imagine the rotation of an object, referred to as mental rotation, is fundamental to many aspects of cognitive functioning. 
The capacity to improve this skill through training is important for education in a range of disciplines. Theories from both cognitive 
science and brain sciences propose that when participants repeatedly practice with the same stimuli improvements in mental rotation 
occur not by developing this specific spatial ability but result from a shift in strategy to categorisation. This change in strategy 
corresponds to the development of automaticity, whereby responses are difficult to inhibit and resistant to distraction. We examined the 
effects of practice on the development of automaticity by collecting reaction time (RT) and event-related brain responses during 
performance of a Shepard-Metzler mental rotation task. Brain activity was measured with concurrent electroencephalography (EEG) 
and Magnetoencephalography (MEG), from 12 participants before and again after practice with the same stimuli. Analysis of pre-
practice RT showed a monotonic increase as a function of angular mismatch between a constant standard and the test image, 
consistent with participants mentally rotating the images. Every participantʼs mean RT and variability in RT showed a marked decrease 
with practice, while accuracy remained high, and their performance quickly became insensitive to rotation angle. Brain responses 
measured prior to training showed an orientation-sensitive component over the parietal cortex at approx 300-500 ms post stimulus, an 
established electrophysiological marker of mental rotation. Post-practice brain responses lacked this component and had an enhanced 
and earlier latency P300 component compared to pre-practice responses. These results show that practice-related changes in 
cognitive strategy are associated with robust changes in measures of cognitive brain activity. 
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1+1 = 3: Factors influencing error detection with mathematical and reasoning problems
Pymont, Carly Michael Smithson
Department of Psychology, Australian 
National University
carly.pymont@anu.edu.au
Mathematics and reasoning are often assumed to be dependent, however, little research has directly examined whether task 
performance in these domains is comparable. Further, the ability to detect errors is important in both mathematics and reasoning tasks, 
as correct problem-solving involves monitoring of performance. The current study aimed to explore the relationship between error 
detection in these two domains and the factors which influence error detection performance. It was hypothesized that performance on 
the two domains would be related and that confidence would positively correlate with performance, particularly for mathematical error 
detection. The reasoning task used was the Wason card task. Despite being well-researched, the actual mechanisms used when 
solving the Wason are still debated. Hence, task manipulations were included to determine whether matching of the rule
and cards was likely to be occurring and whether the two forms of the task, social and abstract, interact. Mathematical stimuli were 
from four areas of mathematics; algebraic calculation, mathematical statements, fractions and power calculations.
Undergraduate students (N = 74, Mean age = 18.94) were instructed to detect errors in a series of randomly presented correct and 
erroneous stimuli. Stimuli were presented in three randomly-ordered blocks; abstract Wason, social Wason and mathematical. 
Contrary to predictions, performance on the Wason and mathematical tasks was not related. Ratings of confidence, ability and 
enjoyment of mathematical andlogic tasks were related to each other and formed a single factor through factor analysis. Similarly, as 
hypothesised confidence predicted performance for the mathematical tasks but not for the Wason. For mathematical error detection 
tasks the area of mathematics was found to interact with the stimulitype (correct vs. erroneous), such that for the harder areas 
participants were more accurate at detecting erroneous stimuli than correct. For the Wason the form of the rule had an effect on ability 
to detect errors: rules of the form “If P then not-Q” had the greatest success rate and “If P then Q” the worst, suggesting that matching 
may be occurring. Wording also interacted with the context of the task and the stimuli type.
Finally following from previous research the scores for the social contract version of the Wason were greater than those for the abstract 
version. Further, it was found that block presentation order did not influence performance, suggesting that simply completing the social 
task does not facilitate performance in the abstract task. Overall, these results suggest that mathematical problems and deductive 
reasoning as measured by the Wason are not related even though confidence on mathematics and logic/reasoning is. Further 
confidence predicts error detection in mathematics while the task type,context and wording are important for the Wason.
Auditory processing in the dyslexic brain
Reid, Melanie Blake W. Johnson, Genevieve McArthur, Anne Castles, Michael Hautus
Macquarie University
melanie.reid@mq.edu.au
A prominent theory of dyslexia states that it is caused, at least in part, by neural deficits in processing auditory information. We 
examined brain responses of dyslexic children to sounds designed to challenge the temporal processing capabilities of the auditory 
system. The sounds were 500 ms duration broadband noises containing a binaurally embedded pitch. Event-related brain responses 
were measured with simultaneous 64-channel electroencephalography (EEG) and 160-channel magnetoencephalography (MEG). 
During the brain measurements children viewed a video and ignored the acoustic stimuli.  Initial data from five dyslexic children shows 
large amplitude auditory responses at a latency of about 100 ms. Children tolerated the experimental environment well and we were 
able to collect data from all subjects for 800 trials over a 40 minute experimental session. This resulted in auditory responses with a 
high signal-to-noise ratio, important because childrenʼs auditory responses tend to be considerably noisier and more variable than 
those of adults. Further data collection will allow us to compare auditory brain responses in dyxlexic and age-matched control children. 
In a bind! What do change detection tasks tell us about visual working memory representations?
Roberts, Reece Michael C. Corballis, Anthony Lambert
Research Centre for Cognitive 
Neuroscience, The University of Auckland
rrob042@aucklanduni.ac.nz
Cognitive psychologists investigating the nature of visual working memory (VWM) representations can roughly be divided into two 
camps: some propose VWM representations to be integrated wholes that store all the relevant visual features associated with a 
remembered item (e.g. Luck and Vogel, 1997), while others posit the existence of parallel visual feature stores, each specific to a 
different visual feature dimension (e.g. Wheeler and Treisman, 2001). A common paradigm used to study this question is the change 
detection task (CDT), which requires participants, after being presented with two images separated by a delay period, to determine if a 
change has occurred. A striking feature of this task is the effect the nature of the second display — whether it is a single item or a multi-
item display — has on the pattern of results. Namely, when presenting multiple items in the second display, participants are worse at 
detecting binding changes (the swapping of visual features between items) than novel changes (the addition of novel visual features to 
the second display). This “binding deficit” is, however, absent when presenting a single item in the second display.
Given these differential effects, it is difficult to determine whether performance in a CDT is due to the nature of VWM representations or 
to the effect the second display has on VWM storage. One way to circumvent this potential confound is to present a retro-active cue — 
an informative cue which allows participants to orient attention to a single item in VWM —between the first and second display in a 
CDT. Using such a modified CDT, I present results which provide evidence against an “integrated wholes” account of VWM 
representations. Instead, the results are explained well by accounts of VWM storage involving independent visual feature stores, with 
additional processes or representations responsible for maintaining binding information in VWM. 
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ʻRiskyʼ decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task are associated with trait impulsivity: Evidence from cognitive model parameters 
and cross-task correlation
Upton, Daniel J. J. C. Stout
Monash University
daniel.upton@med.monash.edu.au
Recent studies emphasise the need to compliment behavioural measures of Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) performance with other 
approaches such as cognitive modeling, cross-task correlations and neuroimaging. These approaches can facilitate more accurate 
interpretation regarding how decision task behaviour reflects risk-taking and attentional biases, as well as learning and memory ability. 
In the present study, cross-task correlations between the IGT and Balloon Analogue Response Task (BART), which is a well validated 
measure of risk-taking, were conducted to investigate the link between trait impulsivity and risk taking in a young sample performing 
the IGT (mean age: 20.5 years). In addition, the Expectancy-Valence Learning (EVL) model was used to investigate the cognitive and 
motivational processes contributing to decision task performance in low and high trait impulsivity. Given that high trait impulsivity is 
associated with ʻriskyʼ behaviour, it was expected that the high trait impulsivity group (HI, n = 31), when compared to the low trait 
impulsivity group (LI, n = 32), would make more selections from ʻriskyʼ deck B in the IGT, and would display higher risk taking 
behaviour in the BART. A positive correlation was also expected between ʻriskyʼ deck B selections and risk-taking in the BART for both 
LI and HI groups, providing evidence for a similar processes underlying ʻriskyʼ behaviour across tasks. For the modeling analysis, we 
expected EVL model parameter estimates of attention to loss and choice consistency to be lower in the HI group, reflecting low 
sensitivity to loss and impulsive decision process in individuals with high trait impulsivity. As predicted, the HI group made more 
selections from ʻriskyʼ deck B than the LI group. Cross-task correlations indicated that ʻriskyʼ deck B selections and risk-taking in the 
BART reflect different processes in the HI group. In contrast a positive correlation was found between ʻriskyʼ deck B selections and risk 
taking in the BART for the LI group. EVL model parameters indicated that the HI group were less sensitive to negative outcomes, but 
choice consistency parameter estimates were not different between LI and HI groups. Taken together, these results indicate that 
individuals with high trait impulsivity take more risks in complex decision situations, and that this may be related to their low sensitivity 
to loss.
How space gets into language: Evidence from language acquisition
Ursini, Francesco-Alessio Stephen Crain
MACCS centre for Cognitive Science
fursini@maccs.mq.edu.au
There is a dearth of research regarding expressions of space in language, or prepositions (e.g. “in”, “at”, “from”, “to”). Some theoretical 
proposals offer evidence that their ʻcoreʼ function is to express inclusion between two or more objects, which can be stable or changing 
over time. In this latter case, it can be a consequence or a premise of the change (Cresswell 1978, Parsons 1990, Kracht 2002, Zwarts 
2005). In English, four prepositions capture these notions, as the examples (1)-(4) show:
(1) All the trains are in the shed (necessary inclusion; stable)
(2) All the trains are at the shed (possible inclusion; stable)
(3) All the trains walk to the shed (possible inclusion; consequence)
(4) All the trains move from the shed (necessary inclusion; premise)
In Language acquisition, there is a dearth of research on the acquisition of prepositions, with some works claiming that children access 
an adult-like reading once they learn these words (Stringer 2005,2006) while others claim that children interpret prepositions in a 
substantially non-adult way, since they are assumed not to understand such notions (Tomasello 1992, Bowerman & Choi 2005). 
     In this poster I present evidence that children, can properly interpret sentences (1)-(4) once they learn the meaning of “in”,  “at”, “to” 
and “from”, hence offering an argument in favour of the continuum hypothesis (Pinker 1984). 
       I present data from one longitudinal study (August 2008-June 2009) focused on one Australian-speaking child, Terrence P. (age 
3;1-3;11), who has been interviewed and recorded on videotape on a fortnight basis, in 1-hour long sessions, for a total of 18 sessions 
(except for holiday periods). This child has been tested by using two tasks: the act-out task and the truth-value judgment task (Crain & 
Thornton (1999)).   
        In the act-out task, reserved to “dynamic” prepositions, the experimenter used a puppet (Godzilla) to ask the child to carry out a 
task, e.g. Godzilla asked to the child to take the trains to the shed. 
    In the truth-value judgment task, Godzilla asked instead whether it was true or note that trains went to the shed, once the task was 
over. For the act-out task, the task is considered “complete” when the child complies to the request, “fail” when the child claimed to 
have completed the sentence before time, and “other” when the child got distracted.  
    For the truth-value judgment task, the task is considered “true” when the child accepted a sentence as a true description of the 
events, or rejected it when it is not. It is considered “false” when the child accepted a sentence which is not a correct description of the 
events, and “other” when the child did not answer or got distracted.
    I present the results of the study, which suggest that children understand the “core” prepositions in an adult-like way, offering support 
to the continuity hypothesis.
(Numbers are in percentages. Act Out task:  “in”: -; “at”: -; “to”: 64,1/0/35,9; ”from”: 78,7/3/18,3. Truth-value judgment task: “in”: 80/6/14; 
“at” 79,2/9,2/11,8; “to”: 77,6/7/18,4; ʻfrom”: 77,7/4,4/17,7).
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The development of maladaptive schemas
Warburton, Wayne Doris McIlwain, David Cairns
Macquarie University
waynew@psy.mq.edu.au
Enduring knowledge structures about oneself (e.g., whether one is lovable) and oneʼs world (e.g., whether others can be trusted) begin 
to develop very early in life. Apart from providing a framework through which to view events in oneʼs life, these schemas, when 
triggered, provide a cognitive shortcut that allows rapid (and often automatic) processing of familiar information and the production of 
linked action tendencies. Such schemas become maladaptive when they elicit automatic responses that consistently lead to 
undesirable outcomes. These ʻearly maladaptive schemasʼ are linked to a range of negative life outcomes including low self-regard, 
relationship difficulties, depression, suicide, personality disorders, and other forms of mental illness. Therapies based on changing 
early maladaptive schemas have assumed an origin in harsh and punitive early parenting, but there has been little research that has 
examined this proposition directly. In the first study, 443 students provided recollections of their early parenting experiences and were 
then tested for various maladaptive schemas. It was found that (1) participants who recollected having experienced one type of harsh 
or abusive behaviour in their early home usually remembered having experienced many, (2) participants who had one maladaptive 
schema tended to have many, and (3) harsh and abusive behaviour from the mother had a stronger effect on schema development 
than similar levels of harsh and abusive behaviour from the father. In the second study, a subset of 71 participants was tested for a 
specific schema that links aggressive responding to a perceived loss of control over oneʼs environment. Each participant was exposed 
to an aversive noise over which they had no control and measured for aggressive responding using the hot sauce paradigm of 
Lieberman et al., 1999. The strength of the ʻcontrol-aggression schemaʼ robustly predicted the degree of aggressive responding. 
Interestingly, recollections of harsh and abusive parenting by the mother but not the father predicted the degree of aggression, even 
though harsh and abusive parenting by both predicted the strength of the schema. The implications for theories of schema 
development are discussed.
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